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Non-Causal Laws: An Alternative Hypothesis to Armstrong’s Hypothesis
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Resumo(s)
Non-causal laws have long been a thorn in David Armstrong’s side. This paper aims to provide a more accommodating framework for these laws within Armstrong’s metaphysics of laws of nature. Armstrong proposed the hypothesis that non-causal laws supervene upon causal laws. In this paper, I present arguments against Armstrong’s hypothesis and propose an alternative hypothesis: non-causal laws are fundamental laws, not supervenient upon causal laws. Additionally, as some non-causal laws are functional laws, this paper will also delve into characterising the nature of functional laws. Finally, I will demonstrate how my conception of non-causal laws solves the identification problem posed by Bas van Fraassen.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
David Armstrong Laws of Nature Metaphysics Functional Laws Supervenience