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Abstract(s)
This discussion paper is a reply to Stathis Psillos’ paper “Induction and
Natural Necessities” (2017), published in this journal. In that paper, he attempts to
refute David Armstrong’s solution to the problem of induction. To accomplish this
desideratum, he proposes that the best explanation for our observed regularities is a sort
of “best before date” necessity. That is, necessary connections may break down and are
not by default timeless. He develops arguments against my (author 1) defence of the
necessitarian solution regarding a previous paper by Helen Beebee (2011). He alleges
that a) best before date necessity is no worse than timeless necessity; b) his proposal
does not imply any further inductive generalisation to timeless necessity; and c)
inductive inferences are justified. In this discussion paper, I provide arguments against
these three claims.
Description
Keywords
Induction Laws of nature Timeless necessity Time-limited necessity Inference to the best Laws of nature Explanation