



UNIVERSIDADE DA BEIRA INTERIOR
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President Obama vs. President W. Bush: Can a President's Leadership Style be an Effective and Efficient Influence for US Diplomacy and Foreign Policy?

Joana Margarida Jacinto Ribeiro

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Supervisor: Assistant Professor Teresa Cierco, PhD

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Extended Abstract

This dissertation intends, as its main purpose, to study and characterise leadership style of both George W. Bush and Barack H. Obama during the period of their first mandate regarding diplomatic and foreign affairs issues in Islamic countries. It will analyse if Muslim countries' leaders changed the way they saw and interacted with the West, particularly the United States of America, in response to a different type of leadership. This work will also try to answer the question of whether the relationship between USA and Islamic countries can be reinvented by the diplomatic behaviour of a president and how media conveys these images and ideas in order to influence the homeland public as well as the public abroad.

The present essay will examine different Islamic countries such as Iraq, with which USA is at war, and Iran, both of them antagonists of what America stands for, and Turkey an associated country of USA.

The main research question guiding this analysis is: How do leadership styles and presidential charisma influence US Foreign Policy design and efficiency towards the Muslim world? This problematic will be viewed by several angles, for there are numerous theories that can help perceive this issue. As a result, both Presidents' leadership style and charisma will be analysed.

Afterwards, this dissertation will frame its most important notions giving them a conceptual delimitation, supplied by renowned authors of social sciences such as International Relations, Communications, Psychology, Sociology and Political Studies.

The case study, with direct and indirect sources, will focus on relevant Islamic countries to US, some because they are sworn enemies (Iraq and Iran) and others (Turkey) because they are loyal to what the North America stands for.

George W. Bush is a Republican who served two times as President of the USA, during which, America was offended with the most assertive and horrifying terrorist attack ever seen in US soil, in a day that forever more will live in infamy: 11th of September. On the other hand, Barack Obama is an African-American Democrat with Muslim roots of his own, who campaigned against war abroad but ended up involving his country, through NATO'S intervention, in another one (Libya).

The dissertation will end with the conclusions to whatever results may be found in the pursuit of this question: Are leadership styles and charismatic behaviours an influence in efficiency and efficacy of the Foreign Affairs Policy towards Islamic Countries?

In order to respond as accurately as possible all sources will be considered in this study, the statements made by the two Presidents during their first mandate, their official

communications, the decisions made upon decisive moments, the press releases related to these matters, the speeches made and the news written regarding these issues.

The thesis will deem other lines of thoughts than the ones relaying on the International Relations basis. The Political Agenda setting of both Presidents and how Media dealt with them as well as character traces of these two men are perspectives that should be taken into account and that can provide this work with enrichment and enlightenment.

Keywords

Barack Obama; Charisma; Democracy; Diplomacy; Effectiveness; Efficiency; Foreign Policy; George W. Bush; Influence; Islamic Countries; Leadership style; Media; Peace; Power; Public Opinion; State; War.

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Acronyms

EU	European Union
GHG	Green House Gasses
IR	International Relations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
US	United States
USA	United States of America
UN	United Nations
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party or PKK - Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan

Introduction

It's a real "salad bowl", with a political ideology which relies on the liberty, duties and rights of each citizen. That's how the United States of America (USA) define themselves. They became independent from the United Kingdom on the 4th of July of 1776 and were recognized as such with the Paris Treaty of 1783. Since then USA grew into one of the biggest economical, political, military and cultural powers of the entire world. With a presidential system since the beginning, USA was lead by 43 presidents (Obama being the 44th).

The USA is one of the countries where the political machine is better developed, where politics has evolved into a practice in which its own agenda is very closely related to a media agenda setting. Politics are aware that media can make an issue as important or as small as it best serves its own purposes.

A political leader has the need, as all those who work in public offices and in representation, to be assisted by an expert in image and media management who can lead him on the right path. Help with public's concerns, questions, decisions made and decisions to me made, personal beliefs, presentation and so many other are critical matters that the media consultant has to deal with in order to provide the political leader with the best image before his or her public. If the public figure is none other than the American President itself, the level of demand goes up a notch.

This work is about the two last Presidents of the United States of America, the former and the present one: George W. Bush and Barack Obama Presidents' character may have a systematic influence over an effective Foreign Policy. It is also important to examine if the leadership of this world power is becoming reinforced or, on other hand, is being weakened.

Foreign Policy measures adopted by both Presidents will be compared as well as the political responses of the three Islamic countries under scrutiny. Even though the presidency timeline of George W. Bush presents us with a bigger pool to choose from, the recent re-election of President Obama provides the expectancy of Foreign Policy continuity towards these Islamic countries.

As referenced before, both presidents will be analysed under the light of three different international relation's theories that may help explain different reactions to similar situations, since it is essential in Politics to adjust responses a reactions to the environment surrounding, not only political, but also social and economical. As so, Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism were the chosen IR theories

This dissertation will be divided into five Chapters, an Abstract, an Introduction, some Definitions, the Main Findings of each chapter and the Conclusion.

The first chapter will address important issues related to the conceptual and theoretical part of the study. The importance of communication, personality, charisma and leadership styles are here portrayed.

Next chapter is related to the Foreign Policy structures existing in US and how significant keywords may represent a vital part in a more effective and efficient diplomacy in foreign affairs towards Islamic countries.

The third and fourth chapters concern the Presidencies' politics. The first one is reserved to George W. Bush and the other one to Obama. Each chapter is divided into sub-chapters that analyse the Islamic countries, Iraq, Iran and Turkey, in detail.

The last chapter is directly associated to the chapters before since it has to do with the perception that Islamic countries have on US Foreign policies and how they interpret US moves to be beneficial or harmful to their own agendas. Both Presidents and their Presidencies will be analysed under the three countries' governments and populations' scope: Iraq, Iran and Turkey

The last chapter is reserved to the conclusions taken from this study.

Reference Definitions

Even though there are several definitions the following ones chosen here will be used as reference for this work. Most definitions can refer to others here presented for they are all connected.

Charisma can have two meanings according to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2006). One regards “a personal magic of leadership arousing special popular loyalty or enthusiasm for a public figure (as a political leader)”. The second is defined as “a special magnetic charm or appeal (the charisma of a popular actor)”. Even though both definitions could be applied to this case the first one is the most accurate term for what is being analyzed.

Ronald Riggio in *The Encyclopedia of Positive Psychology* says that charisma is a series of characteristics that can manipulate feelings, thoughts and behaviours of others. He also acknowledges that it is a notion that has been studied and has great impact in areas such as Psychology, Political Science, Communication and Sociology (2009: 141). Charisma is considered to be a key ingredient to a successful leader. Hence, leadership style is intimately connected to this reference and one cannot be explained without the other one being as well.

As Abraham Lincoln said in the Gettysburg Address (1863), Democracy is a “Government of the people, by the people, for the people”. A very different definition is offered by Schumpeter in Gerry Mackie’s article of 2004. The author supports the 1942 Schumpeter’s proposal of a modern doctrine of democracy that (2004: 2)

Democracy is only about the competition of leaders for votes. Democracy is just a method, neither valuable in itself nor tending to right action or good ends. The will of the people, usually, is not genuine, but is manufactured by the leader.

People get influenced by their leaders in order to vote and those who present themselves as the best ones get more votes. Once again, the notion of leader appears, revealing its importance amongst notions such as democracy. Another fundamental notion is political communication and the ability to convey a message that is accepted as valid.

Harold Nicholson defined Diplomacy as “the management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist” (Nicholson, 1950: 15).

Many years later, and according to Dr. George Voskopoulos (2008) diplomacy has a similar meaning relating to

Peaceful means of implementing national strategy through win-win approaches. Since we live in an anarchic international environment, each state focuses its policy on sustaining its status quo or improving its position in a clearly hierarchical system. This system has the form of a pyramid. The closer a state is to the top, the better its chances to achieve its goals. Consequently, diplomacy is more probable to bear fruit when a country is independent, autonomous and developed. In practical terms, that means that the diplomacy practised by powerful states may be different and has diametrically different goals from that of smaller states which are less autonomous (South East European Institute of International Affairs).

Diplomacy has much to do with negotiating since it's a way of providing gains to both sides without losing the goal of interest. State diplomacy, conveyed by the Commander in Chief, is essential in this study.

Effectiveness is the best way to obtain a goal. It can be defined as “a measure of the match between stated goals and their achievement. It is always possible to achieve ‘easy’, low-standard goals. (...) cannot only be a question of achievements ‘outputs’ but must also involve judgments about the goals (part of ‘inputs’)” (Fraser, 1994: 104).

Erlendsson (Quality Research International, 2002) defines effectiveness as “The extent to which objectives are met (‘doing the right things’).” While The UNESCO uses a different definition,

an output of specific review/analyses (e.g., the *WASC Educational Effectiveness Review* or its *Reports on Institutional Effectiveness*) that measure (the quality of) the achievement of a specific educational goal or the degree to which a higher education institution can be expected to achieve specific requirements. It is different from efficiency, which is measured by the volume of output or input used. As a primary measure of success of a programme or of a higher education institution, clear indicators, meaningful information, and evidence best reflecting institutional effectiveness with respect to student learning and academic achievement have to be gathered through various procedures (inspection, observation, site visits, etc.). Engaging in the measurement of educational effectiveness creates a value-added process through quality assurance and accreditation review and contributes to building, within the institution, a culture of evidence (Vlăsceanu *et al.*, 2004: 37).

Wojtczak (2002) defines effectiveness in the context of media education as

A measure of the extent to which a specific intervention, procedure, regimen, or service, when deployed in the field in routine circumstances, does what it is intended to do for a specified population. In the health field, it is a measure of output from those health services that contribute towards reducing the dimension of a problem or improving an unsatisfactory situation. (*in* Quality Research International).

Relating to this reference to political construct Sammons (1996: 117) says that “Effectiveness is not a neutral term (...) criteria of effectiveness will be the subject of political debate”.

Psychologically speaking Efficiency is the performance of a behaviour or the accomplishment level of the effect of an action. According to Doron and Parot (1991: 264) there are several types of efficiency due to several types of behaviours (psychological efficiency; quotient efficiency and skilled efficiency). Nevertheless, the efficiency of a leader's action can be measured by the people's approval of it. It is almost always directly connected to the effectiveness, for one implies the other. Therefore, efficiency can be defined as "a measure of the resources used (costs) to achieve stated goals. It is unfortunate that governments frequently confuse quality in higher education with efficiency. Low-standard goals might well be achieved at low cost". (Fraser, 1994: 104).

Erlendsson (Quality Research International, 2002) says that efficiency is "performing tasks with reasonable effort ('doing things the right way')" and, finally The UNESCO defines efficiency as "an ability to perform well or to achieve a result without wasted resources, effort, time, or money (using the smallest quantity of resources possible). Educational efficiency can be measured in physical terms (technical efficiency) or in terms of cost (economic efficiency)" (Vlăsceanu *et al.*, 2004: 38).

Thursby (2000: 400) defined efficiency as when comparing departments with similar level of inputs, "it could produce greater research outputs without increasing its inputs usage, or equivalently, it is one which, compared to departments with similar levels of outputs, could produce the current levels of outputs with fewer inputs".

Wojtczak defines efficiency in the context of media education as

an ability to perform well or achieve a result without wasted energy, resources, effort, time or money. Efficiency can be measured in physical terms (technical efficiency) or terms of cost (economic efficiency). Greater efficiency is achieved where the same amount and standard of services are produced for a lower cost, if a more useful activity is substituted for a less useful one at the same cost or if needless activities are eliminated. (Quality Research International, 2002).

Foreign Policy is one of the most important concepts of all. There are a number of Foreign Policy behaviours' types that can go from resorting to war or the use of force to pacific interactions between societies in the international arena. However it may be perceived, Walter Carlsnaes *et al.* (2002: 335) has defined Foreign Policy as

those actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated goals, commitments and/or directives, and pursued by governmental representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign communities, are directed toward objectives, conditions and actors - both governmental and non-

governmental - which they want to affect and which lie beyond their territorial legitimacy

This is a rather important definition for it relates deeply to other concepts presented in this dissertation. As a result we may affirm that diplomacy, for instance, is the tool of Foreign Policy, and war, alliances, international trade and, ultimately peace maintenance, may all be manifestations of it.

Stephen Skowronek (2005: 817) Professor of Political and Social Science at Yale University, said that

George W. Bush elevated the value of definition in presidential leadership and made it central to his political stance. This was as much a strategic calculation of political advantage in the moment at hand as it was a reflection of the man's innate character. Accounting for Bush's leadership posture in this way helps to situate it on a larger historical canvas as a particular rendition of a familiar type; reference to general characteristics of the type facilitates, in turn, an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of Bush's performance over the course of his first term. Conclusions consider deviations from the patterned political effects of leadership of this sort and weigh their possible significance.

Considering that leadership style is a major issue in this study this political definition has much to say about George W. Bush. Nonetheless, he was US President two times in a row between 2001 and 2008 and had to face serious political decisions that shaped his leadership during this period.

Psychologically speaking Influence is when an individual believes to be submitted to an external or internal force that directs his thoughts, feelings, actions and behavior. For the purpose of this essay influence will be defined accordingly to Daniel Deudney (2001), Professor of Political Science at the Johns Hopkins University, as

the claim by a state to exclusive or predominant control over a foreign area or territory. The term may refer to a political claim to exclusive control, which other nations may or may not recognize as a matter of fact, or it may refer to a legal agreement by which another state or states pledge themselves to refrain from interference within the sphere of influence.

This concept is closely related to leadership and one might even say that influence cannot be exercised properly if there is not a leader to enforce it.

It is not easy to define Islamic Countries; nevertheless, Dr. Tariq Ramadan (1999: 123-124) recognizes the differences between these countries and the ones in the West. He claims that Islamic Countries need to be delimited, firstly, because in

Islamic territories, the scholars were able to point out what the essential conditions making a space or a nation Islamic were and what the rulings determining the political and strategic relations with other nations or empire were. Second, it allowed them to establish a clear distinction, as regard legal issues, between the situation of Muslims living inside the Islamic world and those living abroad or those who travelled often such as traders (and who thus required specific ruling).

As a result these needs to be taken into account for there are several legal, cultural and religious differences that can explain the constant friction between Islamic Countries and Western ones.

Roland Doron and Françoise Parot (1991: 460) in the *Dictionnaire de Psychologie* portray Leadership Style as the process of social influence by which an individual guides a group towards the achievement of an objective. Leadership is not only telling someone to do something but the ability to change the group's attitude, mobilizing them e conducting them in a common purpose. As a result, a leader must know to deal with individual and group motivations showing the most effective path without imposing authority.

In 1939, Kurt Lewin and a group of psychologists divided and established leadership styles into three major separate clusters (see Graphic I).

The authoritarian or autocratic leaders provide clear expectations for what needs to be done, when it should be done, and how it should be done. There is also a clear division between the leader and the followers. Authoritarian leaders make decisions independently with little or no input from the rest of the group. Researchers found that decision-making was less creative under authoritarian leadership. Lewin also found that it is harder to move from an authoritarian style to a democratic style than the other way around. Too much use of this style is usually viewed as domineering, tyrannical, and despotic. Authoritarian leadership is better used in situations where there is little time for the group to make a decision or when the leader is the one member of the group that knows more about the subject.

The participative or democratic leaders are those who provide assistance to the group members, but they also engage in the group allowing input from other group members. In Lewin's study, children in this group had less prolific actions than the members of the authoritarian group, but their contributions had a superior quality. Participative leaders promote group members participation, but the final statement over the decision-making process is still theirs. Group members feel they are participating in the process and are more enthusiastic and creative. As a result, this is the type of leadership style that provides best results, more efficiently and effectively.

At last, there is the Delegative leadership style. It was found that this was the less productive and efficient leadership style for researchers found that children under delegative leadership, also known as laissez-fair leadership, were the least productive of all three groups. The children in this group also required more from their leader, showed little collaboration and were unable to work in an independent way. Delegative leaders offer little or no regulation to group members and leave the decision-making process to group members. While this style can be effective in situations where group members are highly qualified in an area of expertise, it often leads to poorly defined roles and a lack of stimulant behavior.

This is an extremely important notion for it will be necessary to establish both Presidents' leadership styles in order to determine efficiency and effectiveness in Foreign Policy and in acceptance and compliance of their decision-making process.

Media can be defined by having two distinct meanings that are referred to by two different terms. "Mass media," "the media," and "media organizations" refer to commercial media channels such as newspapers, television stations, radio stations, and web providers that produce media messages in a variety of formats. "Communications media" refers to the way that these messages— or "variety of formats"— are conveyed and may comprise print, visual, audio, video, and multimedia, referring to a combination of these formats. Historically, media messages have been created by the mass media, but with the Internet they are being more and more produced by individuals, for access to communications media is becoming increasingly more available and at a cheapest costs.

According to Dan Gillmor (2004: 14) in his book "We the Media", journalism has gone from a mass communication medium of the 20th century to something much more civic and democratic, evolving and progressing with the aid of technology that can turn us all, at the same time, in both the public and the journalist.

Peace cannot be defined merely by being the absence of war, even though it must acknowledge it. Leo R. Sandy and Ray Perkins, (2002: 6) uttered that

peace must include positive characteristics over and above the mere absence of belligerence. Rather, it must include those positive factors that foster cooperation among human groups with ostensibly different cultural patterns so that social justice can be done and human potential can freely develop within democratic political structures. And this--promoting social justice/freedom by democratic means--will almost certainly require more selfless concern at all levels: at the personal level, more brotherly love; and at the international level, less narrow national self-interest-- a goal which we believe will require a diminution of the current system of nation states and the gradual emergence of a world community self-governed by world law. In this way, a truly peaceful world will be a world where war has been made impossible - or, at least much less likely.

Maintaining peace is a difficult process that implies other notions as cooperation, negotiation and respect towards others. Even though, a perpetual peace may seem like a utopia, long periods of peace all over the world shows that there are underlying dynamics that can be followed in order to achieve this timeless goal.

Doron and Parot (2010: 585) say that Power generally means an individual ability to intentionally modify his surroundings. In Psychology it can translate either the capacity of an individual to intentionally modify other people judgments, attitudes and behaviours or the ability to control the results of the action taken by other revealing an asymmetric relationship of interdependence between individuals or groups.

Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (2005: 42) define power as “the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate. (...) is restricted to the production of particular kinds of effects, namely those on the capacities of actors to determine the conditions of their existence” (see Graphic II).

Public Opinion can be shaped by what Communications authors refer to the Agenda-setting put into action by the Gatekeeper who can produce changes through cognitive effects which results from the scrutiny process made by him in the media and that ultimately defines what are interesting events and what is not, providing them with the proper relevance in time and space. Enric Saperas (1987: 54) stated that there is no doubt about the power that media has to exercise influence and determine the level of attention dedicated by the public to a certain theme or collective interest.

As a result, public opinion can be manipulated by media by sorting out what issues are conveyed and what issues are left behind. This has particular impact on Politics for it may influence positively or negatively the outcomes of an election or the way people perceive a decision-making.

Trotsky said that every State was founded on force; John Wallis and Douglass North find this definition to be incorrect for it confuses the concept of government (pre-modern) from the one of state. They consider that government is just one type of organization that the state organizes, which means that for these authors, state is the organization that puts in order other organizations. State has the “ability to organize, and the tendency to conflate the government and the state, has hampered our ability to understand the process of social dynamics and institutional change in the modern world” (2010: 11).

This means that relationships between states are more complicated as the organizations inside them have to relate to other foreign organizations. It is a complex dynamic between

social and institutional interests that can collide with other states interests resulting in less favourable outcome such as war.

Alexander Moseley, sub-editor for the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy since 2000, has defined War with the help of several different authors across History. He wrote that

Cicero defines war broadly as 'a contention by force'; Hugo Grotius adds that 'war is the state of contending parties, considered as such'; Thomas Hobbes notes that war is also an attitude: 'By war is meant a state of affairs, which may exist even while its operations are not continued;' Denis Diderot comments that war is 'a convulsive and violent disease of the body politic;' for Karl von Clausewitz, 'war is the continuation of politics by other means', and so on.

He continues stating that

the notion that wars only involve states, as Clausewitz implies, belies a strong political theory that assumes politics can only involve states and that war is in some manner or form a reflection of political activity. 'War' defined by *Webster's Dictionary* is a state of open and declared hostile armed conflict between states or nations, or a period of such conflict. This captures a particularly political-rationalistic account of war and warfare, i.e., that war needs to be explicitly declared and to be between states to be a war.

And as Rousseau (2009) said in 1762 about this subject: "War is constituted by a relation between things, and not between persons...War then is a relation, not between man and man, but between State and State...". Its inherent value has much more to do with the notion of Political Power than minor issues discussed by individuals.

As a result, it is seen that the concept of war is directly attached to state concept, for it cannot be said that there are wars between individuals, only conflicts, but between countries or sovereign states.

This dissertation will convey how George W. Bush and Barack Obama are perceived not only by their domestic public but also by the foreign one, specifically those in Islamic Countries. It's important to analyse how both Presidents:

- imposed their influence and power through media;
- how this was identified and accepted by the public opinion;
- what type of leadership style was involved in most decision-making process regarding Islamic Countries,
- How they managed state in order to maintain peace or declare war;
- How the presence or absence of a charismatic behaviour has enabled or not the efficiency and effectiveness of foreign policy abroad.

Defining all the concepts above is essential to understand, compare and identify the differences between these two American Presidents and to comprehend what is assumed when dealing with these terms along this essay.

Enriched by these notions this work will now continue to the case study where it will be used to help classify and characterize the similarities and differences between the first four years for mandate of the last two American Presidents.

Chapter 1 - Theoretical and Conceptual Framing

There are several international relations theories that can be applied to this particular study. Nevertheless, there are three that can help diagnose and answer the initial question. Both presidencies need to be evaluated under the light of Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism. One, Realism, can present a more harsh reality of the American presidency, both at the domestic and external level, another (Liberalism) can specify the main principles defended by the USA, the pillar of their own existence and the third theory (Constructivism) is critical to present another point of view such as those that domestic public may have as well, and more important, as the Islamic Countries pointed out in this study.

Realism is essential because it establishes notions as important as power, state and leader, which facilitate the definition of the present essay. The way a leader expresses his or her power and the way the state represents its people's desires and ambitions towards other nations is better understood under the scope of Realism.

On the other hand, Liberalism is a theory that emerged as a counterpoint to Realism and that focused on the liberty to act, the supremacy of democracy above all else and the expectation of inter-governmental to help states from subsiding and collapsing into war.

Finally, Constructivism can provide this essay with the remaining position left analysed, the Public Opinion not only from their own American people but also, and more significantly, from the public opinion (and leaders) of countries as Iraq, Iran and Turkey. This last theory will be most helpful in answering how actions are being recognised, and if the leadership style and/or leader charisma can be an asset on efficient and effective foreign affairs policies towards other countries. The Constructivist theory will also help understand how leaders' communications and leadership styles influence Foreign Affairs between countries, through the image they project and the way others perceive them. This theory claims that rather than gathering power or maintaining peace is the continuous social interactions that help construct and influence the international arena.

Although the other two IR theories will also be considered, the most important one for this work is the one related to Constructivism for it will do a detailed analysis of the last two US leaders' speeches, as well as the speeches uttered by the main leaders of the three Islamic Countries in question, "States, like people, come to see themselves as others see them" (Goldstein, 2005:126).

The notion that perceptions may be altered due to the act of speech and through the way an idea, a value or a rule is communicated, is intrinsically linked with the Constructivist's

concepts that the people (or in this case, the two USA Presidents) built and redefined the social world through language and that this process continues, ending in a circle where people, by their turn, are influenced by the social world (or the domestic and foreign public to which they redirect their political speeches).

Further along, and throughout this dissertation, these IR theories will be applied to both leadership styles and decision-making in order to understand the differences in their presidencies and how it may have influenced diplomatic relations towards Islamic countries.

1.1. Communication and Attitudes in Foreign Policy Making

Now that we have addressed an important part of this dissertation it is time to move forward to another key component that is the importance of communication and attitudes in Foreign Policy making. It was said before that leaders around the world, especially those in US, have a political machine working behind them in order to obtain the best results in the electoral campaign. Usually, people that worked in media, such as journalists and marketing managers, are responsible for the candidates' image as well as their speeches.

“When a major decision is called for, successful leaders ask how the decision will be communicated, make sure that it is communicated, and then confirm that the loop is closed on all engagement and communication efforts” (Houston *et al*, 2009: 56). This means that the way they communicate may decide the success of a leader and the support of influential people as well as the public itself.

When a leader communicates, it is a two way-street in which the spokesman conveys an idea or a decision and those who are listening understand it, embrace it or, on the other hand, repel it. If communication is made in an incomprehensive method or if not all required information is disclosed this street may be compromised and it may cost the leader more than the people's support. Nevertheless, in politics communication is not processed directly towards those who are the messages' recipients. Media is to be taken in consideration and how they deliver the message to the public. “Political Communication has then moved from being a direct, personal, face-to-face, activity to being conducted indirectly via the media of mass communication” (Lilleker, 2006: 9). It then becomes a necessity to prepare the stage of communication as the medium used have changed throughout times and from newspapers, to radio it has evolved to TV and Internet.

Leaders had to learn how to dress accordingly (for instance, in a TV set with beige backgrounds it is advised not to wear clear, pastel colours), how to speak and act, how to respond and how to use all advantages they can to improve their image.

They also had to learn how to discourse to the public in order to turn something that could become prejudicial into something undamaging, being the best example of this Nixon's "Checkers Speech"¹.

There are leaders who have a more fluent speech and a better body language, there are leaders who are more aggressive and tend to be defensive of their communications, and there are even leaders with poor communication skills that strive but still manage to conquer power because of the political machine behind him.

As Paul Watzlawick said at Palo Alto's Institute² "one cannot not Communicate", for when we are not communicating we are, in fact, saying that we do not want to communicate and therefore expressing an idea to others. This signifies that leaders are communicating all the time, and that they are exposed to public scrutiny twenty four hours of the day. This is true to the domestic public but also to the ones abroad, leading that Foreign Policy is made through the official channels but also through media, "to interact within a community of relationships is to engage in interpersonal influence. We are continually seeking to confirm the validity of how we order the environment..." (Bentwood, 2007: 6).

Communication styles can in fact have a deep impact in the effectiveness and efficiency in diplomacy and great importance in Foreign Policy. In the next chapters an analysis to both Presidents will be made in order to understand how does the way they communicate, as well as their attitudes towards domestic and foreign public, can influence.

1.2.Charisma/Personality and Perceptions in Foreign Policy

As said before, several authors have defined leaders' personality according to a well defined set of characteristics. Nevertheless, the one presented by Margaret Hermann will be the one used in this chapter. She classifies personality types regarding two elements: Information and Constraints, thus creating eight distinct types (open or closed to share information and prone to respecting or challenging constraints).

As so, there are the: Expansionistic (focus on increasing power); Evangelistic (focus on persuading others to join the cause); Incremental (focus on escaping obstacles while maintain flexibility of manoeuvres); Charismatic (focus on achieving the goals while persuading others to act); Directive (focus on personality guidance while respecting rules); Consultative (focus in controlling the others considered to be important); Reactive (focus on assessing how to act

¹ In 1952 Nixon was accused of improprieties relating to a fund established by his backers to reimburse him for his political expenses. Nixon said in a national broadcast that he in fact had received a personal gift, a dog named Checkers, and that he intended to keep it.

² Mental Research Institute in Palo Alto, California.

and what is important) and finally Accommodative (focus on reconciling differences while empowering others) (Herman *et al*, 2011: 95).

These classifications express the idea that a charismatic leader is much more than one beloved by the people, but it is someone that knows how to interact with others, that is not just focused in power or on reconciling different points of views but also to engage others in his vision, appealing them to act and to join the cause.

Leaders with a charismatic leadership style accept that perceptions of power and authority are often in the “eye of the beholder” and are desirous of ensuring that important constituencies and institutions understand and support what they are doing before, and even as, they are engaged in particular foreign policy activities (Hermann *et al*, 2001: 98).

The question if a charismatic leader can make the society change in order to approximate the public to his own agenda has been made by authors for some years now.

So how might charismatic leaders alter a group's identity to be more conducive to social change? One potential avenue may be communication tactics aimed at realigning followers' values and identities to be more in line with the leader's vision. Specifically, we propose that social identity alteration occurs through charismatic communication tactics aimed at breaking, moving, and realigning (...) followers' sense of group identity. (Seyranian and Bligh, 2008: 65).

Can a charismatic leader make the difference; can he join together people, groups and even countries with different and diverse values? Studies have been made and the answer seems to be yes, “In support of this proposition, recent empirical evidence shows that charismatic leaders empower followers by increasing their social identification” (Idem).

An earlier study in 1993 by Shamir *et al*. (1993: 584), suggests that

...charismatic leaders change the salience of hierarchy of values and identities within the follower's self-concept, thus increasing the probability that these values and identities will be implicated in action. Since values and identities are socially based, their control of behavior is likely to represent a shift from the instrumental to the moral and from concern with individual gains to concerns with contributions of the collective.

Nevertheless, what these studies have shown was that even though a person may be born with a charismatic personality, a leader always makes an adjustment in order to obtain better results with the public. They follow a series of procedures in order to increase peoples' feelings of belonging and empowerment and therefore making them feeling closer to the leader's opinions and suggestions.

This gets a bigger dimension when we do the correlation to Foreign Policy since appealing to others that share our culture, customs and traditions may not be the easiest task in the

World, doing so in countries that have totally different backgrounds is a challenge that even the best prepared and most charismatic leaders may fear. “Empirically the importance of the personality component lies not only in the fact that other foreign policy determinants are mediated by the policy-maker images, attitudes, values, beliefs, doctrines and ideologies, but also in the characteristics of the political (sub) system...” (Ramachandran, 1996: 15).

The major problem regarding this is that using a charismatic personality to the service of Foreign Affairs has a greater complexity that it is linked to what has been said before (differences in ideologies, history and common goals). In the domestic environment the leader feels more at ease because he is more familiar to the responses, needs and complaints of the public. On the other hand, “foreign policy arises from the interaction of states, within the international community to achieve their own national interests and their consequent attitudes to international issues, all connected directly or indirectly with issues of peace and war.” (Idem: 20).

Though there is a difference between how much a charismatic leader can obtain in his domestic field or abroad, studies seem to confirm that who leads does matter and can change the way the countries relate to one another.

1.3. Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama’s Assessment

The 43rd USA President was George W. Bush, son of a former President. He won the first time not without contest from the American Public for there was a suspicion of vote manipulation. Nonetheless, this did not stop him from having one of the highest Presidential Job Approval ever. These results happened after the 11th of September 2001, when terrorists attacked the Twin Towers, the Pentagon and missed an attack on Camp David.

The 11th of September, however terrifying and appalling it was, provided President Bush with a surprisingly opportunity to unite US citizens around a common goal: punish the terrorists involved and all those who declared to be enemy of the USA.

Even though it failed the capture and death of America number one nemesis (it was during the Barack Obama mandate that Osama Bin Laden was captured and killed) the chase was a crucial part of Bush’s presidency.

On 20th of September 2001, George W. Bush addressed to the nation, USA was mourning the death of thousands of people resultant of the biggest terrorist attack ever seen in the US. Bush immortalized the moment and implied the future course of his actions and of USA destiny in these celebre words: “Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. Whether we bring

our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done” (Bush, 2001, Address to the Nation Speech).

It is not assumed that George W. Bush is a charismatic person by nature. Nevertheless, pictures of him, expressing a less than formal behaviour, have run the entire world. But this is not the same to say that he had no support from his voters or from the public in general. As a matter of fact, it is interesting to notice that his election results improved on his second candidacy to the Presidency, increasing from the 47,9% obtained in 2000 to 50,7% in 2004 (see Map I and II).

And as charisma goes, a recent study by Bligh, Kholes and Meindl (2004) explored George W. Bush’s charismatic speech before and after the 9/11 terrorist attack and discovered that his charisma enhanced after this traumatic event, showing that Bush knew how to take advantage of a catastrophe and turn it into an opportunity.

Prior to the events of 9/11, President George W. Bush was generally not seen as a strong, charismatic leader that people would place their faith in during times of crisis or external threat. Throughout the first nine months of his presidency, a number of questions surrounded Bush’s leadership, including the perils of following a president with high charismatic appeal, questions about foreign policy issues, and the lingering cloud of the election vote-counting debacle. In addition, the media often characterized the President as oratorically challenged and frequently disparaged him for his “troubled relationship with the English language. (Kornblut, 2001 apud Bligh *et al.*, 2004: 213).

Still, the Bush Administration used the fear of future terrorist attacks to maintain an atmosphere of looming crisis and subsequently portrayed Bush as the candidate most capable of managing the war on terror. In a crisis situation leaders who are not the cause of the crisis are likely to be seen as charismatic (Riggio, 2004).

There are several proofs that even though George W. Bush was not a charismatic leader with an impressive leadership style he managed to accommodate himself and ended up having 70% of job approval by the end of his first mandate in 2003, before crashing up suddenly due to the wear out of war in Iraq.

On the other hand, Barack Obama was a unique candidate in several aspects to start with He’s the first African-American president; he’s the first president with a Muslim background, something he assumes naturally (“I have Muslim members of my family. I have lived in Muslim countries.” Obama, 2009, Al-Arabiya), and he’s the third president on the job awarded with the Nobel Prize, a few months after being elected. These characteristics, combined with a seemingly charismatic, relaxed and approachable personality make of the current President

of the USA an emblematic State figure who may, or may not, influence in a positive way the Foreign Policy of the USA.

Nevertheless, it becomes essential to have in mind that everything considered

Obama is neither Messiah nor miracle worker. (...) In Obama's own words: «young and old, rich and poor, Democrat and Republican, black, white, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, gay, straight, disabled and not disabled, Americans sent a message to the world that we have never been just a collection of individuals or a collection of Red states and Blue states...we are and always will be, the United States of America.» (Bligh e Kohles, 2009: 490).

Although there was a huge euphoria around Barack Obama's application and subsequent election to the presidency of USA it was expected that Obama wouldn't win due to the so called "Bradley Effect" which says that "voters have a tendency to withhold their leanings from pollsters when they plan to vote for a white candidate instead of a black one" (Altman, 2008, Time Magazine).

This theory is based upon the story of Tom Bradley, Mayor of Los Angeles and an African-American citizen, who in 1982 lost the elections to California Governor to his white opponent even though all polls pointed him out as the winner.

Indeed, though Obama was strongly supported by several public figures (with the launch of a music in which the chorus reported to the Obama's campaign slogan "Yes we can") and the electors' enthusiasm, the final results were a bit short of the 55% winning votes that polls indicated. (see Map III).

It was shown that Obama's initial job approval rating (from Eisenhower until Obama) was the second best (losing only to Kennedy) *in ex aequo* with Eisenhower (see Table I). Nevertheless, only 100 days after the beginning of his mandate, Obama's approval rating had suffered a 3% fall, going from 68% to 65%. Only Clinton and Carter had the same political performance with a 3% drop each (see Table II).

This reaction from the north-American towards their president is, in some ways, connected with the serious crisis that began spreading across America in 2007 and the rest of the world in 2008, as well as controversial measures such as those taken in the Health care system and the withdraw of US soldiers from Iraq.

It remains to be seen whether or not Obama can capitalize on this challenging situation and his charismatic appeal to effectively resolve the current economic crisis. Charismatic leadership is often a fleeting phenomenon, gained or lost quickly as circumstances change. If the crisis situation ends, or if followers become more confident and feel that they are

more capable of solving problems on their own, charismatic attributions will fade (Bligh e Kholes, 2009: 488).

Nonetheless, Obama still captures attentions, not only from his own electors but also from all across the planet. His perseverance in accomplishing promises - "When I say that when we promised during the campaign, change you can believe in, it wasn't change you can believe in 18 months...What I would say is, 'Yes, we can', but it is not going to happen overnight." (Obama, 2010, Daily Show). And in keeping his political ideas, as well as his image and charismatic character as the Head of the State of one of the biggest world nations, may be influencing the Foreign Policy of the USA. As Barack Obama said "...we are moving in the right direction, and that's what people have to keep in mind." (2010, Rolling Stone interview).

It's clear that there is not an obvious and straightforward connection between the charisma and leadership style of political leaders and the effectiveness of the Foreign Policy being pursued under their leadership. George W. Bush was never perceived as a charismatic person but he (with the help of his staff) managed to play along and grab opportunities that granted him a new image towards domestic public opinion. Barack Obama, otherwise, was involved in an aura of charisma that gave him a high initial approval rate but he has been slipping down ever since. Especially in political systems that rely to a large extent on the President to define and implement Foreign Policy strategies, the personal style of leadership can have an impact, both in the domestic and in the external level.

1.4. Leadership Style and Decision-Making in Foreign Policy

This dissertation intends to prove that the way leaders react and how they make their decisions, as well as how they convey them back to the public, has significant correlation to the success of Foreign Policy measures.

The idea of a strong leadership, of state power as main actor in the efficacy of foreign affairs and of the leader as the person who embodies all, has extreme importance as a backbone of this study question. As Maquiavel once said, "superior leadership can overcome presumed structural constraints" (apud Freyberg-Inan, 2004: 61).

If we assume that democratic leaders are the representation of state power their leadership style has undoubtedly connections with the USA ability to be heard and respected around the world by their decision making and by their Foreign Policy.

The state is the pre-eminent actor in world politics. International relations are primarily relations of states. (...) The main point of foreign policy is to project and defend the interests of the states in world politics. (...) The most important states in the world politics are the great politics (Jackson and Sorensen, 2007: 60).

In a time where political diplomacy rules and open confrontation makes little sense, the realistic ideas of strategical actions of the sovereign states with the sole purpose of enlarging or reinforcing their power will have to be on the hands (and kind words) of the world leaders. As a result, the capability of leadership is crucial for “Indeed, power and responsibility are inseparable concepts. (...) The balance of power is also a basic value: it is a legitimate goal and a guide to responsible statecraft on the part of the leaders of the great powers.” (Idem: 71).

Several different authors present different contributions for what they believe it to be the leader’s personality map. For instance, Rubenzer and Faschingbauer categorize the diverse presidents of USA as Dominators, Introverts, Good Guys, Innocents, Actors, Providers, Philosophers and Extroverts. Margaret Hermann (see Chart I) and James Barber (see Chart II) have other typologies for characterizing presidents’ personality. Both George W. Bush and Obama, present many of the characteristics that these authors refer. For instance, it is believed that Obama is more prone to giving information, has a more positive attitude towards adversity and a better ability to stimulate and motivate his followers. Nevertheless, George W. Bush managed to maintain a country united throughout one of the hardest times US ever had to face, he was re-elected in 2004 to serve a second term and he finished it without any major scandals in his resume.

Transactional leaders are those who lead through social exchange. (...) Transformational leaders, on the other hand, are those who stimulate and inspire followers to both achieve extraordinary outcomes and, in the process, develop their own leadership capacity (Bass and Riggio, 2008: 3).

However, the question stands. What makes an efficient leadership? As Head of State what sort of abilities has the President to show in order to lead the destiny of one of the greatest nations worldwide towards a more promising future?

A president who lacks leadership, salesmanship, and the ability to wholeheartedly pursue goals will likely accomplish little. (...) Successful presidents, not surprisingly, have shown a pattern of leadership, achievement, and flexible persuasive tactics over the course of their lives (Rubenzer and Faschingbauer, 2004: 59).

Besides the capability of inspiring his countrymen and countrywomen, US Commander in Chief also has to raise support all over the world, since he is one of the central figures in world events

The focus of attention here is on the importance of leadership style in understanding what predominant leaders will do in formulating foreign policy—on how different ways of dealing with political constraints, processing information, and assuming authority can promote different reactions to what is essentially the same decision-making environment (Hermann *et al.*, 2001: 84).

The typification of leadership styles and decision-making processes is rather meaningful in helping to understand why certain leaders get better responses, while other, for instance, deal with problematic situations in a more assertive way. Even though, as we have seen before, the categories may vary, as well as the names given to it, the main characteristics of these categories remain similar, same as the ideas, ideals, ideologies and beliefs of those in charge.

Snyder and Diesing (1977: 202) portrayed the main two types of leadership styles as one being more active and more goal oriented, while the other was more passive and more responsive to what the situation itself brought.

The more goal-driven leaders—the crusaders, the ideologues, those who are directive, task-oriented, or transformational in focus—interpret the environment through a lens that is structured by their beliefs, attitudes, motives, and passions. (...) Leaders who are more responsive to the current situation—the pragmatists, the opportunists, and those who are consultative, relations-oriented, or transactional—tend, to paraphrase Shakespeare, to see life as a theater where there are many roles to be played. (Hermann *et al*, 2001:87).

As a result, Foreign Policy is and can be influenced by these two different types of leadership styles. It was found that

The more contextually responsive predominant leaders appear more constrained by the specific domestic settings in which they find themselves than do their more goal-driven counterparts, and, accordingly, are relatively incremental in the activities they urge on their governments. They are less likely to engage in conflict than the predominant leaders who are more goal-driven, and are averse to committing their country's resources to bellicose actions unless the choice enjoys the support of important constituencies. The contextually responsive leaders are predisposed to seek support for their international decisions. Interested in consensus-building and multilateral approaches to foreign policy, they are most comfortable working within the range of permissible choices that their constituents authorize. (Idem: 87-88).

Therefore, leadership styles may influence a great deal Foreign Policy, especially if we are talking about countries that have culture, traditions and customs different than the ones in US, because the distinction between the two main types of leadership styles may, for instance, be the difference between going to war or not.

1.4.1. George W. Bush Leadership Style

Kurt Lewin's referred to three particular leadership styles. Other studies made afterwards have enriched these definitions but, for all purposes, the main leadership styles remain three. It is not an easy task to classify George W. Bush's type of leadership. He was President of the biggest democracy in the world, so invariable, this classifies him as a democratic or

participative leader. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that his leadership style changed after the 9/11.

American people raised a

Number of questions surrounding Bush's leadership, including the perils of following a President with high charismatic appeal, questions about foreign policy issues, and the lingering cloud of the election vote-counting debacle. In addition, the media often characterised the President as oratorically challenged and frequently disparaged him for his 'troubled relationship with the English language' (Bligh et al., 2004: 213; Kornblut, 2001).

The fact remains that leaders who have a difficult time in expressing themselves or that do it in a less than perfected way, have a bigger difficult in conveying confidence to the people. Before the terrorist attack of 9/11, the public was not sure of George W. Bush's ability to lead and to do it when a crisis arrived nonetheless, if

prior to the events of 9/11, there were real concerns about Bush's leadership, and many questioned his ability to rise to the challenge in the immediate aftermath of the attacks. Seemingly overnight, however, Americans embraced the President and his leadership. Before the terrorist attacks, 51% of Americans approved of Bush's job performance, whereas after the attacks, his approval ratings jumped to 86% (Bligh et al, 2004: 213).

George W. Bush's lack of charisma in the beginning of his mandate was overcompensated with a powerful demonstration of strength, endurance and decisiveness that provided him with one of the highest approval ratings ever. "For Bush, decisiveness was related to charismatic leadership, which in turn predicted voting behaviour" (Williams et al, 2009:70).

Charismatic behaviour is not the strongest asset on George W. Bush's portfolio. However, he is a man that knows how to make the most of what he has, and, by the end of the day, charisma was something that could be gained along with trust. "For realists the first priority for state leaders is to ensure the survival of their state" (Schmidt, 1997: 93). This must be obtained through war, if necessary, and through the imposition of the state power towards other nations.

When three planes crashed against the twin Towers and the Pentagon, the world watched the biggest terrorist attack ever to be planned and executed in US. The times that ensued were difficult on the American people but George W. Bush took this very serious and ended up declaring war on two Islamic Countries: Afghanistan and Iraq. Besides that, George W. Bush stated for the world to hear that

He would not "wait on events" while "the world's most dangerous weapons" were acquired by "the world's most dangerous regimes." One such regime, he specified, was Saddam Hussein's Iraq, which he grouped with Iran and

North Korea in what he referred to as an “axis of evil” (Greenstein, 2003: 16).

George W. Bush was always straightforward about what he thought should be done regarding issues of this nature. George W. Bush tried, more than once during his two terms, to approach the countries he considered enemies of the state. Candidate Bush admitted realism may be comparable to what Hans Morgenthau (1972) refers to “as a public official who discusses Foreign Policy in a manner that will allow the official to appeal to the popular opinions of the public in order to gain political support” (apud Shrader, 2007: 29).

After the cancellation of the ABM Treaty³ in 2002 George W. Bush turned his policy toward Liberalism. This can be seen in his first State of the Union Address delivered on January 29, 2002 when he said that “rather than talking tough against other powers in the world, as he had done in his pre-election rhetoric, Bush called for unity against a common danger- terrorism-by erasing "old rivalries"(Shrader, 2007: 33).

Liberal George W. Bush emerged as a result of a special set of occasions. As Shrader (2007: 24) put it,

George W. Bush “administration’s rhetorical focus shifted from ‘realist’ to ‘liberal internationalist’ during this period because it was engaged in a political marketing campaign to brand, package, and sell a Foreign Policy to the American people. Through the use of presidential rhetoric, the administration converted Bush from a Reaganesque realist to a neo-Wilsonian who relied upon the generalities of international institutions and the promotion of democracy to achieve a permission slip from the American people to expand the overall “War on Terror” to a separate battleground in Iraq under the guise of expanding democracy.

The sudden preoccupation on defending democracy above all else was due to George W. Bush’s worn out image by the end of the first mandate which occurred due to several things that went from social reasons, to economics, political and diplomatic. The USA was facing battles in two fronts, the youngsters were being sent into the battlefield, which had claimed more than its share of lives, and it was starting to be obvious the enormous amount of money required to maintain warfare.

The dissonant voices heard inside the country were crying out for a solution that the President felt he had to find. Not only the free World freedom and ways of life was being threatened but also the very existence of the Western World. In 2003 the US, supported by the United Kingdom; accused Iraqi authorities of hiding mass destruction weapons. And, yet these were never found, it justified the presence and death of American young soldiers in Iraqi soil. Even if there is not a clear union in the top decision-makers “prediction of

³ Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty withdrew in June 2002

international outcomes is significantly improved by understanding internal bargaining, especially with respect to minimally acceptable compromises.” (Snyder and Diesing apud Putnam, 1988: 435) this means that in order to obtain what he wanted abroad, to continue war fair with Iraq, the President had to bargain and convince the people, as well as other opinion makers, that US presence was absolutely vital in Iraqi re established democracy.

In June of 2002, during the West Point Graduation Speech, George W. Bush stated that

The 20th century ended with a single surviving model of human progress, based on non-negotiable demands of human dignity, the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women and private property and free speech and equal justice and religious tolerance. America cannot impose this vision -- yet we can support and reward governments that make the right choices for their own people. In our development aid, in our diplomatic efforts, in our international broadcasting, and in our educational assistance, the United States will promote moderation and tolerance and human rights. And we will defend the peace that makes all progress possible. When it comes to the common rights and needs of men and women, there is no clash of civilizations. The requirements of freedom apply fully to Africa and Latin America and the entire Islamic world. The peoples of the Islamic nations want and deserve the same freedoms and opportunities as people in every nation. And their governments should listen to their hopes.

This inspirational speech, which expressed clearly the connections between Liberalism, Democracy and Bush’s New Foreign Policy, was a small sample that allowed understanding the shift made by George W. Bush Administration after a period of realism that was now not acceptable due to the American society changes, even the ones that were occurring in the Middle Eastern countries and that arose only a few years later.

How was Bush’s Freedom Agenda accepted by the countries which were directly involved in it? George W. Bush behaviour and decision-making was contrary to the interests of Islamic Countries. Bush decided to declare war on terrorism after the 9/11 attack and almost every Muslim countries that were not a USA ally, were put under fire.

With the terrorist attack came a change in George’s W. Bush leadership style and charismatic personality which translated into a change of the Foreign Policy. Although the change could not simply be imposed from the top-down;

It must be articulated to the public at large and translated down the line to the level of policy implementation. In effect, policy change requires cooperation and acceptance if it is to be institutionalized. To understand the role of strategic foreign policy actors and the elite project they have termed the *Freedom Agenda*, the notion of articulation is invaluable, as it is through articulation that foreign policy actors were able to render intelligible their historical situation on September 11, 2001 (Ali Hassan, 2009: 101).

One major issue that occurred during George W. Bush's presidency regarding USA Foreign Policy towards Islamic countries was the lack of ability to understand the other side and to see the ideas that commanded the actions of these states. Even though the terrorist attack may have been extremely important to shape North America into what it is nowadays. The blind measurements taken against all Middle Eastern countries that did not have a friendly relation with USA and the veiled menaces made from these Islamic Countries to US, were a setback in foreign affairs as we perceive them.

By placing a procedural understanding of democracy, namely elections, at the forefront of the Freedom Agenda the Bush administration proved that its ideological-discursive formation was woefully inadequate in understanding the strategically selective context. Although the administration had established an ideological justification for why reforming the Middle East was in the national interest, it had failed to appreciate how the original strategically selective context that led to previous administrations supporting friendly regimes remained (Idem: 233).

It can be said that communicational gaps between the West and the Middle East were guilty of a faulty constructivist interaction between the states. It is understandable that both sides want to protect their territories and what theirs but this should not cloud the leaders judgment, who have; first and foremost the duty to serve is citizens.

George W. Bush's presidency was rich in events, polemical decisions, strength and character. In the beginning American public was rather doubtful about his capacity to lead and to demonstrate the full power of potency such as USA.

During 8 years as USA President, George W. Bush had to adjust his political theories in order to prevail in the real life action. The terrorist attack in George W. Bush's first year was crucial to define the rest of his presidency. He had to strengthen his realistic position declaring war on terrorism, on the axis of evil (Iran, Iraq and North Korea). America would end up entering to war against Iraq and against Afghanistan, both of each in George W. Bush's first mandate as president.

Near the second mandate had to make a swift turn into Liberalism for the job rating approvals exposed during, and shortly after, the post 9/11 became really low and George W. Bush feared he would not be re-elected. He was. But the relationship between USA (and ultimately with his/her Head of State) and Islamic countries was compromised and, as we are going to see was going to imply stepping back on his doctrine.

1.4.2. Barack Obama Leadership Style

According to the Lewin's definition of leadership styles Barack Obama is a democratic leader. It is not only the fact that he is charismatic and even-tempered with a positive attitude. It is

also the fact that he can recognise his own mistakes and assume that things have not gone as planned.

During an interview with CBS's "60 Minutes" Obama acknowledged that

[w]e were so busy and so focused on getting a bunch of stuff done that we stopped paying attention to the fact that, yeah, leadership isn't just legislation, that it's a matter of persuading people and giving them confidence and bringing them together, and setting a tone [...] We haven't always been successful at that, and I take personal responsibility for that. And it's something that I have to examine carefully as I go forward (Obama, 2010).

This statement clearly indicates Obama's concern in explaining to the public the decisions that are made. He also assumes full responsibility for flaws that may occur in this particular area, since it is the President's duty to inform and unite the American people.

When Fortune Magazine asked him about whether he had exaggerated the negative effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement he said that "[s]ometimes during campaigns the rhetoric gets overheated and amplified. Politicians are always guilty of that, and I don't exempt myself" (Obama: 2010). Once again, Obama tries to regain control on what is said to people and how it is said, showing concern about the public opinion.

The ideas of a strong leadership, of state power as main actor in the efficacy of foreign affairs and of the leader as the person who embodies all of this, are well known concepts of the International Relations' Realistic Theory. Barack Obama's character is absolutely essential for this theory. Machiavelli once said that "superior leadership can overcome presumed structural constraints" (apud Freyberg-Inan, 2004: 61).

If we assume that democratic leaders are the representation of state power, then Obama's charisma has undoubtedly connections with the USA ability to be heard and respected around the world by their decision making and by their Foreign Policy. "The state is the pre-eminent actor in world politics. International relations are primarily relations of states. [...] The main point of Foreign Policy is to protect and defend the interests of the states in world politics. [...] The most important states in the world politics are the great politics" (Jackson and Sorensen, 2007: 60).

In a time where political diplomacy rules and open confrontation makes little sense, the realistic ideas of strategic actions of the sovereign states with the sole purpose of enlarging or reinforcing their power will have to be on the hands (and kind words) of the world leaders. As a result, the capability of leadership is crucial for success.

As Head of State has he shown the ability to lead the destiny of one of the greatest nations worldwide towards a more promising future? Besides the capability of inspiring his citizens, Obama has also been admired all over the world, being one of the central figures in world events

it is possible to conceive that Obama's emerging cautious, consultative and pragmatic foreign policy style, and his own personal tale of migration and cultural hybridity, provide precisely the symbols and tactics required to restore international belief in America, and thus, by extension, American capitalism (Ramutsindela *et al.*, 2010: 13).

Obama has been trying really hard to obtain his objectives and achieve all of the goals that he set for himself when he was elected, "And so, to all the other peoples and governments who are watching today (...) know that America is a friend of each nation, and every man, woman and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity. And we are ready to lead once more" (Obama, 2009, Inaugural Speech), however the question remains as to whether Obama may live up to the high expectations created around him, especially when his election

New President of the United States has cautiously raised hopes and expectations that he will adopt a more constructive policy toward the Middle East than that of George W. Bush, who looked at nations there as 'radical,' or 'moderate,' 'pro-American' or 'anti-American,' 'evil' or 'good.' By applying that yardstick, the Bush administration succeeded, to a good extent, to further inflame the old tensions in the region (Tarock, 2009: 69).

One of Obama's first promises when he arrived to the position was that the USA was going to retreat from Iraq as soon as possible. Not only he did not live up to the expectations but also entered into war (as a NATO member) with a new country: Libya. Why did he do that? One of the reasons to explain this is the USA's relations with the concept of freedom.

The United States are always trying to provide other countries with the American dream where capitalism and progress are relevant areas of individual happiness. The belief that "peoples and governments are affected by what happens elsewhere, by the actions of their counterparts in other countries" (Jackson and Sorenson, 2007: 101) is one of the major reasons why Barack Obama has entered into war to free Libyan rebels from a dictatorial regime, even though the very basis of Liberalism rejects the idea of war.

Obama, as a liberal, respects all five elements identified by Deudney and Ikenberry (1999) as essential to western liberal countries and to their notion of world order:

- Security co-binding;
- Penetrated reciprocal hegemony;
- Semi-sovereignty and partial great powers;
- Economic openness and;

- Civic Identity.

The particular challenge confronting Obama's charismatic vision of a liberal world - interdependent, responsible, shared and intermediated - is the duality inherent to it, especially when it comes to the Islamic Countries. Liberalist approaches to Foreign Policies is just another of the differences between the US and Islamic Countries, that often see Americans as meddlers, trying to gain access to their oil.

As Arthur Kroker (2011) has put it, how can Barack Obama

Convince the Muslim world of the good intentions presented by the United States, when facts are not moving as fast towards that same direction? How does Obama persuade the world that what is in the particular interest of the United States is also in the general interest of the global community? Secondly, how will Obama accomplish what surely must be his major objective, namely migrating American political thought to a more complex understanding of Islam? After all, at the same moment that Obama rose to speak in Cairo the empire politics of the United States were in full motion: the garrisoning of the globe with a multiplicity of American bases; the violent occupation of Iraq; mass casualties among the Iraqi civilian population as a result of American air attacks; a decade-long war against Muslim guerilla forces in Afghanistan; aggressive containment policies against Iran; and American support of Israel. (CTheory)

Liberalism, as Bentham (1789) has famously put it, it is a political and economical system that strives for “the greatest happiness of the greatest number”, and it was under this assumption that the Liberal Obama recurred in an error that his predecessor also did (but for different reasons) and that may condition the relationship between USA and Islamic Countries, even though his attempts to connect when he said “What I want to do is to create a better dialogue so that the Muslim world understands more effectively how the United States, but also how the West thinks about many of these difficult issues like terrorism, like democracy, to discuss the framework for what’s happened in Iraq and Afghanistan and our outreach to Iran, and also how we view the prospects for peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians.” (Obama, 2009, Canal Plus)

Every person, every organization and every State has its place in the affairs of the world. Therefore, in the Constructivism “human relations consist of thought and ideas and not essentially of material conditions or forces. This is the philosophically idealist element of constructivism which contrasts with the materialist philosophy of much social science positivism” (Jackson and Sorenson, 2007: 162).

That is also why this is the right theory to combine the results achieved on previous analyses, Obama and Realism, and Obama and Liberalism. One more focused on his leadership style and charismatic behaviour towards the public (whether we are talking about domestic one or

foreign one) and the other one more centered on his politics towards the Islamic Countries and the perceived differences between them.

Narrowing it further, Nia states that “To understand Iranian foreign behaviour, one should try to understand the basic characteristics of the country’s normative and discursive structures.” (2010: 148).

In 2008, President Ahmadinejad urged President Barack Obama to make “fundamental change” in the USA Foreign Policy. He wrote President Obama that the world expects him to end policies “based on warmongering, invasion, bullying, trickery, and the humiliation of other countries by the imposition of biased and unfair requirements, and a diplomatic approach that has bred hatred for America’s leaders and undermined respect for its people.” (Nia, 2010: 167-168).

The participative leadership style and charismatic personality of president Obama allowed him to absorb some of the requests made by the Iran’s president. His emphatic remarks on diplomatic and peaceful solutions for Iran’s nuclear activities gave result. And during the first year of Barack Obama’s presidency Iran participated in openly diplomatic talks with the United States over its nuclear program in Geneva in the 5+1 talks⁴.

For these same reasons when Obama visited Iraq on April 7th 2009 the Iraqi spokesman for Nouri Al-Malik, Iraq Prime-Minister, said the meeting had been “positive” and that Barack Obama had “renewed the American commitment to Iraq and to withdrawing troops as previously planned” (BBC News, 2009).

Obama told the Iraqi Prime-Minister that progress had been made on improving security but that it was “absolutely critical” for all Iraqis to be integrated into the political system. He also said the US had “no claim on Iraqi territory and resources” (BBC News, 2009). Once more Barack Obama acted as a promoter of communication which makes Iraqis’ more permeable to USA reaching out and more acceptant of their Foreign Policy towards them.

On the other hand, USA shares a privileged relationship with Turkey, an Islamic country that usually supports America’s endeavours. Barack Obama’s first official visit as USA President was Turkey, this mere detail is a rather incisive question.

In fact, this was so relevant for the diplomatic relationship of the two countries that Erdogan, Turkey’s Prime-Minister, stated that “The fact that the President visited Turkey on his first overseas trip and that he described and characterized Turkish-US relations as a model

⁴ Iran talks with the five permanent members of UN Council (US, Russia, China, Britain, France) and Germany.

partnership has been very important for us politically and in the process that we all look forward to in the future as well” (USA Declarations with President Obama, 2009).

Therefore, the Social Constructivism theory present in the former examples states that Islamic Countries are aware of USA’s ideas, reaching out towards them in several different ways and convening it to the type of interlocutor.

Obama’s course of action can be perceived in many ways, as focusing more on this or that detail. Nevertheless, evidences exist that, theoretically, the Obama’s administration was preoccupied in putting into practice adequate Foreign Policy towards the different Islamic Countries that are in the sphere of influence of USA.

Whether Obama actively knows that is charismatic personality and behaviour can be an added value to this part of the job, or if he is really concerned in improving America’s relation with the rest of the world removing the idea that USA only acts on pure interest, it cannot be said. However, at least, a small door of opportunity has been opened towards countries as difficult and as different as Iran and conversations are being made between the two sides of the ocean.

Chapter 2 - American Foreign Policy Structures and Power

This chapter is dedicated to the different Foreign Policy structures of US and their role in maintaining the bridge between US and other countries. There are four essential structures involved in the US Foreign Policy making.

The first one, and the most important of all, is the US President. Not only because the President is the face of America but also because he actively represents a role in this international stage. Although he does not play his part alone, for he has a number of advisers, the President has a person who is in charge of dealing with all matters related to Foreign Affairs: the Secretary of State. He speaks on behalf of the president and of the US Government and he deals with subjects of international interest. Several cabinet members and the National Security Council, as well as others, also help the President fulfilling his task.

The next structure is the US State Department which is the governments lead agency in charge of developing and implementing Foreign Policy. The third structure is the US States Congress that has the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee, two vital organisms in the pursuit of improved Foreign Affairs. The last one concerns US citizens, who through their votes can help choose the people representing them abroad.

Ever since the Vietnam War, Foreign Policy gained a new dimension and importance in the US political machine. Critics and thinkers emerged from the political arena, many of them with on-the-job experience, and they pointed out problems such as “false assumptions, prone to misguided activism, and plagued by high and sometimes hidden costs (...) Cold War policies are no longer appropriate.” (Hunt, 1987: 1-2).

Nevertheless, after Cold War and before Foreign Policy structures were tuned in and turned into a science, “US officials possessed scarcely more than rhetorical faith in democracy. They feared its very unpredictability. If left to choose, oppressed people would not necessarily adopt as their own the core values of America’s governing elite.” (Walker, 1996: 669). This, however, never stopped US from reaching out and meddling with Foreign Affairs in order to demonstrate their power and their ideals.

The idea of an USA, paladin of freedom and defender of the world peace, represents the “crucial link ideology provides between American nationalism and an assertive American

foreign policy“ (Hunt, 1987: 3). This represented a problem when the American Foreign Policy was directed to countries with severe democratical, historical and religious differences.

Nowadays, and even though US has multiple structures to deal with Foreign Policy issues, the matter of the fact is that it seems that Foreign Policy has become more and more interlaced with foreign assistance and foreign development, “Ironically, while foreign assistance has grown in importance in US Foreign Policy over the past two decades, it has deteriorated organizationally, substantively, and procedurally.” (Hyman, 2010: 1).

More importantly, both Presidents portrayed in this study gave a major contribute to the state of things regarding Foreign Policy. George W. Bush doubled his budget to foreign development assistance due to the two wars fought in Middle East and Barack Obama doubled it again due to the efforts required to begin the troops withdraw from Iraq in 2009 as well as improving US image abroad.

Ever since the “Notwithstanding the additional resources, the Bush administration gave a giant push to the dismantling of the original architecture of foreign assistance, and the Obama administration appears to be adding to the debris.” (Hyman, 2010: 2). This meant, amongst other things, that the procedures and the outline of American Foreign Policy has changed a great deal for the past few years, especially during George W. Bush’s administration and continued to change through Obama’s administration.

Next we will see how Bush and Obama outlined their Foreign Policy measures and how that had implications in the diplomatic arena.

2.1. Bush’s Doctrine and Leadership Style Impact in Foreign Policy Decisions

Bush’s Foreign Policy was directly influenced by the dissatisfaction that the conservative party had been expressing since 1991 when US won over Iraq the Gulf War and this country was forced to leave Kuwait. However, nothing was done regarding the Saddam Hussein permanence in Iraq government. The Post-War treaty implied that Saddam Hussein had to allow periodical visits of the United Nations in the search of mass destruction weapons, which he usually staled or prohibited, making the conservatives in US more and more unhappy.

Once George W. Bush was elected he implemented the element of “America First” which basically defended that the interests of America should be put first above the interests of the rest of the world. This was revealed even before 9/11 when in March 2001, only two months

after being sworn, Bush withdraw US from the Kyoto Protocol⁵, turning America into one of the two countries that decided not to subscribe the Protocol, allegedly due to high costs that the American industry would have to endure to move from coal to cleaner electricity or natural gas.

When 9/11 happened the Bush Doctrine took a new dimension and the US adopted the position: if you are not with us you are against us. It was based upon the presumption of constant threat, "The Bush Doctrine identifies three threat agents: terrorist organizations with global reach, weak states that harbour and assist such terrorist organizations, and rogue states. Al Qaeda and the Taliban's Afghanistan embody the first two agents." (Record, 2003: 5). Bush also said to the American people that America would no longer make a difference between those who were terrorists and those who gave shelter to the terrorists. America would fight against both.

By this time George W. Bush was showing the world a reactive or expansionistic leadership style. He was concerned, not with Foreign Policy diplomacy, but in assessing what to do with what was given to him, providing the world a very serious and final response on how deep is the US power in the modern World and how far US is willing to go in order to get its payback.

Only three months after the attack on the Twin Towers, President George W. Bush made a speech that would change everything. He identified the "axis of evil" as being formed by Iraq, Iran and North Korea. George W. Bush said, "We'll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons." (George W. Bush, 2002, Second State of the Union Address).

It was the beginning of a major change in Foreign Policy procedures for George W. Bush was openly discussing the possibility of initiating a pre-emptive war, which he considered it to be prevention. These two words, "preemption" and "prevention" were, until then, popularly used in the political arena regarding what was being done in order to avoid armed conflict. "...the most desirable consequence of international affirmation of the Bush doctrine would be to convince potential aspiring foes to continue to renounce WMD or persuade existing proliferators to change their ways" (Heisbourg, 2003: 86).

Bush did manage to obtain the public's support, and even gain some notoriety with these radical measures. The 9/11 was the biggest terrorist attack ever seen in US and people felt

⁵ The Kyoto Protocol is an amendment to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), an international treaty intended to bring countries together to reduce global warming and to cope with the effects of temperature increases.

the need to protect themselves against foreign enemies. Foreign Policy towards the countries in the axis of evil was not being done under the scope of diplomacy but under the constitutional idea that the Americans have the right to defend themselves violently if needed.

The doctrine has four elements: a strong belief in the importance of a state's domestic regime in determining its foreign policy and the related judgment that this is an opportune time to transform international politics; the perception of great threats that can be defeated only by new and vigorous policies, most notably preventive war; a willingness to act unilaterally when necessary; and, as both a cause and a summary of these beliefs, an overriding sense that peace and stability require the United States to assert its primacy in world politics (Jervis, 2003: 365).

And in March 2003 US invaded Iraq, under the presumption of finding WMD, and began a war in which the US army would only leave in 2011 during Obama's Administration. All through that time, many American soldiers died, innocent Iraqis and Saddam Hussein was captured and killed. Nevertheless, WMD, the main reason why US attacked Iraq were never found.

Bush Doctrine would meet its end in 2006, two years before the end of Bush's Administration and it had its costs. With the Bush Doctrine everything changed and the consequences, such as dissatisfaction of the American people, the alteration of the US Secretary of Defence (Donald Rumsfeld) and other cabinet members, the return of Congress control back into the hands of Democrats and, ultimately, the loss of 2008 elections to the Democrats.

2.2. Barack's Administration and Leadership Style Impact in Foreign Policy Decisions

Barack Obama's Foreign Policy could not be more estranged to the one practiced by the previous office. One of the first concerns Barack Obama had when he first became American President was to undo some of the decisions made by George W. Bush. Obama was against Iraq war even before the elections to the US Senate. At the time he proposed and regional conference, involving both Syria and Iran, in order to achieve a solution to Iraq. As Obama wrote in *Renewing American Leadership* (2007:1)

The Bush administration responded to the unconventional attacks of 9/11 with conventional thinking of the past, largely viewing problems as state-based and principally amenable to military solutions. It was this tragically misguided view that led us into a war in Iraq that never should have been authorized and never should have been waged.

He also defended the necessity to improve America's energy independence while claiming for a better and cleaner energy source, one that will not aggravate global warming nor increase the air pollution. Even before Obama was on the White House and he already managed to gain important support from "the foreign leaders that had the opportunity to listen to Obama's

message of change and the foreign policy experts that expressed support to ‘manage’ US interests...” (Davis, 2009: xxii).

Once in the US Government Barack Obama compiled his Foreign Policy measures in five important items. (US Foreign Policy, 2009)

- End the war in Iraq responsibly
- Finish the fight against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan
- Secure nuclear weapons and loose nuclear materials from terrorists
- Renew American diplomacy to support strong alliances
- Seek a lasting peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Therefore, one of his first decisions while in power was to withdraw American Army from Iraq and resume the diplomatic highway towards Iran and North Korea,

The administration's task, particularly with regard to North Korea and Iran, will be to keep the far-flung negotiations led by energetic personalities heading toward an agreed goal. In the process, it must navigate between two kinds of public pressures toward diplomacy endemic in American attitudes. (Kissinger, Washington Post, 2009).

His leadership style more concerned with reconciling differences, building consensus and achieving one’s agenda by engaging others, can be classified as Accommodative and Charismatic, leading to inner and outer agreement. Obama made a real effort in order to clarify that not only the Islam is not the enemy but also that the “war on terror” is not an American prerogative.

In fact, the Foreign Policy measures taken by Obama gave him the Nobel Prize in 2009 due to his appeals on nuclear non-proliferation and the promotion of a new climate in international, especially in reaching out to the Muslim world. “Obama has demonstrated a genuine sense of strategic direction, a solid grasp of what today's world is all about, and an understanding of what the United States ought to be doing in it” (Brzezinski, 2010: 1).

Barack Obama, has been trying to reunite the American people with the rest of the World, (2007: 6)

Ultimately, no foreign policy can succeed unless the American people understand it and feel they have a stake in its success - unless they trust that their government hears their concerns as well. We will not be able to increase foreign aid if we fail to invest in security and opportunity for our own people

Rather than imposing America's power and ideals through force, Obama believes in the quest for the consensus, the mediation, and the resolution. For Obama, the truth lies in the Roosevelt words when he once said that the Americans were not destroyers, but builders, that their power should be directed towards good and annihilation of evil. Foreign Policy under the Barack Obama's Administration could be resumed by his own words: "This is our moment to renew the trust and faith of our people - and all people - in an America that battles immediate evils, promotes an ultimate good, and leads the world once more" (Renewing American Leadership, 2007: 6).

Chapter 3 - US Foreign Policy under George W. Bush

We have seen that George W. Bush initiated a strong campaign against terrorism after the 9/11. Until that Bush's pursuit on diplomatic strategy, which he tried to differ from the humanitarian aid characterized by Bill Clinton's Foreign Policy, was not centred on terrorism. Bush's main concern was related with turning US back into the most important geopolitical nation.

This "America First" Bush's preoccupation was shown well before the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. Just two months after being elected, Bush withdrew the United States from the United Nation's Kyoto Protocol⁶ which had been created to obligate 37 industrialized countries, as well as those in the European community, to reduce greenhouse gasses emissions around worldwide. Bush reasoned that the transition required an effort that America could not pay because what was required in order to the go from coal to cleaner electricity or natural gas would imply a great increase in the energy costs and would force a rebuilt of manufacturing infrastructures. As a result, alongside with Australia, US ignored the GHG effects on the world just as long America had something to gain.

In the 24 months of the Bush administration, America's Foreign Policy has become confused and incoherent because of a new and indefensible unilateralism.... Never before has an administration defied the accumulated wisdom of [world experts] and rejected ... treaties agreed upon by all of the major nations (Drinan, 2003: 16).

This was something that became transversal to Bush's Foreign Policy during his entire presidency. The Unilateralism featured for 2001 until 2008 led to profound reservations in the rest of the World towards Bush's approach. Europeans were, by that time, extremely assertive in their criticism of the president's Foreign Policy – a survey made on August 2001 by the Pew Research Center, in association with the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Herald Tribune, showed that more than seven out of ten people in each of four major European nations believed that President Bush made his decisions based entirely on US interests. (see Table III).

However, things got worse after 9/11 when Bush decided that there was only two ways countries could ever relate to US - as allies or as enemies, "US unilateralism was something new, a product of the present administration [Bush] and perhaps of the increasing influence

⁶ The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement linked to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

within the administration of "hard right," anti-internationalist voices since September 11, 2001" (Rubinfeld, 2004: 1973).

Throughout Bush's leadership, Foreign Policy was based upon an extremely hard power strategy, also known by Nye as Transactional Leadership, that coerced and bullied other countries in order to convince them to engage in his agenda, "Transactional leaders, on the other hand, create concrete incentives to influence followers' efforts and set out rules that relate work to rewards" (Nye, 2006: 7).

Another problem that Bush had to face regarding his Foreign Policy approaches came from inside his government as Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor (Bush's second term Secretary of State), disagreed with the preventive war policy outlined by Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld. In fact, on Bush' second term Foreign Policy had a bigger emphasis on diplomacy towards other countries,

The State Department under Condoleezza Rice, unlike the State Department in Bush's first term, is now deeply engaged in diplomatic pressure, working with our allies, working with other nations, really trying to make things happen without the use of force in some of these countries, and it does show that the United States can be quite effective when you have a State Department that is energetically pursuing the president's foreign policy (Kristol *et al.*, 2005: 12)

As a result, and as time went by, Bush' Doctrine began losing his strength because "When the exercise of hard power undercuts soft power, it makes leadership more difficult - as the United States is finding out in its struggle against jihadist terrorism. The ability to combine hard and soft power fruitfully is 'smart power'" (Nye, 2006: 4). And so, from 2006 to 2008, Bush's Administration tried a friendlier Foreign Policy approach.

3.1. September 11 and Islam

As said before, after Al Qaeda terrorists attacked the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001, Bush's Doctrine took a new dimension. That day, while talking to the American people, Bush said US fight against terrorism would not set apart between terrorists and nations that harboured terrorists.

Bush explained the World what he meant by that when he addressed a joint session of Congress on September 20th, 2001. He said,

We will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.

That resulted in two things: the invasion of Iraq and the invasion of Afghanistan. In what was called a Preventive war, both countries were accused of harbouring Al Qaeda members who were considered terrorists. In October 2001, US as a UN member and allied troops invaded Afghanistan and in January 2002 Bush's army headed towards Iraq. By that time, Bush had already described Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an "axis of evil" that supported terror and wanted to attack America and the free world with WMD. Bush said during his State of the Union address on January 2002,

We'll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons.

Nevertheless, Bush was careful in his words and tried to shield Muslim's from American's and Western's hate and discrimination, for "he repeatedly stated that the US response would not be directed toward Muslims or toward the Afghan people and sought to clearly distinguish between terrorists and Arabs (Schildkraut, 2002: 520). When President Bush delivered the speech of the joint session of Congress to the Nation on 20 September 2001, he said about Muslims:

I ask you to uphold the values of America, and remember why so many have come here. We are in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them. No one should be singled out for unfair treatment or unkind words because of their ethnic background or religious faith.

Although Bush's concern on distinguishing terrorists from Arabs, that still resulted in a worldwide discomfort about Muslims emigration towards Western countries as well as them owning or producing WMD, "It engulfed much of the world over a variety of issue areas, including Muslim migration in Europe, the continuing conflict in the Middle East, and the right to hold weapons of mass destruction" (Kristol *et al*, 2005: 6).

2002 Invasion of Iraq by US was done under the premise that Iraq had WMD. When nothing was found America had to experience an insurgency against their occupation of Iraq and inability to quickly create a working democratic government. Also, domestically Bush had to face the fact that both wars, in Iraq as well as in Afghanistan, resulted in a high increase of America's expense on defence (see Graphic III) which led to American people dissatisfaction and complaints.

3.2.US Foreign Policy towards Islamic Countries under George W. Bush

As we have seen George W. Bush Foreign Policy was determined by the 9/11 event which led to severe consequences in the Middle Eastern as well as in USA. George W. Bush presented

two different approaches to the Islamic Countries whether we are talking about the ones he perceived as enemies or the ones he saw as allies,

while some of the Muslim countries, such as Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya are characterized 'rogue', 'backlash', 'the bad sons of the world' and 'axis of evil' by the US leaders and policymakers some other Islamic nations particularly Turkey, Pakistan are viewed as fully 'democratic countries'. (Yazdani, 2008: 41).

In war against what he called the "axis of evil" Bush forged some questionable alliances as the one he created with Pakistan, "under the hammer of the Bush doctrine, Pakistan was forced to relinquish its long-time support of the Taliban and its tolerance of Al Qaeda." (Hirsh, 2002: 1). He also tried to reinforce his alliance with Turkey, obtaining the exact opposite result, as Turks saw war on Iraq as US enforcement or its leadership, disregardless of anything else.

Bush, who also intended to separate Iraq, Iran and North Korea from any foreign support they could garner, believed that the Muslim world should embrace western world notion of democracy, "the Bush administration has adopted the view that democracy is not only feasible but also necessary in the Middle East and the Muslim world" (Khan, 2003: 1)

Nevertheless Bush's alliances on the Middle East, his Foreign Policy towards the Islamic world could be basically summed up as 'If you are not for us, you are against us and therefore we have the right to defend ourselves'. Under Bush's policy, the countries that were reluctant to join Bush's war on terror were regarded as allies of terrorism which later encouraged to dangerous divisions in the world, forcing many to believe that Bush's war was a sort of American jihad against both Islamist terrorists as well as those countries that had nothing against them.

US Foreign Policy towards Islamic Countries resulted in an inflamed religious fundamentalism as Islamists militants saw Bush's Doctrine as a free pass for them to commit more terrorists acts, while secular Muslims got caught in the middle of a dilemma: they had not pledge alliance neither to terrorism perpetrated on Islam's name nor they did to George W Bush's war on terror.

What the world saw on Bush's Foreign Policy on Islamic Countries was facts that could never be proven - like the false claims of WMS existence - which led to the killings of thousands of innocent civilians both in Iraq and Afghanistan, America's war against its former ally Saddam Hussein turned the Iraqi people into targets of assault of both the insurgents end - Al Qaeda and US.

As formulated by the US the world had a new order. Ever since 9/11 accusations against US government by Human Rights groups have been growing, with the Amnesty International

stating that the war on terror must not be an excuse to deny these rights. In fact, US should have taken into account that “effective democracy reflects not only the extent to which civil and political rights exist on paper, but also the degree to which officials actually respect these rights” (Inglehart and Welzel 2009: 10)

Nevertheless, Bush’s Foreign Policy also brought the Patriot Act⁷ that allows US agencies to search people’s homes and offices without a search warrant just as long they thought these people had something to do with terrorism.

Although Bush’s administration made the effort to separate, at least on paper, Muslims from terrorists the matter of the fact was that his policy inside and abroad led to complaints and more conflicts between Islamic world and the West.

3.2.1.Iraq

After 9/11 and Bush having classified Iraq as one of the countries that belonged to the “axis of evil”, his Foreign Policy grew from the diplomatic to a more aggressive form. On the pursuit of his “war on terror”, Bush invaded Iraq and helped depose Saddam Hussein, but

the policy of military regime change in Iraq lacked legitimacy because, due to confusion over the state of Saddam Hussein’s WMD program, there was no undisputable perception of imminent threat and because there was no solid evidence of any close relationship between Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaida network and the Iraqi regime (CSS, 2008: 2).

Although 9/11 was a major influence on the Iraq’s invasion some authors believed that there was another history behind it that provided the conditions for what came next. Iraq’s oil reservations were one of the reasons. Haass, National Security Council staff director in charge of the Middle East during the George Bush presidency said that “The US strategic priority after Iraq’s invasion was liberating Kuwait and making sure that Saddam Hussein could not dominate the oil-rich region” (Iran Primer, 2010: 1).

For whatever reasons or previous motives that Bush might have had he received domestic and international support on his policy of US vs. Terrorism. But as time went by and financial costs increased, as well as the loss of American lives and opinions’ abroad became more and more disgruntled, Bush’s Foreign Policy began to lose its interest, for

Public has little tolerance for losing American lives in matters that lack a direct link to national security. (...)While many equate foreign policy in these areas to the general war on terror, the connection is not necessarily straightforward. This might explain why overall support for continued efforts in Iraq has waned as the conflict has progressed. Although our understanding (Baumgartner, 2008: 172).

⁷ A law signed by President George W. Bush on October 26, 2001.

Besides US own agenda when invading Iraq, Bush also intended to implement democracy and freedom in this country. His strategy for Iraq had a clear plan of creating another ally in an area overcrowded with enemies. However, Bush forgot that

Democracy is likely to emerge and survive only when certain social and cultural conditions are in place. The Bush administration ignored this reality when it attempted to implant democracy in Iraq without first establishing internal security and overlooked cultural conditions that endangered the effort (Inglehart and Welzel, 2009: 1).

Nevertheless after 9/11, he in fact managed to create that for both Iraq's President and Prime-Minister who were elected under Bush's and USA consent.

3.2.2.Iran

Bush's Foreign Policy towards Iran was quite similar to the one he presented towards Iraq, even though USA never invaded Iran, this country also belonged to the infamous list named after Bush as the "axis of evil". "The Bush administration's policy on Iran was shaped largely by three factors: Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, American hostages held by Iranian allies in Lebanon and a new round of Arab-Israeli peace talks" (Haass, 2010: 1).

As said before, much of Bush's Foreign Policy in the Middle East was related to US concerns on this particular area,

The Bush Administration has identified Iran's modernization of its conventional forces as a potential threat to U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf, but others argue that the buildup has been minor and that Iran still is relatively poorly equipped. (...) the focus of current U.S. policy appears to be a return to the containment policy... (Katzman, 2003: Summary).

So, Bush's Foreign Policy towards Iran balanced between fear and contempt, as US was not sure (and still is not) on Iranians' real power. Even though not being sure, Bush kept on stating that,

Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom. (...) States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger (CNN, 2002).

Nevertheless, in 2002 Iran's President was Mohammed Khatami who was seen as Iran's first reformist president, for his campaign focus on the rule of law, democracy and inclusion of all Iranians in the political decision-making process.

When 9/11 happened Khatami made harsh critics on the attack. "On the other hand, Iran strongly condemned the September 11 attacks and tacitly supported the US war on the

Taliban and Al Qaeda” (Katzman, 2003: CRS3), which actually had little impact on Bush’s Foreign Policy towards Iran.

Bush tried to separate Iranian’s regime from Iranians and on July, 12th 2002 Bush stated on the Office of the Press Secretary that “We have seen throughout history the power of one simple idea: when given a choice, people will choose freedom. As we have witnessed over the past few days, the people of Iran want the same freedoms, human rights, and opportunities as people around the world. Their government should listen to their hopes.” (Pars Times, 2002).

Nevertheless, three years later Bush would have to deal with Iran’s new President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who taunted him and even tried to measures strengths while saying that “This wicked man [Bush] desires to harm the Iranian nation” and that Bush’s time as USA president was over (Telegraph.co, 2008).

3.2.3. Turkey

Bush Foreign Policy towards Turkey could not be more different from the previous countries, for Turkey was an US’s ally for a long time. Nevertheless, what Bush’s Foreign Policy had reserved for Turkey was the claim that they ought to help US based on their long-term relationship,

The Bush national security team, while not the first to think of Turkey in terms of ‘what it can do for us’, proved the most flagrant in paying attention to Ankara basically when it needed something - usually in a hurry (Parris, 2008: 6).

However, with the Invasion of Iraq, Turks began to fear for their security if they engaged more actively on Bush’s demand. Not only because they are next to Iraq but also because they perceived Bush’s actions towards Iraq as being dictatorial.

A tendency to see Turkey as a function of Washington’s big idea of the moment, insensitivity to a broadening perception in Turkey of US disregard for Turkish interests, inaction in the face of PKK terror, weak leadership on energy security and schizophrenia toward Turkey’s internal politics have left U.S.-Turkish relations worse than when George W. Bush came to office (Parris, 2008: 1).

As a direct result, Turkey refused to participate in any extend to the Iraq war led on by USA, Turkey’s concerns were more tuned into what they needed instead of what USA wanted.

The issue of Turkey’s unwillingness to cooperate with the United States in the war against Iraq came up in the discussion, and Secretary Burns pointed out that democracy in Turkey had actually impeded US foreign-policy goals and that democracy in the rest of the Muslim world would perhaps make it more

difficult for the United States to pursue its interests in the region (Khan, 2003:2).

That distressed US-Turkey relationship which was put to a test later on 2007. US-Turkey Foreign Policy relationship suffered a serious menace by the end of Bush's Administration,

The most significant threat to this policy came when the relations with the United States were expected to collapse in 2007. A serious problem with the United States seemed imminent, due to the developments concerning the Armenian resolution and the Iraqi situation. Nevertheless, by the end of 2007, Turkish-American relations had evolved such that both sides emerged with a better understanding of each other; channels of communication continue to remain open on both sides (Davutoglu, 2008: 82).

In fact, US concerns about their own problems made Bush's government blind to Turks problems, which the most severe had to do with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Kurdish terrorist organization which, since 1984, has been fighting against Turkey for an autonomous Kurdistan and greater political rights for the Kurds in Turkey. Nevertheless, the US-Turkey relationship survived and continued on to Obama's Administration.

3.3.Main Findings

What this chapter has shown us is that Bush should have focused on changing the internal dynamics of Muslim countries by strengthening secular forces instead of running them over with military actions that weakened US power over Foreign Policies as well as destroyed some countries for years to come.

Although the World was sympathetic with what US suffered during the 9/11 attack time revealed some inconsistencies which led to a poor image of US outside as well as inside. We saw that this happened not only in countries perceived as US enemies but also in long-term allies such as Europe.

Bush's Foreign Policy towards Iraq could be summed up as a "war on terror" that led to a series of events throughout the World. On Iran, Bush's perception was similar to the one he had on Iraq but no real actions were taken into account. Finally, Bush's Foreign Policy on Turkey led to a distressed relationship in which US expected more than the Turks were willing to give.

As a result, Bush should have realized sooner that any real change in the Muslim world should come from within and not be imposed by US military power, as we will see on chapter five.

Chapter 4 - US Foreign Policy under Obama

When Obama won the elections on 2008 Foreign Policy changed a great deal. In his inaugural address on 20th January 2009, Obama disclosed his Foreign Policy by saying

We will begin to responsibly leave Iraq to its people and forge a hard-earned peace in Afghanistan. With old friends and former foes, we'll work tirelessly to lessen the nuclear threat, and roll back the specter of a warming planet.

He also spoke about America's determination to combat terrorism while inviting the Muslim world to "a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect". Obama's Foreign Policy, unlike Bush's sat on a multilateral relationship between US and other countries,

He reset relations with Russia; visited China; agonized over Afghanistan, Iraq, North Korea, and Iran; reached out to the Muslim world; attempted to regain Europe's trust; tried to jumpstart the Middle East peace process; and promoted economic recovery, climate change, and energy independence (Nau, 2010: 2).

While engaging other countries to participate Obama promoted multilateral relationships between US and other countries,

...broader defining values of Obama's foreign policy, such as multilateralism and consensus building. And its emphasis on indirect, quieter measures rather than high profile gestures would sit well with the heightened sensitivities in many parts of the world about democracy promotion as political interventionism (Carothers, 2012: 23).

In order to pursuit Obama's vision of unity around the World, as well as to distance's Obama's Foreign Policy from Bush's, Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton replied on her first public statement while in charge that, "There is a great exhalation of breath going on around the world. We've got a lot of damage to repair" (The New York Times, 2009). Although, Hillary also said that he did not all of Bush's past policies would be repudiated, and specifically said it was essential that the six-party talks⁸ over the North Korean nuclear weapons program continued.

Obama's first term in Presidency brought a lot of hope to the Islamic Countries for Obama himself is of Muslim descendent. One of Obama's Foreign Policy promises had to do his plans for peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which led, on January 23rd of 2009, to the nomination of George Mitchell as Special Envoy for Middle East peace and Richard Holbrooke as special representative to Pakistan and Afghanistan. That ended up not solving anything while conflicts in this part of the World continued to rise.

⁸ Talks between US, South Korea, North Korea, China, Russia and Japan on 27 to 29 August 2003 and that resulted in North Korea withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Obama's leadership style and Foreign Policy was much more on soft power than on the hard power side, "Under President Barack Obama, US Foreign Policy has swung decisively in the opposite direction. Now, US security interests matter more than democracy, force is a last resort, substantial regulations are needed to end the booms and busts of global capitalism, and multilateralism is the sine qua non of US diplomacy" (Nau, 2010: 1).

Even though Obama's Administration continued to sanction countries as Iran, North Korea or more recently Syria, Obama's Foreign Policy is much more related to the power of communication rather than the menace behind it. Joseph Nye said that "Soft power is the ability to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than using the carrots and sticks of payment or coercion. (...) rests on the skills of emotional intelligence, vision, and communication that Obama possesses in abundance" (Huffington Post, 2008).

Nevertheless, some critics believe that Obama may not live up to his ideals as US Foreign Policy is mingled with the wars US fought during Bush's Administration. Obama may have to make use of some hard power or, at least, conciliate it with soft power in order to create Nye's notion of smart power. Countries as Iran, North Korea, Afghanistan and Pakistan may not be interested in finding an agreement with USA.

4.1. Islam and President Obama

As said before President Barack Obama is no stranger to Muslims religion as his father was a Muslim. When in September 2012 a video posted on YouTube depicted prophet Mohammed in a negative way, the Muslim society was outrageous, especially the extremists faction.

One of the most waited speeches came from president Obama to UN in which he said that 'it is time to heed the words of Gandhi (...) the future must not belong to those who slander the prophet of Islam" (The White House, 2012). Obama strongly condemned the protests that spread across the Middle East and the murder of Chris Stevens, the US ambassador to Libya, branding them as acts of violence against America.

While separating his government from the video he said:

I have made it clear that the United States government had nothing to do with this video, and I believe its message must be rejected by all who respect our common humanity. It is an insult not only to Muslims, but to America as well - for as the city outside these walls makes clear, we are a country that has welcomed people of every race and religion (Address to UN *in* The White House, 2012).

One of Obama's concerns was not to depict the Middle East violence as terrorism, using the word 'terrorist' just once during the speech when he referred to the Iranian government. Nevertheless, after condemning the video, Obama said: "There are no words that excuse the killing of innocents. There is no video that justifies an attack on an embassy. There is no

slander that provides an excuse for people to burn a restaurant in Lebanon, or destroy a school in Tunis, or cause death and destruction in Pakistan” (Idem).

During Obama’s first term his Cairo Speech led many to believe in a brighter future to the Middle East. As Obama said he was looking for a “new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world” (The White House, 2009), nevertheless, Obama’s real intentions on acting upon this new beginning stopped at a wishful thinking.

The first Arabic uprising emerged on December 2010 in Tunisia and quickly spread to Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, Algeria, Iraq Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, and Sudan. When this happened the world stopped and waited on Obama’s move. Obama praised the search for democracy and freedom in these countries but did nothing,

Obama is quite clear he rejects the use of force as a vehicle for democracy promotion, but does not rule it out case of genocide and ethnic cleansing provided that the ground swell of international support exists, American burdens are limited and conditions are ripe for success. The complexity of Obama’s view on human rights and democracy, a jumble of realist and Wilsonian impulses, may explain his difficulty in grappling with the Arab Spring movement” (Celso, 2012: 5).

USA’s support to the Arab Spring revolution, a spontaneous combustion that happened independent of Western influence, and which has given people new power, hope and democratic elections, showed once again that Obama’s Foreign Policy laid in a much less interventive way than the one of his predecessor.

Unlike the Bush years, where the concept of Middle East democracy was intrinsically linked Iraq, Obama captured a wider imagination by linking democracy promotion to unemployment, the role of women, globalization, and many other variables that scholars attribute to giving rise to the Arab Spring. Obama won the presidency by convincing US voters that he understood and could change those salient issues impacting the everyday lives of Americans (Day, 2011:2).

On the 60 Minutes TV program he defended his policy as “It was absolutely the right thing for us to do to align ourselves with democracy, universal rights, a notion that people have to be able to participate in their own governance.” (CBS News, 2012).

Although it is clear Obama’s refusal to engage US on another war, authors seemed to find it difficult to achieve a conclusion as many say this is a good thing while others say the opposite. Nevertheless, on the Arab Spring movement

Obama has proven to be an extremely cautious and hesitant democratic reformer. The Administration’s failure to fully embrace the Arab Spring belies much of the optimism generated by his famous 2009 Cairo Speech. Obama’s ambivalence toward democratic reform is driven by a multiplicity of factors that include: his aversion to the Iraq war, his “realist-idealist” vision of a post American world, and U.S. strategic interests” (Celso, 2012: 1).

4.2. US Foreign Policy towards Islamic Countries under Barack Obama

After being elected Obama was confronted with dealing with on-going conflicts in Iraq, Israel-Gaza, Afghanistan and Pakistan. As well as keeping on fighting terrorism, and promoting development and democracy, “The Foreign Policy of US President Barack Obama can be assessed most usefully in two parts: first, his goals and decision-making system and, second, his policies and their implementation. Although one can speak with some confidence about the former, the latter is still an unfolding process” (Brzezinski, 2010: 1).

On January 26, Obama gave his first formal interview as president to the Arabic-language television news channel Al Arabiya. Obama said that, “My job to the Muslim world is to communicate that the Americans are not your enemy” (Huffington Post, 2009). Obama stated that he had spent several years growing up in the world’s most populous Muslim nation, Indonesia, in what as a somewhat successful attempt to find common ground. This gesture by Obama’s, in trying to reach out to the Muslim world was an unprecedented attitude for a US president.

“Reflecting a globalized economy, the rise of new powers, declining U.S. economic fortunes, and the appearance of unique, complex security challenges, Obama adds some new components to U.S. foreign policy. (...) sees a post American world where soft power and multilateralism become hallmarks of a new strategic paradigm” (Celso, 2012: 3). As a result, when, on December 2010, the world watched as a series of Islamic Countries began uprising against their governments to what was called “The Arab Spring”, US under Obama’s Administration did not make a move to suppress or aid in any tangible way these movements.

It is true that US, as a country, has sanctioned Syria and alongside with the UN has invaded Libya but no further actions were taken into account.

For a superpower that has spent 60 years claiming to be a sentinel of Middle Eastern stability, even stalemate, the record recently has been very different. Mr Obama helped push an old friend, Hosni Mubarak, out of office in Egypt. He has sought to midwife a new order in Yemen to replace that led by another partner, Ali Abdullah Saleh. He has blessed the removal of an ally in Tunisia, Zine Al Abedin bin Ali. He is demanding that Bashar Al Assad step down in Syria. And he has used the US military to help unseat Muammar Qaddafi in Libya. US support for the monarchy in Bahrain is the exception confirming the rule” (Young *in* The National, 2011).

Obama’s administration supported the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 to create a no-fly zone in Libya and on March 2011, Obama endorsed the firing of 110 Tomahawk cruise missiles against targets in Libya, as a response to the regime deeds against rebel forces. This revealed the world that US was interested in the pursuit of a friendlier Foreign Policy under the Barack Obama’s Administration and as a country but when having the

support of the International Community was as able to strike just as the Administration before did. Nevertheless, searching for the International Support was a big change from what US used to do.

Then, on May 2nd 2011, Obama managed to do something that Bush tried real hard and failed. On that day, the former leader of the Islamist militant group Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden was killed in Pakistan by the Navy Seals. When addressing the Nation on 2011 Obama said that “For over two decades, Bin Laden has been Al Qaeda’s leader and symbol, and has continued to plot attacks against our country and our friends and allies. The death of bin Laden marks the most significant achievement to date in our nation’s effort to defeat al Qaeda” (The White House, 2011).

Obama also had the care to separate Muslims from terrorist while he said that Osama Bin Laden was not a Muslim leader but a killer, “As we do, we must also reaffirm that the United States is not -- and never will be -- at war with Islam. I’ve made clear, just as President Bush did shortly after 9/11, that our war is not against Islam. Bin Laden was not a Muslim leader; he was a mass murderer of Muslims” (The White House, 2011).

Obama’s actions towards the Islamic World has shown that Foreign Policy towards Islamic countries is one of

the central areas of concern that have taken up most of the administration’s time and energy: pursuing counterterrorism, including through the war in Afghanistan, the related conflict in Pakistan, and the larger struggle to combat al-Qaeda on multiple continents; ending the war in Iraq; (...) trying to thwart Iran’s nuclear ambitions; attempting to facilitate a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and last but by no means least, trying to avoid further international economic instability and crisis (Carothers, 2012: 43).

US under Obama’s leadership still condemn terrorism but it is just not interested in fighting it at all costs. Obama is capable of using force in order to implement his policies but all in all he has clear interest in creating a better relationship between US and Islamic countries.

4.2.1.Iraq

Obama’s main Foreign Policy decision towards Iraq was definitely the one he made regarding US army’s withdraw from the country. On April 2009, Obama’s paid his first visit as US President to Iraq where he said that “It is time for us to transition to the Iraqis. They need to take responsibility for their country and for their sovereignty” (The White House, 2009).

The withdraw of US military from Iraq was an expected outcome for even before being President Obama had always stated his disagreement on Bush’s Iraq Invasion. Obama wrote,

I opposed the war in Iraq before it began, and would end it as president. I believed it was a grave mistake to allow ourselves to be distracted from the fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban by invading a country that posed no imminent threat and had nothing to do with the 9/11 attacks. Since then, more than 4,000 Americans have died and we have spent nearly \$1 trillion. Our military is overstretched. Nearly every threat we face – from Afghanistan to Al Qaeda to Iran – has grown (Obama, 2008: 1).

During Obama's first term, his Foreign Policy claimed that sending military action to Iraq was to divert essential human resources leaving the real "war on terrorism" unprotected.

On one hand, Obama was ideologically against war on Iraq, on the other he had the perception that this war was taking a toll on America's budget. As a result, Obama

finds unacceptable the costs to the United States of an open-ended commitment to continue a war that should never have been started. Obama concludes that in the overall interest of the United States, it is necessary to start withdrawing US ground combat troops at a steady but, he emphasizes, "careful" pace (Holbrooke, 2008: 5).

Obama wanted two things, to withdraw Iraq as quickly as he could and to do it in the least harmful way for both countries - US and Iraq.

By saying that it was time for Iraqis to take responsibility on their country Barack Obama was placing a confidence vote on Iraqi's leaders, allowing him to pursue other necessities on the Foreign Policy field.

One of the most important steps the Obama administration can take is to extend Washington's vision beyond Iraq. The "surge" in US troops, and arguably even more a change in US tactics and the willingness of Sunni and Shiite leaders to establish and maintain order in their communities, has created an opening for the United States to devote attention to other regional issues (Haass and Indyk, 2009: 3).

As a result, Iraq is now on the hands of its government, free-elected, but still dealing with many war related issues that will linger in time.

4.2.2.Iran

Obama's Foreign Policy on Iran is utterly related to its Nuclear Program. While speaking to world leaders at the UN General Assembly on 25th September 2012, Obama said that a nuclear armed Iran was not something that US would approve for it would directly threaten Israel and indirectly, the rest of the world.

Obama's soft power policy making regarding Iran does not bend towards major issues such as the nuclear program or the constant menaces made towards long last US ally - Israel. Even though, Obama decided to use the diplomatic way to convey his ideas for the relationship

these two countries should maintain, he also was concerned about not letting the (still) unknown range of power of this county increase further.

As a result, although Obama's Foreign Policy towards Iran is more sympathetic than the one Bush's had, Obama still uses a hard power approach through the imposition of sanctions and the clarification that US will not stand on an attack on Western countries. Obama's Foreign Policy made clear that it does not encourages any desires that Iran may have regarding the improvement of its nuclear program, "On Iran, finally, Obama tried engagement, received no encouraging response, and so has imposed strong sanctions and kept all options firmly on the table regarding Tehran's nuclear, and wider strategic, ambitions" (Milne, 2012: 943).

With his Foreign Policy it might seem that "Obama has been inconsistent on Iran, seeming more diplomatic than his predecessor, but at the same time supporting a stiffening of sanctions—a classical act of belligerence" (Gregory, 2011:12). But in fact, Obama is gaining precious time in order to make a more accurate assessment on what is Iran's real nuclear power as well as what is the International Community view on this subject,

Obama should offer direct official engagement with the Iranian government, without preconditions, along with other incentives in an attempt to turn Tehran away from developing the capacity to rapidly produce substantial amounts of nuclear-weapons-grade fuel. At the same time, he should lay the groundwork for an international effort to impose harsher sanctions on Iran if it proves unwilling to change course (Haass and Martin Indyk, 2009: 1).

Nevertheless, Obama's Foreign Policy towards Iran has a major difference from Bush's. Obama is willing to do a more active diplomacy work in Iran in order to solve the main issues on this countries related to USA,

Obama has said repeatedly that he is ready to have direct contacts with Iran at whatever level he thinks would be productive, not only on nuclear issues but also on Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran's support for terrorist organizations, including Hamas and Hezbollah (which Iran has equipped with tens of thousands of rockets aimed directly at Israel's heartland) (Holbrooke, 2008:6).

4.2.3.Turkey

Obama's first diplomatic visit as a president was to Turkey. This is even more important as Turkey is a Muslim country. Between 6th and 7th of April of 2009 the USA President went to Turkey with the strong conviction of reinforcing the alliances with this country, which is strategically positioned between Europe and other Muslim countries.

Obama's address to the Turkish Parliament reinforced the importance of this country in the global context "Turkey is a critical ally. Turkey is an important part of Europe. And Turkey

and the United States must stand together - and work together - to overcome the challenges of our time” (The White House, 2009).

Obama made a real effort to change US Foreign Policy towards Turkey as Bush’s had degraded significantly this relationship, “It would be unfair to argue that under Obama, Turkish - American relations will face more of the same. Turkey may still end up getting less attention than it deserves. But the Obama administration is likely to be very different from its immediate predecessor in one key aspect: a genuine preference for multilateralism” (Taspinar, 2009: 14). From Obama’s first visit to Turkey until all of Obama’s appeals on Turkish Government to speak out in favour of US political agenda, Obama has clearly stated that Turkey plays an important role on US Foreign Policy.

Turkey is important not only geopolitically but also because is a democratic Muslim country.

While helping to bolster bilateral US-Turkish relations, Obama’s trip was primarily designed to take advantage of Turkey’s unique role as a member of the Western community of nations as well as of the Muslim world. Throughout his visit, Obama underlined the positive message he has been sending to Muslims since his inauguration relating to a new relationship based on ‘mutual respect’ (Aliriza, 2009: 1).

As a result US and Turkey share nowadays similar interests and goals, that can be benefited by this relationship as

it becomes clear that the alliance between the United States and Turkey is founded on a firm base of diverse and deep shared interests. And when one considers so many of the pressing challenges in the world today, it becomes equally clear that U.S.-Turkish cooperation can be a force for immense progress (Gordon, 2010: 5).

4.3.Main Findings

The relationship between USA and the Islamic Countries improved, as when Obama was elected and afterwards, during his Cairo Speech, presented a message of hope and union.

Obama made some promises to the Islamic community and while some were accomplished (like the withdrawal of US army from Iraq) others felt short (like finding a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict).

Obama’s refusal to engage on a more vigorous action during the Arab Spring while attacking Libya with UN’s consent shows an US Foreign Policy more committed to what the rest of the International Community wants. Shows that US is not putting “America First” no matter what the consequences are.

Obama's Foreign Policy towards Iraq has much to do with his beliefs before becoming President, as he did not supported the US invasion on Iraq. Obama withdraw US military forces from Iraq as soon as he could while US is still helping Iraq rebuilt after the war. US Foreign Policy towards Iran was related to what US still perceives as a menace on the West but without concrete proofs they remain uncertain. Finally on Turkey, Obama made an effort to improve US relationship with this country that has been a US ally since the Cold War.

After four years of Presidency US Foreign Policy under Barack Obama has revealed itself as having some problems and not being perfect but as trying to make amends with the past.

Chapter 5 - Islamic Countries' Perceptions of US Foreign Policy

One of the most important things regarding Muslim countries has to do with the fact that many of them do not really have a separation between Politics and Religion. In many Islamic Countries the Head of State is also the Head of the Mosque, and the Koran is sacred and mandatory and Shari'a is the law. For Western countries, especially US, the fact that the three powers (judiciary, legislature and executive) are concentrated in one person or small group of people, is the first step to taint the Political and Social process.

Western and Eastern countries have different perspectives on Political, Social, Religious, Economical and Cultural issues.

History demonstrates that political Islam is both extremist and mainstream. On the one hand, Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran, the Taliban's Afghanistan, and Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda as well as terrorists from Morocco to Indonesia have espoused a revolutionary Islam that relies on violence and terror. On the other, many Islamist social and political movements across the Muslim world have worked within the political system (Esposito, Georgetown University, 2007)

In order to succeed in a favourable Foreign Policy towards Islamic Countries it is necessary to understand how they think and what they want. It is also important to make a distinction in the response whether we are talking about Moderate Muslims or Extremists. Nevertheless, is this separation important when the path is done the other way around? Do moderate and extremist Muslims think very differently about US Foreign Policy?

When asked what they admired most about the West, both extremists and moderates had the identical top three spontaneous responses: (1) technology; (2) the West's value system, hard work, self-responsibility, rule of law, and cooperation; and (3) its fair political systems, democracy, respect for human rights, freedom of speech, and gender equality. A significantly higher percent of potential extremists than moderates (50 percent versus 35 percent) believe that 'moving towards greater governmental democracy' will foster progress in the Arab/Muslim world. Potential extremists believe even more strongly than moderates (58 percent versus 45 percent) that Arab/Muslim nations are eager to have better relations with the West. Finally, no significant difference exists between the percentage of potential extremists and moderates who said 'better relations with the West concerns me a lot' (Idem).

It seems that what differs the most between moderate and extremists Muslims has more to do with the perception they have that US will not let them lead their own political agenda, or to adapt the notions of freedom and democracy to their religious beliefs, more than it has to do with the potential ties that may, one day emerge from US and Middle East countries.

Other thing that took a toll on the views Islamic Countries have of US Foreign Policy has directly to do with the privileged relationship US has with Israel.

Islamic Countries also have a problem with the way, they believe, the West perceives them. Several incidents have occurred along the last few years, regarding movies, pictures and books related to the Islam. One of the last incidents took place in September 2012, when an anti-Islam movie was released in US. Just a few days later a French newspaper also published a cartoon mocking the Prophet, which made Muslims even angrier.

According to Swiss activist Manfred Petritsch who gave an interview to Iranian Press TV,

A lot of people believe that the cause for all this protest is the film, but I think it's not the film; the film was just the ignition point... There was a whole explosive mixture existing because of the American Foreign Policy or the Foreign Policy of the West as a whole against all Islamic Countries; against the war they are fighting; against this double standard they are doing; against the killer drones, which are killing hundreds of civilians (Press TV, 2012).

It is clear that Islamic Countries expect a different treatment from the US counterpart, in order to improve the way they perceive US Foreign Policy it is necessary that US becomes willing to cooperate further and modulate some issues.

The single most important step the United States can take to combat Islamist extremism is to support "Islamic renewal," a recent, diffuse but growing social, political, and intellectual movement that aims to cultivate modern norms and address modern needs by drawing on Islamic traditions (Maghraoui, 2006: 28).

5.1. Islamic Views of Bush's and Obama's Foreign Policy

This subchapter will try to portray the image Islamic countries, especially those selected to this study, have of US Foreign Policy. We have seen that the US Foreign Policy towards Islamic Countries has changed a great deal from George W. Bush to Barack Obama. But we still do not have a clear picture of what the leaders and the people living in these countries think.

The differences, religious, cultural, political, social and economical, are so big between America and the Middle East countries that it might be possible that the image of US Foreign Policy has not changed as much as the Foreign Policy itself. "Following his election, Obama made it a priority to change America's dismal image in the Muslim world, most prominently in his June 2009 Cairo speech. And he has had some successes; in fact, Muslim publics still generally give him more positive ratings than Bush received" (Wike, Foreign Policy, 2012).

However, it has only been four years since Barack Obama assumed the US Government and "Muslims around the world continue to voice the same criticisms of US Foreign Policy that

were common in the Bush years. US anti-terrorism efforts are still widely unpopular. America is still seen as ignoring the interests of other countries” (Idem).

With all the changes occurring in Middle East countries since December 2010, known as the Arab Spring, countries as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, have been facing dramatic political and social modifications. Some, like in Libya and Syria, have become extremely violent and the inaction of US, that has not lead locally an intervention, but acted only through sanctions or with the support of UN, may have not been seen in a very positive way. Being that the opinion of several Foreign Policy experts is that “The president has tried, though not very convincingly, to play up the fact that the US, as the world's leading democracy, has a desire to see democracy triumph elsewhere” (Young, The National, 2011).

In a way or the other, and because history taught us that even tough things may repeat in a very similar way, there are no repeating moments, the Muslim Countries perceptions must have changed even if just a little bit as we are going to show in this chapter. In the selected countries, Iraq, Iran and Turkey, some have experienced a bigger change in US Foreign Policy than others but still, a change.

5.1.1. Iraq on Bush’s Foreign Policy

One of the most criticized things during the invasion of Iraq by the US army was the previous relationship that existed between these two countries. The Secretary of State, Donald Rumsfeld, that approved the pre-emptive war, was the same Rumsfeld that twenty years before was shaking hands with Saddam as a special envoy of President Ronald Reagan. (see Photo I). In 1983, not only was Iraq an ally of US but also was protected and received help (including arming) in the war against Iran.

Twenty years later, in 2003, Iraq was being invaded by US military forces and Saddam Hussein was deposed. In 2003 and 2004 the country was run by a Coalition Provisional Authority which had the support of US government resulting in a dependent relation between the Iraqi government and the one in USA. In 2004 Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer assumed the position of Acting President buying Iraq another year before the first free elections post-war.

Even though other names were spoken, Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer was the chosen one. Then, on April 5th 2005 free elections lead to Ibrahim al-Jaafari (of the Islamic Dawa Party) taking place as Prime-Minister while Jalal Talabani (founder and secretary general of one of the main Kurdish political parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) assumed the presidency.

Nevertheless, Iraq’s government was still extremely dependent of US’ approval, and when al-Jaafari was pressured by George W. Bush and Tony Blair to withdraw his nomination, refused

any foreign interference in the Iraqi politics and instead gave the United Iraqi Alliance the choice to decide whom they wanted to Prime Minister. This ended up leading to his replacement by Nuri Kamil Mohammed Hasan al-Maliki, of the same political party.

Any results that may be found are tainted because the perceived outcome on what Iraq's government thinks of Bush's Foreign Policy is very good. After all, it was US' support that enabled them to achieve power.

On November 2006 Bush and al-Maliki issued a joint statement in which Bush said

I told the Prime Minister we're ready to make changes to better support the unity government of Iraq, and that certain key principles behind our strategy remain firm and they're fixed. First, we believe the success of Prime Minister Maliki's government is critical to the success in Iraq. His government was chosen by the Iraqi people through free elections in which nearly 12 million people defied terrorists to cast their ballots (The New York Times, 2006).

Al-Maliki replied that

I would also like to thank the President of the United States for his response and for the role that he has shown in dealing most positively with all the files that we've discussed. And I would like, during this occasion as we leave this transitional stage, we have won initially when we have accomplished democracy in Iraq and when we give Iraq the permanent constitution and the parliament and the unity government. (...) And Iraq will never be a safe haven for terrorists who are trying to spread darkness instead of light" (Idem, 2006).

Nevertheless, further along the time, al-Maliki wanted to make perfectly clear that even though both countries shared ties of friendship he is has sovereignty over Iraq's government - "I am a friend of the United States, but I am not America's man in Iraq" (CBS News, 2009).

President Jalal Talabani went a bit further on September 2005 when he thanked Americans by saying "We owe to those American heroes who came to liberate us from the worst kind of dictatorship. (...) Thanks to your brave Army, now Iraqi people (are free)" (United States Department of Defense, 2005).

And three years later, on September 2008 he doubled his thanks when he met George W. Bush on the White House by saying,

Thank you very much for giving me the honor of meeting you again. I think it's clear that we are in Iraq looking to you as a hero of liberation of Iraq from worst kind of dictatorship. And now we are working with your -- with you, Mr. President, for finalizing the strategic framework agreement between United States and Iraq. And also, we are always getting benefit from your views about how to secure Iraq. I think you know very well that you and we in Iraq achieved very good successes on terrorism" (The White House, 2008).

Even though, Iraqi's government opinion is generally positive towards Bush's Foreign Policy in Iraq, Iraqi people's views may differ. For once, violent deaths have escalated ever since Iraq

was invaded by US in 2003 “The risk of death from violence in the period after the invasion was 58 times higher (...) than in the period before the war” (Roberts, 2004: 1).

It also seems that the fact Iraq nation has several ethnicities and religions subtypes can lead to mixed results on what Iraqi’s think about US intervention on their country, “Iraqis are conflicted, with about one-half of both Shia and Sunni Arabs saying that they are “worse off,” while 60% of Kurds say they are “better off.” Overall, about one-quarter of all Iraqis say their situation is “the same” (Zogby, 2011: 1) (see Table IV).

We should bear in mind that the Iraq’s President is a Kurd and the Prime-Minister is a Shiite. As a result, it’s normal that the Kurds feel that things are now better than before while Shia and Sunni Arabs feel the opposite. This has to do with the fact that Kurds feel represented in the new Iraqi government, while Sunni and Shia Arabs do not.

Zogby study conducted in 2011 and regarding the previous eight years of Ira’s existence produced interesting results as

Majorities of Iraqi respondents say that the impact of the war has been negative with respect to their personal safety and security (72%), economic development and employment (66%), administration of government services (59%), and relations with neighboring countries (54%). One-half feel there has been a negative impact on political freedom (as opposed to one-third who say that political freedom has advanced). Similarly almost one-half of Iraqis feel the impact on education has been negative. The results are more mixed in terms of women’s rights (26% positive, 37% negative, 26% no impact) (Zogby, 2011: 6).

Nevertheless, Iraqi’s people confidence on US is really low with more than 40% stating they don’t have any confidence in US or UK occupation forces (see Graphic IV).

It is not clear if Bush’s Foreign Policy in Iraq developed a more effective and efficient diplomacy in Iraq. The perceptions are different: to Iraq’s governments it did, but for the people of Iraq, it did not.

5.1.2.Iran on Bush’s Foreign Policy

When 9/11 happened Iran’s President was Mohammed Khatami, a reformist that advocated freedom of expression, tolerance and civil society. Khatami also spoke for an economic policy that supported a free market and foreign investment and a well-adjusted diplomatic relations with other states including in the Asia and European Union. Nevertheless, “The Iranian revolution of 1979, which was partly a rejection of US influence on Iran, has been a major force behind the growth of anti-US Islamism. The tide of anti-US Islamism would never have reached present levels without the rhetoric and the example of the Iranian revolution” (Khan, 2003: 4).

When the attacks on US occurred Mohammed condemned them as terrorism, however US-Iran relations went sour when Bush classified Iran as one of the “axis of evil” countries. When Bush began to menace Middle East with military retaliations Khatami advised him to think it through, “I believe that if he (Bush) has any sense he should know they can't (overturn Iran's independence), and if they can, the price they will pay is far heavier than we would” (China Daily, 2005).

Nevertheless, under Khatami's regime, Iran never stopped trying to improve Iran's relationship with US, “His re-election in 2001 seemed to offer opportunity for a thaw with the United States. In 2003, Iran admitted the existence of a clandestine nuclear program and agreed to suspend all nuclear research. Mr. Khatami was reported to have offered the Bush administration a ‘grand bargain’, which would have included the abandonment of all nuclear ambitions in return for more normal relations, an offer that was rejected” (The New York Times, 2003). But Bush refused any possibility of mediation and, when on 2005 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected President of Iran things took a turn to the worst for Ahmadinejad is much more conservative and prone to dictatorial actions.

On 2006 Ahmadinejad decided to write a letter to Bush in which he questioned Bush's decisions as invading Iraq. He wrote

Can one be a follower of Jesus Christ (...) at the same time, have countries attacked; the lives, reputations and possessions of people destroyed and on the slight chance of the ... criminals in a village city, or convoy for example the entire village, city or convey set ablaze. Or because of the possibility of the existence of WMDs in one country, it is occupied, around one hundred thousand people killed, its water sources, agriculture and industry destroyed, close to 180,000 foreign troops put on the ground, sanctity of private homes of citizens broken, and the country pushed back perhaps fifty years (Washington Post, 2006).

The letter clearly stated some content on Bush's Foreign Policies towards Islamic countries. Written in a provocative tone, Ahmadinejad also said that “Liberalism and Western style democracy have not been able to help realize the ideals of humanity. Today these two concepts have failed. Those with insight can already hear the sounds of the shattering and fall of the ideology and thoughts of the liberal democratic systems” (Washington Post, 2006), in a veiled way of saying Iran is not interested in the Western concepts of Democracy and Liberalism.

But Iran is an Islamic Country with a peculiarity for its government is not independent from the countries' major religion. Above Ahmadinejad, President elected by the Iranian, lays the Supreme Leader, who also embodies the supreme religious chef of Islam.

The Gran Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, perceived Bush's Foreign Policy in an extremely negative way. In fact, during Bush's Administration things took a toll for the worse, for “US-Iranian

relations have undoubtedly grown more adversarial during the Bush administration; in exchange for Iran's "axis of evil" label, Khamenei has begun referring to the United States as "the devil incarnated" (Sadjadpour, 2009: 15).

For whatever reason Bush never did to Iran what he had done to Iraq, and even though US-Iran relations never improved during his administration, it also did not achieve an unbearable breaking point. Khamenei implied to the US government that in if the conditions are the right ones; Iran-US can enjoy a fruitful partnership.

While Khamenei's mistrust of the Bush administration and personal animosity towards President Bush are too deep to be overcome, his speeches reflect a growing Iranian confidence that US Foreign Policy elites are coming to terms with America's difficulties in Iraq, Iran's indispensable role in the Middle East, its mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle, and the legitimacy of the Islamic Republican government. Khamenei's message is that he is amenable to a relationship with an America that has accepted these realities (Sadjadpour, 2009: 17).

So, we have seen so far that Iran's government perception on Bush's Foreign Policy is not the best. What about the one held by Iranians?

Perhaps one of the most exhaustive studies about Iranian-American attitudes towards each other is by the World Public Opinion Organization that was published in 2007. Through questionnaire, interview and web survey, they asked Iranians and Americans about key international issues. Results showed that forty-nine percent of Iranians had an unfavorable opinion of the American people (33% very, 16% somewhat). Forty-five percent had a favorable opinion (9% very, 36% somewhat). These results also showed that a clear majority of Americans also have a negative view of the Iranian people. Fifty-nine percent said they had an unfavorable opinion of the Iranian people (20% very), while only 29 percent said they had a favorable opinion. Four studies used schema theory for analysis of Iranian-American attitudes toward each other. The first study was conducted by Ahmad-Zadeh *et al.* (2005) and showed that Americans do not believe in common stereotypes about Iranians in the Western media. This study also showed that Iranians have "positive stereotypes" about American people. However, they had limited their respondents to Iranian and American university students and professors. They interviewed their Iranian respondents while American respondents were reached by email. A second study was done by Mirani *et al.* (2006) and showed that their Iranian respondents have favorable attitudes towards Americans, but their project failed because Americans did not respond to their questionnaire (Shahghasemi, 2011: 3).

Not many studies have been made but the ones referred previously clearly state that Iranian's have a mixed impression over US Foreign Policy. Educated Iranians tend to perceive US Foreign Policy in a more positive way than those with no education. Nevertheless, and as a result, overall, Bush's Foreign Policy and leadership style in Iran was not well embraced.

5.1.3. Turkey on Bush's Foreign Policy

Bush's Foreign Policy towards Turkey is very different than the one he outlined for the two countries studied before. However, it seems that it was not an obstacle on Turks perception of Bush's Foreign Policy as negative, as "Pew Global Attitudes Survey published in June found that the Muslim country in which the US held the least favourable rating was Turkey. (...) Turks had roughly the same amount of confidence in George Bush as they had in Osama Bin Laden" (Transatlantic Trends, 2009). As a result, 58% of Turks did not like Bush at all (See Graphic V).

The fact that US Foreign Policy under Bush was unilateral, with its focus on the America's First concept lead to the degradation of the relationship between these two countries, "More than any other factor, the Bush administration's failure to respond to Turkey's calls for assistance against the PKK soured Turkish official and popular opinion toward America" (Parris, 2008: 8).

As a result Turks began to feel suspicious of US real intentions for

Bush administration's performance since 2002 has led many Turks in and out of government seriously to question - for the first time since World War II - whether Washington has the clarity of purpose and competence necessary to achieve the strategic objectives the two countries share (Parris, 2008: 10).

In a word, Turks feared that in need they would not receive US help. And that was a greater problem as Iraq borders Turkey,

It is the attacks of 9/11 and the Bush administration's decision to overthrow Saddam, however, that provided the final coup de grace pushing Turkey towards the Middle East. Washington needed Ankara to participate in its plans and pressed very hard to open a second-northern-front against Baghdad in 2003. Had it not been for an-unintentional-parliamentary debacle, Turkish troops would have entered Iraq to establish a cordon sanitaire behind the advancing US 4th Infantry Division. In a confusing ballot, the Turkish parliament voted not to allow for the transitioning of US troops (Barkey, 2008: 2).

When Turkey refused to help US, Bush was confronted with two possible ways, to dwell on that and lose a precious ally for good, or to overcome. Bush decided to let that one slide as

The Bush administration came to the conclusion that punishing Ankara's decision which was embedded in the democratic process would be in conflict with US goals for democratization in the Middle East. Therefore, US policy towards Turkey did not change. The US continued to lend support to Turkey's EU drive; Washington continued to support Turkey in the IMF; Congress passed a bill authorizing the administration to offer USD 1 billion grant to Turkey as compensation and the US continued to portray Turkey as an

inspiration for democracy in the region. In the US there is a fairly broad community of political opponents.” (Taşpınar, 2005:12 and 13).

However, Turkey’s perception on US Foreign Policy towards them continued to diminish and in June 2005, Erdogan visited Bush in US where he stated “I am happy that we were able to confirm that our strategic relationship will move along the same path as it has in the past” (Gorvett, 2005, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs). Erdogan was referring to the disagreement both countries had on Iraq invasion when, in March 2003, Turkey’s newly elected parliament voted against allowing US troops to use Turkey as a forward base for the invasion of Iraq. That was not the only time Turkey went another way regarding US wishes to Foreign Policy related issues (Erdogan accused Israel of “state terrorism”; he supported the Franco-British-German position on Iran’s nuclear program and he visited Syria) but it was the most serious one.

As time went by, and Bush’s Doctrine went softer so did the relationship between these two countries. In November 2007, when Erdogan met Bush on USA again he stated that “We have had an opportunity to discuss various issues such as dissolving of the terrorist camps, the capture of leaders of the terrorist organization, or other steps that may be necessary, cutting off logistical support, et cetera. And we believe that it is very important for us to work jointly on a diplomatic, political and military level, and cooperate” (The White House, 2007). That statement had as a goal to reinforcing the idea that joining forces and working together with US is better than to be on the other side.

A few months later, on January 2008, it was the Turkey’s President, Abdullah Gul, who visited Bush in the US. He was a more effusive in his words than his Prime Minister had been before. He thanked Bush for having invited him and underlined the benefits that both countries have in working alongside as allies.

I would like to thank the President for his invitation here. Turkey and the United States are longstanding allies and the relationship between our two countries continues to be strengthened. We have -- we share a common vision and we work together, and the relations between the two countries are such that they have an impact not only on the two countries, but also on a regional and global scale (*in* The White House Archives).

Turkey’s perception of US Foreign Policy was one of the most damaged by Bush’s Doctrine, for both government and people feared that Bush’s unilateral approach on the international and political agenda could harm, more than benefit, Turkey and the Turks.

As time went by, and as Bush’s Foreign Policy became less aggressive, Turkey’s Prime Minister and President tried to resume Turkey-US relationship.

By challenging US, Turkey showed its sovereignty and gained a place on the international arena, “Perhaps Turkey failed to fit in Rumsfeld’s “Old” versus “New” Europe, but Ankara

certainly gained a place of its own with the distress it created for the Bush administration” (Taşpınar, 2005: 1).

5.1.4.Main Findings

Islamic countries were a very important part of Bush’s Foreign Policy. Under his doctrine, he invaded Iraq, sanctioned Iran and placed it in a terrorist’s list, and tried to use Turkey in order to fulfil its needs while disregarding Turkey’s own necessities.

As a result of his Foreign Policy and assertive leadership style the main conclusions are:

- Iraqis’ people are confused on the results US policy towards them. Responses varied as Iraqis’ ethnicity did. Nevertheless, majority of Iraqis’ perceive as having worst life conditions after US invasion as their confidence on US is also low. On the other hand, Iraqis’ government applauded Bush’s measures as US approved their rise to the power.
- Iran’s people have mixed opinions on US Foreign Policy, with the ones with higher education having better remarks on Bush’s Doctrine. Regarding Iran’s government the perception is not very good and has significantly decrease under Ahmadinejad’s ruling. Iran’s government perceived Bush’s Foreign Policy, not only towards Iran but also towards other Islamic countries, as prejudicial.
- Turkey is an US ally for decades. It was also the country that decreased the most on perceiving US Foreign Policies as good. The notion that Bush’ unilateralism could harm Turkey led to a series of public challenges from Turkey to US. Even though, US remained as an ally both countries relationship suffered a toll.

Bush’ concept of “America First” was bad-perceived on other countries. The invasion of Iraq under false pretences empowered this idea, and US continual necessity to put its needs first disregarding other countries requests was fundamental to the poor image US transmitted to these Islamic countries under Bush’s Administration.

5.1.5.Iraq on Obama’s Foreign Policy

Obama was always against war on Iraq. Even before becoming US President Obama was already writing on how he disagreed with this war. After Iraq’s invasion, Obama became more focused on resolving the issue,

We must launch a comprehensive regional and international diplomatic initiative to help broker an end to the civil war in Iraq, prevent its spread, and limit the suffering of the Iraqi people. To gain credibility in this effort, we must make clear that we seek no permanent bases in Iraq. We should leave behind only a minimal over-the-horizon military force in the region to protect American personnel and facilities, continue training Iraqi security forces, and root out al Qaeda (Obama, 2007: 2).

The departure of US soldiers from Iraq was one of Obama's campaign promises and would happen four years later after he had written the essay.

Obama recognized the US dual responsibility to help forge a better future for Iraq and to leave Iraq in a timely manner to the Iraqis, as well as to assist the Afghans to defeat the Taliban. He reaffirmed this first step in the American contributions toward Middle Eastern peace and stability, and American friendship for the Islamic world (Prosser, 2009: 13).

President "Obama's policy prescription was straightforward: he would withdraw all US troops within 16 months of his election" (Lindsay, 2011: 771). That began on June 2009 and was finished by December 2011. One of Obama's Foreign Policy point laid on the fact he understood that all actions made toward others should receive previous agreement of the receiver, "As Obama rightly notes, much of what he or any US president wants to achieve overseas requires the cooperation of others" (Idem: 766).

This is directly linked to the US withdrawal of Iraq which received a strong support from Iraqi's government. This major event led the Prime-Minister al-Maliki to say on a public statement to an Iraqi TV station - "I declare this day, the 31st of December, on which the withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq is complete, as a national day" (Reuters, 2011).

Although, US withdrawal from Iraq was something long awaited by the International arena as well as sought out by Iraqi leaders the feelings that generated towards Iraqi population was not as clear.

Accordingly to a poll made on both American and Iraqi people in 2011, the result was scattered,

Looking forward, Americans and Iraqis seem to agree, at least on the surface, that the departure of American forces from Iraq is a 'good thing'. By a margin of two to one Iraqis say the withdrawal is positive. (...) On this matter, Iraqi views can again be described as conflicted: 22% saying they are happy; 35% saying they are worried; and 30% saying they feel both emotions. The reasons for this mixed Iraqi mood can be seen when we look more closely at a range of concerns as to what might unfold following an American withdrawal from Iraq. Almost six in ten Iraqis say they are concerned about the possibility that the following might occur: 'civil war', 'the country will split into parts', 'increased terrorism', 'economic deterioration', and the fear that Iraq 'may be dominated by a neighboring country' (Zogby, 2011: 2).

After that survey, no further reviews were made on how Iraqi people perceived US' Foreign Policy under Obama towards Iraq. We think that it has not changed much since Bush's Administration, even though the US departure from Iraq had a positively connotation throughout the world.

On Obama's first term as US President, Iraq held new parliamentary elections which were involved in much controversy. Government was formed but not before Obama and his Vice President, Joe Biden, had asked elected President Jalal Talabani to renounce in favour of Iyad Allawi, whose coalition was declared the biggest winner of the parliamentary election with two seats surpassing al-Maliki's party in the Assembly.

Jalal Talabani refused as Qubad Talabani, Talabani's son and the Washington representative of the Kurdistan Regional Government, said the Kurds were disappointed with the United States.

"As the deadlock continues, Iyad Allawi has said the only post he wants is prime minister or president. The Americans have come to us and have asked us to step aside and relinquish the post of president to Iraqiya and specifically to Iyad Allawi, which we find very disappointing" (Washington News, 2010).

This deadlock was eventually solved with Jalal Talabani maintenance as Iraq's President, al-Maliki as Iraq's Prime-Minister and Allawi as the new Security Council.

This event took a toll on Iraq-US relationship as it was seen as America's attempt to influence Iraq's sovereignty. Just a year later, when Iraq's Prime-Minister went to visit Obama, they issued a joint statement in which al-Maliki said,

We have succeeded in signing several agreements through the educational initiative, which put hundreds of our college graduates to continue their graduate studies and specialized subject in American universities. And I am putting it before everyone who is watching the relationship between the U.S. and Iraq. It is a very -- it has very high aspirations. (...) Your Excellency, President Obama, you said that there will be long-range relationships with Iraq. Can you tell us exactly, will Iraq be an ally of the United States or just a friend, or will have a different type of relationship? (The White House, 2011).

The question posed by al-Maliki exposed Iraq's concerns on US Foreign Policy towards them, as it is still not clear the nature of US-Iraq's relationship in the midst of the political and international arena.

5.1.6. Iran on Obama's Foreign Policy

Even though Obama's Foreign Policy towards Middle East has a stronger emphasis on soft power, he has not put aside his concerns on US security regarding the possibility that Iran is leading a nuclear weapons program. While speaking to the UN's on 2012 Obama said

Make no mistake: a nuclear-armed Iran is not a challenge that can be contained. It would threaten the elimination of Israel, the security of Gulf nations, and the stability of the global economy. It risks triggering a nuclear-arms race in the region, and the unraveling of the non-proliferation treaty. That is why a coalition of countries is holding the Iranian government

accountable. And that is why the United States will do what we must to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon (The White House, 2012).

As a response Iran's President, Ahmadinejad, replied that Iran was committed to peace and had a 'global vision and welcomes any effort intended to provide and promote peace, stability and tranquility' in the world (CNN, 2012). He also accused the world powers, particularly US, of double standards in pursuing an arms race while threatening Israel's existence, US biggest ally in Middle East,

American policy toward Israel and its support for Israeli repression against Palestinians, in fact, could be mentioned as one of the most effective factors in this regard. This policy however, has not been considered by some of the Muslim courtiers, namely Pakistan and Turkey but it has become one of the major elements of problematic relations between Iran and the United States since 1979" (Yazdani, 2008: 43).

The fact that during Obama's Administration this privileged relationship continued to thrive was patent during the UN meeting in 2012 when Obama cleared that US was always going to support Israel's right to defend itself against the attacks, which Iran perceived as a bid to weaken the Islamic republic.

In the past, President of Iran, Ahmadinejad, had some expectations towards Obama's ideas for Iran, as he wrote a letter in 2008, congratulating Obama on winning the elections and stating that "People expect an immediate and clear response to the pressure for fundamental change in the American government's policies, both foreign and domestic. This is the desire of all the world's nations and of the American nation as well, and it should be the objective and basis of all your future government's programs and actions" (Washington Post, 2008).

Nevertheless, as time went by relationship between Iran and US' Presidents became more and more aggravate leading to Ahmadinejad's saying that Obama was highly influenced by Israel pretences to target Iran in a more hostile way. Ahmadinejad vowed on an Iranian public television that Iran would never be pushed around and spoke directly to Obama when declaring,

Mr. Obama, you are a newcomer (to politics). Wait until your sweat dries and get some experience. Be careful not to read just any paper put in front of you or repeat any statement recommended...(...) [Obama] is under the pressure of capitalists and the Zionists. [American officials] bigger than you, more bullying than you, couldn't do a damn thing, let alone you (Huffington Post, 2010).

As uttered before, Iran's political destinations also rest on the hands of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, who is also Iran's Religious leader. Unlike Ahmadinejad, who public defied Obama through some explosive statements, Khamenei has welcomed Obama's preference of diplomacy over war, soft power over hard power.

In March 2012 a Russian news channel posted that,

Ayatollah Khamenei, the highest authority figure within the Islamic Republic of Iran, is publically applauding US President Barack Obama over the American commander-in-chief's insistence in postponing any military pressure overseas. Although Israel and America have both expressed concern over the possibility of a nuclear warhead procurement program in Iran, President Obama has insisted on relying on diplomatic sanctions to squash any WMD projects, much to the chagrin of trigger-happy Israelis and the president's Republican Party rivals (RT, 2012).

As a result, Obama said a month later that the United States would agree to an Iranian civilian nuclear program if they proved they were not developing a nuclear bomb in a clear attempt to build a political and peaceful bridge between these two countries (Haaretz Israeli News, 2012).

On the biggest dissention point US has with Iran - the possible existence of a nuclear weapons program,

Obama should offer direct official engagement with the Iranian government, without preconditions, along with other incentives in an attempt to turn Tehran away from developing the capacity to rapidly produce substantial amounts of nuclear-weapons-grade fuel. At the same time, he should lay the groundwork for an international effort to impose harsher sanctions on Iran if it proves unwilling to change course (Haass and Indyk, 2009: 1).

On Iranian's opinion over Obama's Foreign Policy a poll found out that even though they do not have much confidence that Obama will do the right thing regarding world affairs, that same survey discovered that that number had increased compared to what they thought about Bush, and more importantly, those who had absolutely no confidence had decreased significantly (see Graphic VI).

On the same time, more than 60% of Iranians strongly or somewhat agreed on restoring US-Iran's relation while only less than 30% strongly or somewhat opposed (see Graphic VII).

This world public opinion poll specified that these percentages, in which six out of ten Iranians are in favour of restoration diplomatic pathways between their country and the United States, was the highest percentage the Iranian government has held for three decade which favours direct talks between this US Administration and Iran.

This seems to present an interesting frame of Iran towards the notions of democracy and freedom. Even though Iran has not an entirely secular government and does not approve of many of US' Foreign Policies towards Islamic Countries they also appear open to a more constructive dialogue on this matter for "Surprising as it may seem to those who focus only on

elite-level politics, the Iranian public shows relatively strong support for democracy” (Inglehart and Welzel: 2009: 12).

5.1.7. Turkey on Obama’s Foreign Policy

One relationship that Obama actively tried to improve was the one between US and Turkey. This relation that had suffered a toll with Bush’s Administration was dear to Obama’s Foreign Policy pretensions in the Islamic world, “His recognition of Turkey’s geopolitical significance has helped immeasurably in eradicating the negative legacy of the previous administration and in opening a new chapter in relations” (Aliriza, 2009: 1).

Before continuing with the analyses on the Turkey’s perceptions of Obama’s Foreign Policy in their country, we have to keep in mind that Islamic as Turkey may be, it is still a secular country, which is trying to become a member of EU for a while and that has in-depth concepts of democracy and freedom embedded in their society, or at least, compared towards other Islamic countries,

Such improvement in transatlantic relations is good news for Turkey for a number of reasons. The most obvious one is the positive impact on Turkey-EU relations. The logic is simple: Washington has always been a strong and vocal supporter of Turkey’s European vocation. Therefore, the better America’s image in Europe the better it is for Turkey (Taspinar, 2009: 15).

However, “Since 2002, Turkey has maintained a position of promoting civil liberties without undermining security” (Davutoglu, 2008: 77). Turkey’s sense of security is very important and was the reason why they denied Bush’s access to Iraq through their borders and also the reason why their initially positive relationship with Obama’s US took a toll to the worse on the Syria matter.

When Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan met with President Barack Obama in March 2012, he described him as “my dear friend Barack”. His words were

My dear friend, Barack, thank you very much for a very fruitful meeting today. The first topic that we discussed was Syria. We extensively evaluated the situation in Syria. Of course for a country like Turkey, which has a border of 910 kilometers with Syria, the events that are taking place in Syria is very close to us, and we feel it in our hearts and we’re very encouraged to see some of the developments. (...) [we are] very pleased to see that our views in general very much overlap on Syria (The White House, 2012).

Since then a lot has changed and nowadays Turkey’s leaders are far from pleased with Obama’s perceived inaction on the escalating crisis in Syria. Accordingly with Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s statements Turkey could not accept more than 100,000 refugees. That was said in August 2012. In October he revealed that there are now 145,000 refugees in Turkey (US News, 2012).

This disappointment regarding on what Turks think that should be a proactive measure by US resulted in a mixed feeling after Obama's re-election in November. Nevertheless, we should not forget that the ties between US and Turkey forged during Obama's first term was of vital importance, as in September 2012 Obama requested Turkey's Prime-Minister to speak out against the violence committed in the aftermath of the Prophet cartoons.

Following through on Obama's request, Erdogan condemned the attack on the US Consulate during a speech he made in Ukraine while also criticizing the movie, saying that it insulted the sacred values of Islam and that it could not be justified as an exercise of freedom of expression. As an Azerbaijani newspaper stated Erdogan said at a conference in Yalta that "No one can justify acts of terror and violence, the latest example of which was the attack on the US diplomatic mission in Libya, saying that they are acting in the name of Islam" (Azerbaijan News Network, 2012).

Historically speaking, the election of Obama in 2008 was extremely important to re-establish US-Turkeys' relationship. On his first official visit abroad, Obama decided to go to Turkey which led to several appraisal statements by the Turkish government.

For instance, the Prime-Minister said USA Declaration with President Obama that "The fact that the President visited Turkey on his first overseas trip and that he described and characterized Turkish-U.S. relations as a model partnership has been very important for us politically and in the process that we all look forward to in the future as well" (The White House, 2009).

The Turkish President stated, months after this visit occurred, and regarding the Afghan issue, that "As for Afghanistan, it may not be on our agenda now, but the world is interested in the Afghan issue. Turkey is one of the key countries involved as well. I also had a long talk with Mr. Karzai, and then shared my views with President Obama as well. President Obama truly cares about Turkey's opinion on all these matters" (The Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, 2009). Being that the last sentence clearly demonstrated Obama's importance in the foreign affairs issues and the enormous consideration that the other worldwide leaders have towards him.

On the matter of Turks opinion on Obama's Administration,

Approval ratings jumped from eight percent for George Bush in 2008 to 50 percent for President Obama today. The survey was taken after the President was warmly received in the country in April so there may appear to be more spring in this bounce than there in fact is. Still, it is a trend that mirrors Obama's positive ratings throughout Europe and it is a welcome reversal of a long decline in favorable views of the US in Turkey (Transatlantic Trends, 2009).

The percentage of Turks that have a lot or somewhat confidence in Obama's increased from 2% in the Bush's 2008 era to 24% in 2012 (see Table V). On the other hand Turk's positive views on US actions improved from Bush to Obama but not as greatly (see Table VI).

5.1.8.Main Findings

Obama's Foreign Policy towards Islamic Countries tried, above all, to make amends with the past. Under his Administration, he withdraw US army from Iraq, sanctioned Iran but also tried to convey a communication pathway between the two countries and tried to repair US-Turkey's relationship by visiting this country on his first official visit abroad as US President.

As a result of his Foreign Policy and assertive leadership style the main conclusions are:

- It lacks reliable information on what Iraqis' people think of Obama leadership and Foreign Policy. The Iraqi government already experienced some distress after the 2010 elections in Iraq when President Obama asked Jalal Talabani to step down and was utterly refused. Iraq pretences have much to do with a great necessity to assert that it is a sovereign country that does not see gladly outside intervention.
- Iran's people like better Obama than they did Bush. More importantly they now feel that the reestablishment of Iran-US diplomatic highways is of great importance. The Supreme Leader seems to have made a connection with Obama regarding the US plea on Iran's dismissal of Nuclear Weaponry Program. President Ahmadinejad continues to aggravate the relationship between these two countries in what seems a more aggressive taunting on the President than what he did on Bush's Administration.
- Turkey rekindled their positive relationship with US through President Obama. The fact that he visited Turkey on his first visit as US President on a foreign country had a positive perception on Turks and even greater on Turkish members of government. The Syria subject was prejudicial to this relationship but the Turkey's government still tries to pursue Obama's request as the majority of Turks has better perception of Obama's policies than they did of Bush.

Obama made a real effort to erase bad reviews on US behaviour towards the international arena, especially in the Islamic Countries. Nevertheless, the expectations towards Obama's actions in Islamic countries were so high; that it is not all that surprising that the reactions to his actual actions were undermined (see Table VII). The anti-Americanism that was felt during Bush's administration may still exist but as US seems more committed to give a step back and letting other countries do their own policies, the feeling seems to have diminished.

Conclusions

The initial question was if a President's leadership style could be an effective and efficient influence for US diplomacy and Foreign Policy. This study concludes that it does matter and it does have an influence, even though it may not be as big as first thought of.

As Constructivism theory argues international affairs, which are made by men, are always based upon ideas and beliefs. Therefore, the more convincing a speech is or the more persuasive a thought or concept is, the better the social world is constructed and the better are conveyed notions essentials to the interaction of states.

As a result, a President's leadership style is a perfect effigy of what Constructivism defends, that the way a leader expresses his ideas can shape relationships, interests and power connections, as well as influence the way people perceive a country and its politics. In the matter of Foreign Policy towards Islamic Countries, the truth is that the ideas and concepts transmitted changed when the Presidency changed in 2008.

Bush's leadership style and Foreign Policy was described as being one extremely focused on what US wanted and on what US could benefit from others. Bush's Doctrine, as it was called, was based upon menaces, sanctions, backing down in international agreements and spreading a "war on terror" which ironically enough, was fought with war.

Bush's main concern as US President should have been on the change of Islamic Countries through improving conditions to strengthen secular forces instead proceeding to war which only weakened US power.

The 9/11 attack gave Bush the world support for it was the biggest terrorist attack made on US soil since ever. Nevertheless, as time went by reasons invoked by Bush to invade Iraq were overthrown leading to a poor image of US abroad.

Bush's engaged on a "war on terror" against Iraq, accused Iran of terrorism and worsened US-Turkey relationship by making demands that the Turks could not meet, resulting in a weakened perceived position of US in the international field.

On the other hand, the main findings were that:

1. Ethnicity played a major role in Iraqi's perceptions of the results to their life improvement after the invasion. Iraqi's government had a positive review on Bush's foreign approaches for their government was installed with US approval.
2. Population in Iran revealed mixed opinions on US Foreign Policy, with people higher educated demonstrating better remarks on Bush's Doctrine. Regarding Iran's

government the perception is not very good. It got worse when Iran's government transitioned for Khatami to Ahmadinejad. Iran's government perceived Bush's Foreign Policy towards all Islamic countries as prejudicial.

3. Turkey's opinion of US Foreign Policy decreased greatly under Bush's Administration. Bush' unilateral Foreign Policy resulted in poor levels of his actions' acceptance amongst the Turks as well as Turkey's public challenges of US measures.

The invasion of Iraq was essential to weaken US' diplomacy achievement on Islamic Countries. Under Bush's Administration US diplomatic pathway on Islamic Countries was more inefficient and ineffective than under Obama's Administration.

When in the 2008 American's Presidential elections was elected an African-American, Muslim descendent with a charismatic personality and the ability to speak to crowds, the planet rejoiced as the slogan "Yes, we can" travelled around the world.

Much was expected from him, especially in the Islamic Countries. It was perhaps the highest, or at least one of the highest, expectations ever to be held by the world towards an American President. Such high expectations were bound to be underachieved.

After Obama won the elections, he spoke in Cairo and presented a message of hope, peace and union. Obama promised several things such as US' withdrawal from Iraq and relentless search of a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In his pursuit of a more soft power related Foreign Policy, Obama refused to engage more actively in the Arab Spring. It is true that US, under NATO's direction, attacked Libya, but that was done with UN's consent revealing a US Foreign Policy much more committed to the requirements of the International Community.

Obama's Foreign Policy as a US President fully met, his ideals as US Governor. Obama did not support the US invasion on Iraq before and was actively engaged on US military forces withdrawal from Iraq. In what Iran is concerned, US under Obama still perceives this country as a menace on the West. Nevertheless, the lack of evidences regarding Iran's Nuclear Weaponry Program prevents US from taking any other measures into account. On US Foreign Policy towards Turkey the main purpose on Obama's Administration was to improve, as much as he could, US relationship with this long time allied.

This paper can only account for Islamic Countries' perceptions of the first four years of Obama's Presidency. For now, US Foreign Policy under Barack Obama has not been perfect but Obama continues to try to repair US image throughout the world.

Under Obama's Administration the main findings regarding the Islamic countries' perceptions towards US Foreign Policy and Obama's leadership style are:

1. There is insufficient information regarding Iraqis' people opinion of Obama leadership and Foreign Policy. The Iraqi government had some issues with Obama's policy while Iraq major concerns are related to the decrease of international intervention on the country and the regain of the country's sovereign.
2. Iran's people perception of Obama is better than the one they had on Bush. They feel that Iran should resume diplomatic discussions with US. The Supreme Leader seems inclined to submit Obama's pretences on Iran's dismissal of Nuclear Weaponry Program while Ahmadinejad has yet to make a favourable public statement regarding this issue.
3. Turkey has improved with US, being that President Obama has much to do with it for his first official visit as President was to Turkey. Both Turks and Turkish members of government improved their opinion of US policy but the Syria subject was negative to this newly founded relationship.

All in all, Obama's leadership style had some responsibility on a more effective and efficient diplomatic Foreign Policy in the Islamic world. Even though, the expectations were set too high and that Obama only served four years as US President (next four years may change Islamic Countries' perceptions of US for the better or for the worse) the results were positive as Obama is perceived in a better way by these Islamic Countries than his predecessor.

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
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Annex I

Graphic I




Source: Available at <http://www.ustudy.in/node/6032>

Subtitle: Three different approaches to the Leadership Style.

Annex II

Graphic II




Source: Available at <http://www.depts.ttu.edu/aged/leadership/leadstl.htm>

Subtitle: Different types of Leadership and Power in practice.

Annex III

Graphic III




Source: Available at http://www.css.ethz.ch/policy_consultancy/products_INT/graphics/defense_policy_EN

Subtitle: US Defence debt under Bush's Presidency.

Annex IV

Graphic IV




Source: Available at http://thewe.cc/contents/more/archive2004/march/survey_of_occupied_iraq.html

Subtitle: Iraqi's confidence in several matters.

Annex V

Graphic V

I would like you to express how you feel about George W. Bush. You can do this using a 10-point scale: the more you like a person the closer the rating is to 10; the lower the level of liking, the closer the rating is to 1.



May 2007


GALLUP POLL

Source: Available at <http://www.gallup.com/poll/108754/istanbul-attack-underscores-poor-us-image.aspx>

Subtitle: Turkey's feelings about George W. Bush.

Annex VI

Graphic VI




Source: Available at <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/639.php>

Subtitle: Iranians' opinion on Barack Obama.

Annex VII

Graphic VII




Source: Available at <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/bmiddleeastnafricara/639.php>

Subtitle: Iranian's opinion on restoring Iran-US relationship.

Annex IX

Map II




Political Party	Presidential Nom.	VP Nom.	Electoral		Popular	
			#	%	#	%
■ <i>Republican</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> George W. Bush	Richard Cheney	286	53.2	62,040,610	50.7%
■ <i>Democratic</i>	John F. Kerry	John Edwards	251	46.7	59,028,444	48.3%

Source: Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection.php?year=2000>

Subtitle: George W. Bush presidential winning percentage in 2004.

Annex X

Map III



Political Party	Presidential Nom.	VP Nom.	Electoral #	Electoral %	Popular #	Popular %
Democratic	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Barack Obama	Joseph Biden	365	67.8	69,456,897	52.9
Republican	John McCain	Sarah Palin	173	32.2	59,934,814	45.7

Source: Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection.php?year=2008>

Subtitle: Obama Presidential results in 2008.

Annex XI

Table I

Subtitle: Presidents' Initial Job Approval Ratings

Presidents' Initial Job Approval Ratings in Gallup Polls

President	Dates of first poll	% Approval	% Disapproval	% No opinion
Eisenhower	53 Feb 1-5	68	7	25
Kennedy	61 Feb 10-15	72	6	22
Nixon	69 Jan 23-28	59	5	36
Carter	77 Feb 4-7	66	8	26
Reagan	81 Jan 30-Feb 2	51	13	36
Bush	89 Jan 24-26	51	6	43
Clinton	93 Jan 24-26	58	20	22
Bush	01 Feb 1-4	57	25	18
Obama	09 Jan 21-23	68	12	21

Includes presidents elected to first term in office

GALLUP POLL

Source: Available at <http://www.gallup.com/poll/113968/obama-initial-approval-ratings-historical-context.aspx>

Annex XII

Table II

Subtitle: Initial Presidential Job Approval Ratings from Eisenhower to Obama

Initial Presidential Job Approval Ratings
Eisenhower - Obama

Year	Interview Dates	President	% Approval	% Disapproval	% No Opinion
1953	Feb. 1-5	Dwight D. Eisenhower	68	7	25
1961	Feb. 10-15	John Kennedy	72	6	22
1969	Jan. 23-28	Richard Nixon	59	5	36
1977	Feb. 4-7	Jimmy Carter	66	8	26
1981	Jan. 30-Feb. 2	Ronald Reagan	51	13	36
1989	Jan. 24-26	George Bush	51	6	43
1993	Jan. 24-26	William J. Clinton	58	20	22
2001	Feb. 1-4	George W. Bush	57	25	18
2009	Jan. 21-23	Barack Obama	68	12	21

*data includes only presidents inaugurated following election
data compiled from the Gallup Poll

Source: Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu>

Annex XIII

Table III

Subtitle: View of Europeans on Bush's Political Decisions.

The View From Europe: Rating Presidents...					
	<u>Fra</u>	<u>Ger</u>	<u>Ita</u>	<u>GB</u>	<u>US</u>
<i>G.W. Bush's</i>	%	%	%	%	%
<i>int'l policy</i>					
Approve	16	23	29	17	45
Disapprove	59	65	46	49	32
Don't know	<u>25</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>23</u>
	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Bill Clinton's</i>					
<i>int'l policy</i>					
Approve	68	86	71	66	n/a
Disapprove	15	9	16	15	n/a
Don't know	<u>17</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>19</u>	n/a
	100	100	100	100	
... And Assessing Bush's European Approach					
	<u>Fra</u>	<u>Ger</u>	<u>Ita</u>	<u>GB</u>	
<i>Bush makes</i>	%	%	%	%	
<i>decisions:</i>					
Based only on					
U.S. interests	85	73	74	79	
Takes Europe into					
account	8	18	15	14	
Don't know	<u>7</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>7</u>	
	100	100	100	100	
<i>Understands Europe:</i>					
Better than other					
presidents	12	13	18	13	
Less than other					
presidents	74	75	53	75	
Don't know	<u>14</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>12</u>	
	100	100	100	100	

Source: Available at: <http://www.pewglobal.org/2001/08/15/bush-unpopular-in-europe-seen-as-unilateralist/>

Annex XIV

Table IV

Subtitle: Opinions about Iraq after US invasion

	Iraq				United States		
	Total	Shia	Sunni	Kurd	Total	Democratic	Republican
Better Off	30	29	15	60	39	24	58
Worse Off	42	46	55	4	18	26	10
Same	23	24	24	14	30	36	23
Not sure	6	1	7	22	14	14	9

Source: Available at <http://thinkprogress.org/security/2011/12/20/393290/poll-iraq-war-iran/>

Annex XV

Table V

Subtitle: Turks opinions about Bush and Obama's Presidency.

Obama's Ratings Remain Better Than Bush's

% A lot/some confidence

	Bush: 2008	Obama: 2012	Difference
	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>	
U.S.	37	61	+24
Germany	14	87	+73
France	13	86	+73
Britain	16	80	+64
Spain	8	61	+53
Poland	41	50	+9
Russia	22	36	+14
Turkey	2	24	+22
Egypt	11	29	+18
Jordan	7	22	+15
Lebanon	33	39	+6
Pakistan	7	7	0
Japan	25	74	+49
China	30	38	+8
Mexico	16	42	+26

PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q40a.

Source: Available at <http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/13/global-opinion-of-obama-slips-international-policies-faulted/>

Annex XVI

Table VI

Subtitle: Turks views on US actions

Continued Positive Views of U.S. in Obama Era

	% Favorable toward U.S.			Pct point change	
	Bush era 2008	Obama era 2009 2012		08-12	09-12
	%	%	%		
Italy	53*	--	74	+21	--
France	42	75	69	+27	-6
Poland	68	67	69	+1	+2
Britain	53	69	60	+7	-9
Spain	33	58	58	+25	0
Czech Rep.	45*	--	54	+9	--
Germany	31	64	52	+21	-12
Greece	--	--	35	--	--
Russia	46	44	52	+6	+8
Lebanon	51	55	48	-3	-7
Tunisia	--	--	45	--	--
Egypt	22	27	19	-3	-8
Turkey	12	14	15	+3	+1
Jordan	19	25	12	-7	-13
Pakistan	19	16	12	-7	-4
Japan	50	59	72	+22	+13
China	41	47	43	+2	-4
India	--	--	41	--	--
Brazil	--	--	61	--	--
Mexico	47	69	56	+9	-13

* Figures from 2007.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q8a.

Source: Available at <http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/13/global-opinion-of-obama-slips-international-policies-faulted/>

Annex XVII

Table VII

Subtitle: Opinions on Obama's Political Policies

Opinion of Obama Declines, Especially on International Policies

	2009	2012	Change
	%	%	
<i>Confidence in Obama</i>			
Europe*	86	80	-6
Muslim countries*	33	24	-9
Russia	37	36	-1
China	62	38	-24
Japan	85	74	-11
Mexico	55	42	-13
<i>Favorable toward U.S.</i>			
Europe*	67	60	-7
Muslim countries*	25	15	-10
Russia	44	52	+8
China	47	43	-4
Japan	59	72	+13
Mexico	69	56	-13
<i>Approve of Obama's international policies</i>			
Europe*	78	63	-15
Muslim countries*	34	15	-19
Russia	40	22	-18
China	57	27	-30
Japan	77	58	-19
Mexico	56	39	-17

* Median percentages based only on those countries surveyed in 2009 and 2012. In Europe, this includes: Britain, France, Germany, Spain and Poland. Among the Muslim countries, this includes: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan and Turkey.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q8a, Q40a & Q92.

Source: Available at <http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/13/global-opinion-of-obama-slips-international-policies-faulted/>

Annex XVIII

Chart I

Expansionistic:	challenges constraints,	closed to information	Problem focus: focus is on expanding one's power and influence.
Evangelistic:	challenges constraints	closed to information	Relationship focus: focus is on persuading others to accept one's message and join one's cause.
Incremental:	challenges constraints	open to information	Problem focus: focus is on maintaining one's manoeuvrability and flexibility while avoid the obstacles and continually try to limit both.
Charismatic:	challenges constraints	open to information	Relationship focus: focus is on achieving one's agenda by engaging others in the process and persuading them to act.
Directive:	respects constraints	closed to information	Problem focus: focus is on personally guiding policy along paths consistent with one's own views while still working within the norms and rules of one current position.
Consultative:	respects constraints	closed to information	Relationship focus: focus is on monitoring the important others will support, or not actively oppose, what one wants to do in a problem situation.
Reactive:	respects constraints	open to information	Problem focus: focus is on assessing what is possible in the current situation given the nature of the problem and considering what important constituencies will allow.
Accommodative:	respects constraints	open to information	Relationship focus: focus is on reconciling differences and building consensus, empowering others, and sharing accountability in the process.

Source: Available at Hudson, Valerie (2007) *Foreign Policy analysis: classic and contemporary theory*. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. (Hudson, 2007: 60).

Subtitle: Leader's Personality Types according to Margaret Hermann.

Annex XIX

Chart II

Active - Positive	Franklin Roosevelt; Harry Truman; John Kennedy.
Active - Negative	Woodrow Wilson; Herbert Hoover; Richard Nixon.
Passive - Positive	William Taft; Warren Harding; Ronald Reagan.
Passive - Negative	Calvin Coolidge; Dwight Eisenhower.

Source: Available at Taken from Hudson, Valerie (2007) *Foreign Policy analysis: classic and contemporary theory*. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. (Hudson, 2007: 55).

Subtitle: James Baber division of the presidential personalities.

Annex XX

Photo I



Source: Available at <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/>

Subtitle: Donald Rumsfeld shaking hand with Saddam Hussein in 1983.