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Resumo(s)
This paper provides an analysis of the governance-performance relations in public listed and family-controlled firms. After controlling of potential endogeneity problems, by suing GMM estimators, the results show that family firms perform better compared to nonfamily firms. The active family involvement in management positions implies high firm performance. The results also indicate that beside the fact that family management increase efficiency such control does not imply an increase in valuation levels, and thus may not accrue to minority shareholders. Moreover, the results also sustain an incentive alignment effect between the coalition of large shareholders and firm value. Thus, the results confirm that the incentive to collude or monitoring controlling shareholders is affected by the type of blockholder. Additionally, the results support evidence that board dominance is another channel through which families can extract private benefits.
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Palavras-chave
Corporate governance - Performance Empresas familiares - Gestão