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**INDONESIA-PORTUGAL:
FIVE HUNDRED YEARS OF HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP**

Centro Português de Estudos de Sudeste Asiático
Portuguese Centre for the Study of Southeast Asia (CEPESA)

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Apart and together: the Portuguese and the Dutch as neighbours in and around Timor in the nineteenth century

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Both Portugal and the Netherlands were colonial powers in insular Southeast Asia, although there was a great difference in the importance of the territories they controlled there, not only in size, but also regarding the role these had in the respective colonial empires. The Portuguese focused since the nineteenth century on the vast zones they claimed in Africa, while the Netherlands East Indies were by far the most significant part of the Dutch colonial realm.

This paper outlines some episodes of the history of the Timor area, the place where Portuguese and Dutch rub elbows.¹ The focus will be on the mid-nineteenth century, when they contractually agreed on these territories under their respective control. This was thus a period in which the two had necessarily more contact with each other. However, it was not merely at the negotiation table that the two powers met, but also in the practice and the ideology of colonial rule.

The two sides of the border

In the nineteenth century, the Netherlands, Portugal and England defined in several treaties between them the claims they allowed each other on parts of the Southeast Asian archipelago. The first contract between England and the Netherlands was entered into in 1824,² followed by later treaties in 1871, 1891 and 1896. Portugal and the Netherlands concluded agreements regarding the Timor area, the most important being that of 1859.

In most of these territories, the colonial powers had at the time of those contracts just a sort of formal overlordship, recognized as such in agreements with local rulers.

¹ BRON, H.O. – "Where Dutch and Portuguese rub elbows", *Stuyver's Monthly*, 4, 2, 1923, pp. 99-102.

² The Treaty of London or 'Londens Tractaat'. See LOCHER-SCHOLTEN – *Sumatrans sultanaat en koloniale staat; De relatie Djambi-Batavia (1830-1907) en het Nederlandse imperialisme*, Leiden, KITLV Uitgeverij, 1994, p. 44.

As Afonso de Castro, governor of Portuguese Timor around 1860, put it: 'We ought to govern the chiefdoms as sovereigns, however we are in effect simple suzerains.'³ It would take until about 1914, and involve a great deal of military force, until effective control was attained in all zones of the archipelago. In western Timor, the Dutch imposed themselves through their military expeditions of 1905-06.⁴ The Portuguese campaigns in eastern Timor and Oikusi had their high point around the turn of the century, with the last great, and definitive, military action taking place in 1911-1912.

Before the treaties with the Dutch of the mid-nineteenth century, the Portuguese had claims to parts of Timor, Flores, Solor, Adonara, Lomblen, Pantar and Alor. On Timor, the Portuguese had their seat of administration in Dili, and small trade posts along the north coast, in Manatutu and Batugade.⁵ The Dutch had their seat in Kupang and controlled a small coastal area on its Bay, mainly inhabited by people from the islands of Roti and Savu. Furtheron, they had a post in Atapupu on the central northern coast.

Especially the Dutch were keen on a simplification of this territorial map, up to the point of a termination of the Portuguese presence in the zone. G.A.G.Ph. van de Capellen, the first Governor General after the English interregnum⁶ suggested the zones claimed by the Portuguese to be transferred to the Netherlands against a financial compensation. This idea would persist in the subsequent decades.⁷ The proximity of Timor to Australia, a British colony, made the Dutch watchful. They were apprehensive that Portugal, a long-standing ally of England, would cede some area on or near Timor as a place of supply for a potential colony in the Northern Territories.⁸ Furtheron, the jigsaw-puzzle constellation of areas claimed by respectively Dutch and Portuguese led to confusion and clashes between the populations. This culminated in 1847, when the Dutch felt forced to send a man-of-war.⁹ On both sides the wish to create some order on the map increased, and negotiations took place in 1851.¹⁰

The draft treaty agreed in that same year stirred the feelings in the parliaments in both mother countries. In Portugal, the negotiator Lopes de Lima, Governor of Dili, was strongly censured and even arrested for having acted without consultation. There was indignation about the clause by which Portugal ceded its claims to Flores and the other islands, except Timor (and Ataúro), against an indemnization of 200,000 guilders. After Portugal's recent loss of Brasil, a further decrease of its overseas territories through what was called an outright sale went down badly in Lisbon.¹¹ In the Netherlands, the objections of the parliamentarians were different but not less characteristic of the major official concerns of the nation. Fear was expressed for the freedom of religion of the Protestants in the Central Timorese Maubara, which would come under Portuguese rule.¹²

The treaty became subject of negotiations again,¹³ and was in 1859 ratified, in a version not very different from that of 1851. The agreement still left a lot of doubts, in part due to the lack of knowledge about Timor's interior. The Timorese realms of the border area¹⁴ were also unruly, now that the reach of the authority of their chiefs was delimited using geographical criteria. In Southeast Asian tradition, territoriality was a minor principle for defining the power and the scope of a leader. It was the networks of people that were decisive.¹⁵

Effective control by the Europeans was still a long time away in Timor and, as the nationalist Alfred Russel Wallace observed in 1861, '[t]he people retain their independence in a great measure, and both dislike and despise their would-be rulers, whether Portuguese or Dutch'.¹⁶ The treaty was adapted several times in minor aspects, especially regarding the status of the enclaves. The last version of the treaty was ratified in 1914 by the Interna-

3 CASTRO, Afonso de – *As possessões portuguesas na Oceania*, Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional, 1867.

4 North Central Timor would be fully submitted only in 1915. See SCHULTE NORDHOLT, H. G. – *The political system of the Atom of Timor*, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1971, pp. 184-185.

5 KOLFF, D.H. – *Reize door den wechtig bekenden zuidoeligen Molukschen archipel en langs de geheel onbekende Zuidwest kust van Nieuw-Guinea, gedaan in de jaren 1825 en 1826*, Amsterdam, Beyersick, 1828, p. 44.

6 During the Napoleonic period; see about this episode RICKLEFS, M.C. – *A History of Modern Indonesia: c. 1300 to the present*, Houndmills, Macmillan, 1981, pp. 106-110.

7 HEYMAN, Albertus – *De Timor-tractaten (1859 en 1893)*, Leiden, Van Doesburgh, 1895, p. 18.

8 GUNN, Geoffrey C. – *Timor Loro Sae 500 anos*, Macau, Livros do Oriente, 1999, pp. 157-158.

9 HEYMAN, A. – *De Timor-tractaten...*, pp. 19-20. See also René PÉLISSIER, *Timor en guerre. Le crocodile et les Portugais (1847-1913)*, Orgeval, 1996, p. 28.

10 HEYMAN, A. – *De Timor-tractaten...*, pp. 21-22.

11 SCHLICHER, Monika – *Portugal in Ost-Timor – Eine kritische Untersuchung zur portugiesischen Kolonialgeschichte in Ost-Timor 1850 bis 1912*, Hamburg, Abera-Verlag, 1996, p. 115-118; PÉLISSIER, R. – *Timor en guerre...*, pp. 33-37.

12 HEYMAN, A. – *De Timor-tractaten...*, p. 21.

13 About the eagerness of the Dutch for a settlement, in the framework of their general policy at the time, LOCHER-SCHOLTEN, *Sumatrans sultanaat en koloniale staat...*, p. 131.

14 PÉLISSIER (Timor en guerre...), pp.39-40) counted 18 realms.

15 See REID, Anthony – "Introduction", in: A Reid (ed.), *Slavery, bondage and dependency in Southeast Asia*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1983, pp. 1-43. Also Tamblah's concept of galactic polity, seems to be applicable to Timor (S.J. TAMBLAH, "The galactic polity in Southeast Asia", in *Culture, thought, and social action. An anthropological perspective*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1985, pp. 252-286). For an excellent account of (west) Timorese political organization, see SCHULTE NORDHOLT, H.G. – *The political system...*, op. cit.

16 WALLACE, Alfred Russel – *The Malay Archipelago: The land of the orang-utan and the bird of paradise; A narrative of travel, with studies of man and nature*, New York, Dover Publications, 1962 [First published in 1869], p. 151.

tional Court of Arbitration in The Hague and abolished all the enclaves, with the exception of Oikusi.¹⁷

Frequent contacts between the Portuguese and Dutch areas continued after the treaties of the 1850s, not only contacts on the island of Timor but also between Portuguese Timor and the surrounding islands. The Dutch-controlled population of Kisar acknowledged kin bonds with Timor, and regular visits occurred for social and commercial reasons, until this was prohibited by the Portuguese authorities. The fact that the Kisar inhabitants were Protestants seems to have influenced the Portuguese attitude.¹⁸ Kisar made of old tributes to Timor overlords,¹⁹ just as Solor, Adonara, and certain realms in Flores did, a practice which continued after the rearrangement of the territories.²⁰ In Alor, in the 1870s the Portuguese banner was still flying in three realms, and Alorese paid tribute to the lord of Liquiça in Portuguese Timor.²¹ Conversely, a *rajá* of Alor of old claimed tribute from Pulau Kambang or Ataúro, the islet opposite Dili which was assigned as being a Portuguese territory.²² Fishermen from Alor came frequently to Dili, and even had their own neighbourhood there, Kampung Alor. There were regular commercial contacts with the islands to the east, nowadays pertaining to the Indonesian province of the Southeast Moluccas: Wetar, Kisar, Leti and Tapa (Babar).²³ Commodities from these and other islands found their way to Timor, especially the eastern tip of the island.²⁴ This sort of trade occurred without official permission of the Portuguese. The frequent arrest and ill-treatment of inhabitants of Netherlands East Indies territory suspected of smuggling caused friction in the relationships between the colonial powers.²⁵

The authorities in Portuguese Timor however could not go too far in these issues, because the contact with the Netherlands East Indies was fundamental for the survival of

¹⁷ PÉLISSIER, R. – *Timor en guerre...*, pp. 301-302.

¹⁸ See for J.Th.Bik, Kisar – "Aanwekeningen nopens eene reis naar Bima, Timor, de Moluksche eilanden, Menado en Oost-Java, gedaan in 1821 met den hoogleeraar C.G.C. Reinwardt", *Tijdschrift van het Bataviaasch Genootschap voor Kunst en Wetenschappen* 14, 1864, p. 140; JONG Chr. G.F. de – and SELM, M. Van – "Verslag van een reis naar de Zuidkust en Zuidooster-eilanden (Zuid-Molukken) door Joseph Kam (1825)", *Documentatieblad voor de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse zending en overzee bezitken*, 6, 1, 1999, pp. 53-54; CORREIA, Armando Pinto – *Timor de lés a lés*, Lisboa, Agência Geral das Colónias, 1944, p. 319.

¹⁹ GUNN, G. C. – *Timor Loro Sae...*, p. 165.

²⁰ PÉLISSIER, R. – *Timor en guerre...*, p. 67.

²¹ *Koloniaal Verslag of 1877*; PÉLISSIER, R. – *Timor en guerre...*, p. 39.

²² *Koloniaal Verslag* 1880.

²³ PÉLISSIER, R. – *Timor en guerre...*, p. 211.

²⁴ CARDOSO, Luís – *Crónica de uma travessia. A época do Ai-Dik-Funam*, Lisboa, Publicações Dom Quixote, 1997, p. 56.

²⁵ HEYMAN, A. – *De Timor-tractaten...*, pp. 56-58.

their colony. Timor came during most of the nineteenth century under Macau, in the administrative and in the financial respect. Distances were far and transport facilities poor, and thus in case of shortage of money or equipment it was impossible to await the supply from Macau and an appeal had to be made to the neighbours.²⁶ Most of Timor's import and export transactions were with the Netherlands East Indies, and the important export of coffee went almost entirely to Makasar.²⁷ The rupiah (guilder) was the passable currency rather than the pataca, the official tender.²⁸ The opportunity to obtain guilders was, as Villiers suggests, a major reason for the smuggling of valuable commodities such as sandalwood²⁹ and, I suppose, coffee to West Timor.

Civilizing imperialism

The Portuguese man most linked to the 1859 treaty with the Netherlands was arguably Afonso de Castro (b. 1824-d. 1885).³⁰ He attended the negotiations as a secretary, and in 1859 assumed the function of Governor of Portuguese Timor. His bonds with Timor dated from 1854, when he was for the first time elected as a representative in the Portuguese parliament for the Timor constituency. It was quite usual that the parliamentarians who represented Portuguese colonies never set foot in their constituencies.

Like all Portuguese colonial officials, he was a military man, and had become a Governor in part due to his good relations with the regime of the time in Lisbon. What was particular about De Castro was his intellectual inclination. He had merits as a journalist and published various scholarly, well-written works about his experiences in Portuguese Timor, but also in several regions of the Netherlands East Indies. Twice he published in the periodical of the Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen, the learned society of which he was a member.³¹

²⁶ PÉLISSIER, R. – *Timor en guerre...*, p. 80; M. SCHLICHER, *Portugal in Oost-Timor...*, p. 69.

²⁷ CASTRO, A. de – "Une rébellion à Timor en 1861", *Tijdschrift van het Bataviaasch Genootschap* 13, p. 337; TELKAMP, Gerard J. – "The economic structure of an outpost in the Outer Islands in the Indonesian Archipelago: Portuguese Timor 1850-1975" in F. VAN ANRHOJF et al. (ed.), *Between people and statistics. Essays on Modern Indonesian History*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1979, p. 80; FONTOURA, Álvaro – *Relações mais importantes da colônia de Timor com outros territórios*, Lisboa, Agência Geral das Colónias, 1945, p. 17.

²⁸ TELKAMP, G. J. – "The economic structure of an outpost...", p. 80; VILLIERS, John – "The vanishing sandalwood of Portuguese Timor", *Itinerario* 7, 2, 1991, p. 91.

²⁹ VILLIERS, J. – "The vanishing sandalwood...", p. 91.

³⁰ SCHLICHER, M. – *Portugal in Oost-Timor...*, pp. 323-4.

³¹ The Batavia Society for Arts and Science was founded in 1778. On the title page of De Castro's book of 1867 the author is introduced as "membro da Sociedade de Sciencias e Artes de Batavia".

De Castro believed he had a mission in Timor, for the benefit of the whole Portuguese empire. An adequate policy for the colonies would make Portugal a prominent nation again, recovering from the decay of the preceding decades, marked by political instability and even a civil war, and by the independence of Brasil in 1822. For this loss, the remaining colonies might prove to be a compensation, if well administered, according to De Castro: "We have to reach out our hand to the colonies in misery, and through them retake our place among the foremost colonial powers. That is the rank allotted to Portugal by the two archipelagos of Cape Verde, Guinea, the two islands of São Tomé and Príncipe, the vast territory of Angola, Mozambique, Goa, Macao and Timor."³² Such statements heralded the imperialistic era, in which the western powers took control of large parts of the non-western world.

De Castro showed confidence in the beneficial effect of "the energetic measures of the motherland."³³ Within Southeast Asia, Portuguese Timor was a tiny spot, but this had its advantages, De Castro argued. According to his pious hopes, Portugal could now concentrate itself fully on the development of Timor.³⁴ But, for the moment, as he observed, "Timor vegetates, in Portuguese hands, in the most awful misery."³⁵ This contrasted sharply with the islands that were "in the skilful hands of the Dutch."³⁶ His own observation and contacts with Dutch people during his travels gave him a favourable impression of Dutch rule in the nearby zones. To save Timor, a regime should be introduced identical to the one which "rendered Java into the pearl of Oceania."³⁷

De Castro was deeply impressed by the ode to the Dutch colonial regime made by J.W.B. Money, in his book *Java, or how to manage a colony: Showing a practical solution of the questions now affecting British India*, published in two volumes in London, in 1861. This book influenced Belgian, British, German and French attitudes to colonialism³⁸ but also the Portuguese, at least as far as eastern Timor was concerned.

De Castro had, in particular, and just as Money, an admiration for the Cultuurstelsel (Cultivation System), which was applied in Java, West Sumatra and Minahasa – areas at the time under direct Dutch control. This arrangement meant the population was forced to

cultivate certain commercial crops, which then would have to be sold to the Dutch government against prices much below the market level. Although around 1860 in the Netherlands East Indies already serious doubts existed about the feasibility and profitability of the Cultuurstelsel, and it soon would be officially abolished,³⁹ in that same period it was much praised by other colonial powers. The British citizen Wallace found that people in Java under this system were not really poor, and had "acquired habits of steady industry and the art of scientific cultivation."⁴⁰ As a proof of the relative prosperity of the Javanese under the Cultuurstelsel he advanced their high population increase.⁴¹ According to Wallace, the Javanese had learned to work, and this meant that the Dutch had succeeded in what he considered precisely as one of the great challenges posed to the "higher races": they should teach other peoples the virtues of industriousness. In this way, he reflected the general ideas prevailing among the middle classes in Europe at the time, notably in Victorian England, for whom work, discipline and thrift were among the most outstanding values.

Wallace stayed for some months in Portuguese Timor during the period in which De Castro was in office, and probably the two have discussed these issues.⁴² De Castro's opinions are similar to Wallace's statements. He justified his ambitions to boost the agriculture in eastern Timor: "The population will increase, new wants will give birth to industries, and the civilization will flood with its light that land which until now was submerged in the darkness of *barbaria*."⁴³

Afonso de Castro saw the development of eastern Timor as closely linked to its coffee production. It was already well-known that the region brought forth an excellent quality, better than from anywhere else in the archipelago.⁴⁴ Besides, the world market price of coffee was rising in the early 1860s. De Castro planned to expand coffee cultivation at the

³⁹ For a concise description of the Cultuurstelsel including a chronology, see BOOMGAARD, Peter – *Children of the Colonial State: Population Growth and Economic Development in Java, 1795-1880*, Amsterdam, VU Press, 1989, pp. 34-36.

⁴⁰ WALLACE, A. R. – *The Malay Archipelago: The land of the orang-utan...*, pp. 73-74.

⁴¹ WALLACE, A. R. – *The Malay Archipelago: The land of the orang-utan...*, p. 75; P. BOOMGAARD (*Children of the Colonial State: Population Growth...*, pp. 166-171) estimates the increase of the population on Java between 1824 and 1880 as about 2.05% a year. However, the Dutch at the time assumed that the growth rate was much higher than this.

⁴² However, Wallace is, in general, negative about the Portuguese rule. See, for example, WALLACE, A. R. – *The Malay Archipelago: The land of the orang-utan...*, pp. 151-152; CASTRO, A. de – *As possessões portuguesas...*, p. 322, p. 362.

⁴³ CASTRO, A. de – *As possessões portuguesas...*, p. 362. The italics are Castro's

⁴⁴ CASTRO, A. de – "Une rébellion à Timor...", p. 394; WALLACE, A. R. – *The Malay Archipelago: The land of the orang-utan...*, p. 151.

³² CASTRO, A. de – "Une rébellion à Timor...", p. 395.

³³ CASTRO, A. de – "Une rébellion à Timor...", p. 393.

³⁴ CASTRO, A. de – "Une rébellion à Timor...", p. 394.

³⁵ CASTRO, A. de – *As possessões portuguesas...*, p. 47.

³⁶ CASTRO, A. de – *As possessões portuguesas...*, p. 47.

³⁷ CASTRO, A. de – *As possessões portuguesas...*, p. 47.

³⁸ WESSELIING, H.L. – "The impact of Dutch colonialism on European imperialism" in *Papers of the Dutch-Indonesian Historical Conference held at Noordwijkhorst*, pp. 4-16. Leiden/Jakarta, Bureau of Indonesian Studies, 1978.

example of Java and using the specific advice obtained in personal conversations in Batavia with Umbgrove, the Director of Cultures (the Department of Agriculture).⁴⁵ Accordingly, he intended to introduce forced cultivation, and a government monopoly on the produce, just as was the case in Java.⁴⁶ The coffee export from Portuguese Timor increased indeed considerably during De Castro's rule,⁴⁷ probably owing to a more appropriate care for the plants and a better organization of the transport. The increase of the yield was not yet a reflection of an extension of planting during his period in office, as coffee shrubs take several years to attain maturity.

However, De Castro and his successors were unsuccessful in implementing an arrangement similar to the Cultuurstelsel. This was due not only to the difference in natural conditions between Java and Portuguese Timor, but also to a different organization of the colonial government.⁴⁸ In Java and Minahasa the Dutch government created an appropriate infra-structure and obtained (or, imposed) the co-operation of the indigenous leaders.⁴⁹ The Timorese *liurai* (traditional leaders) who at times were called upon to supervise the coffee cultivation were ill-prepared.⁵⁰ The agriculture in eastern Timor was formally controlled by the Portuguese military commanders, but the posts in question were most of the time vacant.⁵¹

De Castro was well aware that the Cultuurstelsel could not be applied in Timor in the same way as in Java. According to him, a major obstacle was the backwardness of the Timorese population in comparison with the Javanese. Along the lines of the evolutionary ideas which were *en vogue* in that era and which were soon to be given a scientific aura by scholars like Wallace and the anthropologists of the first generation such as Bachofen and Morgan, he saw the Javanese in a stage somewhere between the savagery of the Timorese and the western civilization. The Javanese had a rather complex political organization, adhered to a world religion and had a script. Being not a barbarian people, the

Javanese in De Castro's view would be more inclined to work, and the conditions for a success of a policy like the Cultuurstelsel were more favourable than among the 'lazy' Timorese.⁵² But among these backward people, it would also be a greater challenge to introduce the western civilization, one of the high goals of their colonial policy as put forward by the Portuguese and other western powers.

The argument was that agricultural development would be a major means to effectuate civilization. However, less prominence was given to the fact that the type of agriculture imposed would in the first place benefit the colonizer. In the same way, the western powers deemed military actions and the subjection of peoples overseas instrumental in eradicating what was called barbarious customs and in bringing western civilization. According to the discourse in the key of the 'White Man's Burden', western superior civilization should be transmitted, and not too much attention should be paid to the means if they were somewhat harsh, or to any 'collateral damage' to the well-being of the population.⁵³

The Portuguese were very explicit about their 'missão civilizadora', and more than once referred to the glorious years of the Discoveries whose principal objectives were stated to have been the spread of the Christian Faith. Officially the Portuguese recognized no inferiority of the peoples in their colonies, as long as these displayed the Portuguese culture, more specifically the Roman Catholic religion and proficiency in the Portuguese language. The great ideal was the 'Portugalização'⁵⁴ of the colonies by means of the introduction of Christianity, of schools, Portuguese customs, language and western technology. In reality not much of this happened. The Portuguese who actually worked in the colonies had somewhat different ideas. As they repeatedly declared, the most important was teaching the natives to work: working according to norms set by the Portuguese and for objectives dictated by the Portuguese.⁵⁵

The bringing of civilization as an imperial duty was also proclaimed among other colonial powers, especially after the Conference of Berlin (1884-1885). As for the Dutch, their variant of imperialism has sometimes been called an 'Ethical Imperialism',⁵⁶ a somewhat cynical terminology. The 'Ethical Policy' was officially announced by the Dutch Queen

⁴⁵ CASTRO, A. de - *As possessões portuguesas ...*, pp. 417-420.

⁴⁶ R. PÉLISSIER, *Timor en guerre...*, p. 65.

⁴⁷ Statistics in CASTRO, A. de - *As possessões portuguesas ...*, pp. 347-350.

⁴⁸ CLARENCE-SMITH, W.G. - 'Planters and smallholders in Portuguese Timor in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries', *Indonesian Circle* 57, 1992, p. 17.

⁴⁹ SCHOUTEN, M.J.C. - *Leadership and social mobility in a Southeast Asian society: Minahasa, 1677-1983*, Leiden, KITLV Press, 1998, pp. 53-74.

⁵⁰ SCHLICHER, M. - *Portugal in Ost-Timor - Eine kritische...*, p. 156.

⁵¹ In the following years there were declines, due to the discontinuity in regional government and the almost incessant warfare. New projects were developed in the 1880s by Governor Lacerda Maia, but the person who really developed and extended coffee cultivation was Celestino da Silva, governor from 1894 to 1908. He set up private plantations and introduced a strict organization of labour. See CLARENCE-SMITH, W.G. - 'Planters and smallholders in Portuguese Timor...'

⁵² CASTRO, A. de - *As possessões portuguesas ...*, pp. 427-429, p. 322.

⁵³ LAWRENCE, James - *The rise and fall of the British Empire*, London, Abacus, 1997 [1994], pp. 184-216.

⁵⁴ VALLENDE, Paulo - 'O corpo e a busca de lugares de perfeição: escritas missionárias da África colonial portuguesa, 1930-60', *Etnográfica*, 1-1, 1997, p. 77.

⁵⁵ SCHLICHER, M. - *Portugal in Ost-Timor - Eine kritische...*, pp. 299-305; CASTELO, Cláudia, 'O modo português de estar no mundo', *O luso-tropicalismo e a ideologia colonial portuguesa (1933-1961)*, Porto, Edições Afrontamento, 1998, pp. 85-86.

⁵⁶ See LOCHER-SCHOUTEN, E. - *Sumatraans sultanaat en koloniale staat...*, p. 285.

Wilhelmina in 1901 but was in fact a more explicit formulation of a discourse that had existed for decades in the Netherlands, and an extension and acceleration of practices that had already begun. The stated intention of the Ethical Policy was to raise the well-being of the native population, by improving health care, schools, missions and agricultural conditions.

The hidden objective of this policy however was an increase in the effectiveness and profitability of colonial rule. The subjugation of the vast territory was on its way of accomplishment, and the handful of Dutch officials and soldiers were insufficient for controlling this. Indonesians were needed in the armed forces⁵⁷ and in the civil service, – Indonesians with the adequate western schooling. Moreover, the Dutch needed to foster goodwill in order to avoid unrest. In response to the «ethical» measures, the native population was expected to display a more loyal attitude as well as a higher economic output, to attain a higher standard of living and thus more demand for the products of Western enterprises. State intervention in so many aspects of native life would facilitate *de facto* political control. So, well-being and the preservation of order were tacitly interwoven.⁵⁸

The living together of the Portuguese and the Dutch in the Southeast Asian archipelago, after the official breaking apart of their territories, was characterized by a great amount of interdependence. The contacts between the indigenous populations of the two territories remained significant, and at the official level, the Portuguese in Timor were highly dependent on the Netherlands East Indies.

The great differences between the two powers (both as European states and regarding the way they ruled their colonies) have only been hinted at in this paper. There was also much they had in common, exactly because they both were European nations in which the educated people in the nineteenth century were influenced by the same sort of ideas, which they adapted to their own situation. Portugal and the Netherlands, both being imperialistic powers in their own way, used the same sort of ideology of bringing civilization to the backward peoples – not revealing the hidden agenda which aimed at a more effective control.

⁵⁷ In fact, Indonesians had made part of the Dutch colonial army since a long time, for example in the Diponegoro War of 1825-1830 (M.J.C. SCHOUTEN, *Leadership and social mobility*..., pp. 76-77). In 1905, the army counted 26,276 Indonesians and 15,866 Europeans (M.C. RICKLEFS, *A History of Modern Indonesia*..., pp. 138-139).

⁵⁸ See SCHOLTEN, M.J.C. – *Leadership and social mobility*..., p. 189; IOCHER-SCHOLTEN, Elisabeth – "Association in theory and practice: The composition of the regency council (ca 1910-1920)" in ANROOIJ, F. Van et al. (ed.), *Between people and statistics: Essays on Modern Indonesian History*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1979, p. 209.

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The Indonesian-Portuguese relationship: Politics and Diplomacy (1945-1965)

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Indonesia and Portugal have developed for decades a quite peculiar political and diplomatic relationship. The period analysed in this article begins with the proclamation of independence of Indonesia in 1945 and ends in 1965 marking the end of an era and the end of the political life of the man who had led Indonesia since the declaration of independence. This relationship was indeed special since the two countries shared a common border between East and West Timor. But it was also a *personal political relationship* which for two decades was embodied by the two same leaders: President Sukarno and António de Oliveira Salazar. What would those two men have in common? Nothing apparently. On the one hand there was this exuberant personage that was Sukarno, one of the most prominent figures of the third-world anti-colonial struggle, a globe-trotter, a Muslim, a lover of women and of life and on the other hand, a discrete, obscure leader, a strong Catholic, a man who hated to travel, a solitary man and last but not least a fervent colonialist. Yet, these two men cultivated for nearly twenty years a consistent, stable and discrete political relationship. Why?

If for Portugal good relations with Indonesia was a way of guaranteeing a Portuguese colonial presence in Asia, what made Sukarno tolerate and sometimes even appreciate Portuguese colonial presence in the eastern half of the island of Timor? Why did Sukarno, emblematic leader of the anti-colonialist movement, defend the liberation of the people of Angola and yet turn a blind eye to what has been repeatedly compare as "a pocket of medieval colonialism lying in the heart of Indonesia"¹.

Was Indonesian nationalism only interested in the frontiers of the former Dutch empire as Sukarno so exhaustively and frequently repeated? Was Portuguese Timor the core question of Luso-Indonesian relationship in those years? Or had another Portuguese settlement in Asia (Macao) its role to play in this bilateral relationship?

¹ As Tungku Abdul Rahman, first Prime Minister of the newly-founded Federation of Malaysia used to describe it.