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A era digital instaurou um novo regime de presença e ação, no qual a liberdade humana se exerce sob mediações técnicas e algorítmicas que antecipam, modulam e quantificam cada ato. Nesse contexto, o problema filosófico que orienta esta investigação consiste em compreender como a experiência originária da angústia – pela qual o ser humano se descobre condenado à liberdade – foi historicamente transfigurada em ansiedade digital, uma forma difusa de alienação e sofrimento que caracteriza a subjetividade contemporânea. Trata-se de interrogar o modo de ser do para-si em um mundo em que as mediações técnicas precedem e orientam a transcendência, convertendo a liberdade em cálculo e a escolha em probabilidade. O objeto da tese é examinar a relação entre liberdade, angústia e ansiedade no pensamento de Jean-Paul Sartre, em diálogo com o contexto técnico e cultural da era digital. A análise concentra-se nas obras de Sartre produzidas entre 1936 e 1960 – da psicologia fenomenológica à Crítica da Razão Dialética – período em que se estruturam as categorias centrais de sua fenomenologia existencial: intencionalidade, emoção, imaginação, liberdade, má-fé, temporalidade e o prático-inerte. Essas categorias são reinterpretadas à luz das mediações digitais contemporâneas, trazendo a filosofia de Sartre ao diálogo com teóricos da cibercultura e da sociologia do tempo, como Pierre Lévy, Manuel Castells, Jean Baudrillard, Sherry Turkle, Marc Augé, Hartmut Rosa, Byung-Chul Han, e André Barata. A hipótese central sustenta que a ansiedade digital constitui um desdobramento histórico e ontológico da má-fé – entendida como a tentativa da consciência de escapar à angústia inerente à liberdade. Argumenta-se que a ansiedade emerge como conduta psicofísica pela qual o ser humano busca atenuar o confronto com o nada que o fundamenta, ao mesmo tempo em que interioriza as coerções de um mundo tecnicamente mediado. Assim, a liberdade acaba por se traduzir em heteronomia técnica, reproduzida pelas estruturas do prático-inerte algorítmico. A pesquisa adota uma abordagem tripla: fenomenológica, para descrever a ansiedade digital como experiência intencional da consciência, evitando reduzi-la à patologia; hermenêutica, para reinterpretar as categorias centrais de Sartre no contexto contemporâneo da tecnologia e das redes digitais; e crítico-interdisciplinar, para dialogar com as teorias da aceleração, da atomização e da precariedade temporal, integrando-as à ontologia fenomenológica da liberdade. A trajetória argumentativa se desenvolve ao longo de seis capítulos interligados. O primeiro reconstrói a psicologia fenomenológica do jovem Sartre, examinando a intencionalidade, a emoção, a imaginação e a categoria do mágico como fundamentos ontológicos da liberdade. O segundo analisa a ontologia fenomenológica de O Ser e o Nada: Ensaio de Ontologia Fenomenológica, abordando liberdade, angústia, má-fé e intersubjetividade. O terceiro desenvolve a dialética entre liberdade e alienação por meio do método progressivo-regressivo e das mediações do prático-inerte. O quarto transpõe essa dialética para o contexto digital, interpretando o ciberespaço como manifestação contemporânea do prático-inerte e analisando seu papel na estruturação da experiência. O quinto investiga a crise da temporalidade na modernidade tardia, articulando a noção sartriana de ek-stasis com as teorias da aceleração, da atomização e da precariedade. Por fim, o sexto propõe uma interpretação fenomenológica da ansiedade digital como experiência psicofísica diante da angústia existencial, examinando manifestações paradigmáticas – como avatares, ghosting, doomscrolling e FOMO – e suas implicações ético-políticas. A tese demonstra que a ansiedade digital não é um sintoma clínico, mas um desdobramento histórico da má-fé, na qual a liberdade se oculta sob as mediações técnicas do algoritmo. Ao integrar a ontologia fenomenológica de Sartre às estruturas da cibercultura, o trabalho oferece uma interpretação original da subjetividade contemporânea como experiência de liberdade alienada – em que o sujeito busca escapar da indeterminação refugiando-se nas garantias do código. Sua principal contribuição consiste em oferecer a primeira sistematização filosófica da ansiedade digital como atualização histórica da fuga da angústia existencial pela má-fé, reposicionando a ontologia sartriana no centro dos debates contemporâneos sobre tecnologia, temporalidade e sofrimento na era digital.
The digital age has established a new regime of presence and action, in which human freedom unfolds under technical and algorithmic mediations that anticipate, modulate, and quantify every act. In this context, the philosophical problem guiding this investigation is to understand how the original experience of anguish – through which the human being discovers themself condemned to freedom – has been historically transfigured into digital anxiety, a diffuse form of alienation and suffering that characterizes contemporary subjectivity. It is a matter of interrogating the mode of being of the for-itself in a world where technical mediations precede and orient transcendence, converting freedom into calculation and choice into probability. The object of this thesis is to examine the relationship between freedom, anguish, and anxiety in the thought of Jean-Paul Sartre, in dialogue with the technical and cultural context of the digital age. The analysis focuses on Sartre’s works produced between 1936 and 1960 – from phenomenological psychology to the Critique of Dialectical Reason – a period in which the central categories of his existential phenomenology were developed: intentionality, emotion, imagination, freedom, bad faith, temporality, and the practico-inert. These categories are reinterpreted in light of contemporary digital mediations, bringing Sartre’s philosophy into dialogue with theorists of cyberculture and the sociology of time, such as Pierre Lévy, Manuel Castells, Jean Baudrillard, Sherry Turkle, Marc Augé, Hartmut Rosa, Byung-Chul Han, and André Barata. The central hypothesis holds that digital anxiety constitutes a historical and ontological unfolding of bad faith – understood as the consciousness’s attempt to flee from the anguish inherent to freedom. It is argued that anxiety emerges as a psychophysical conduct through which the human being seeks to mitigate the confrontation with the nothingness that grounds existence, while simultaneously internalizing the coercions of a technically mediated world. In this way, freedom is ultimately translated into technical heteronomy, reproduced through the structures of the algorithmic practico-inert. The research adopts a threefold approach: phenomenological, to describe digital anxiety as an intentional experience of consciousness, avoiding its reduction to pathology; hermeneutic, to reinterpret Sartre’s central categories within the contemporary context of technology and digital networks; and critical-interdisciplinary, to engage with theories of acceleration, atomization, and temporal precarity, integrating them into the phenomenological ontology of freedom. The argumentative trajectory unfolds across six interrelated chapters. The first reconstructs the phenomenological psychology of the young Sartre, examining intentionality, emotion, imagination, and the category of the magical as ontological foundations of freedom. The second analyzes the phenomenological ontology of Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, addressing freedom, anguish, bad faith, and intersubjectivity. The third develops the dialectic between freedom and alienation through the progressive-regressive method and the mediations of the practico-inert. The fourth transposes this dialectic to the digital context, interpreting cyberspace as a contemporary manifestation of the practico-inert and analyzing its role in structuring experience. The fifth investigates the crisis of temporality in late modernity, articulating the Sartrean notion of ek-stasis with the theories of acceleration, atomization, and precarity. Finally, the sixth offers a phenomenological interpretation of digital anxiety as a psychophysical experience in the face of existential anguish, examining paradigmatic manifestations – such as avatars, ghosting, doomscrolling, and FOMO – and their ethical-political implications. The thesis demonstrates that digital anxiety is not a clinical symptom but a historical unfolding of bad faith, in which freedom conceals itself beneath the technical mediations of the algorithm. By integrating Sartre’s phenomenological ontology with the structures of cyberculture, the work offers an original interpretation of contemporary subjectivity as an experience of alienated freedom – in which the subject seeks to escape indeterminacy by taking refuge in the guarantees of code. Its main contribution lies in offering the first philosophical systematization of digital anxiety as a historical actualization of the flight from existential anguish through bad faith, repositioning Sartrean ontology at the center of contemporary debates on technology, temporality, and suffering in the digital age.
The digital age has established a new regime of presence and action, in which human freedom unfolds under technical and algorithmic mediations that anticipate, modulate, and quantify every act. In this context, the philosophical problem guiding this investigation is to understand how the original experience of anguish – through which the human being discovers themself condemned to freedom – has been historically transfigured into digital anxiety, a diffuse form of alienation and suffering that characterizes contemporary subjectivity. It is a matter of interrogating the mode of being of the for-itself in a world where technical mediations precede and orient transcendence, converting freedom into calculation and choice into probability. The object of this thesis is to examine the relationship between freedom, anguish, and anxiety in the thought of Jean-Paul Sartre, in dialogue with the technical and cultural context of the digital age. The analysis focuses on Sartre’s works produced between 1936 and 1960 – from phenomenological psychology to the Critique of Dialectical Reason – a period in which the central categories of his existential phenomenology were developed: intentionality, emotion, imagination, freedom, bad faith, temporality, and the practico-inert. These categories are reinterpreted in light of contemporary digital mediations, bringing Sartre’s philosophy into dialogue with theorists of cyberculture and the sociology of time, such as Pierre Lévy, Manuel Castells, Jean Baudrillard, Sherry Turkle, Marc Augé, Hartmut Rosa, Byung-Chul Han, and André Barata. The central hypothesis holds that digital anxiety constitutes a historical and ontological unfolding of bad faith – understood as the consciousness’s attempt to flee from the anguish inherent to freedom. It is argued that anxiety emerges as a psychophysical conduct through which the human being seeks to mitigate the confrontation with the nothingness that grounds existence, while simultaneously internalizing the coercions of a technically mediated world. In this way, freedom is ultimately translated into technical heteronomy, reproduced through the structures of the algorithmic practico-inert. The research adopts a threefold approach: phenomenological, to describe digital anxiety as an intentional experience of consciousness, avoiding its reduction to pathology; hermeneutic, to reinterpret Sartre’s central categories within the contemporary context of technology and digital networks; and critical-interdisciplinary, to engage with theories of acceleration, atomization, and temporal precarity, integrating them into the phenomenological ontology of freedom. The argumentative trajectory unfolds across six interrelated chapters. The first reconstructs the phenomenological psychology of the young Sartre, examining intentionality, emotion, imagination, and the category of the magical as ontological foundations of freedom. The second analyzes the phenomenological ontology of Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, addressing freedom, anguish, bad faith, and intersubjectivity. The third develops the dialectic between freedom and alienation through the progressive-regressive method and the mediations of the practico-inert. The fourth transposes this dialectic to the digital context, interpreting cyberspace as a contemporary manifestation of the practico-inert and analyzing its role in structuring experience. The fifth investigates the crisis of temporality in late modernity, articulating the Sartrean notion of ek-stasis with the theories of acceleration, atomization, and precarity. Finally, the sixth offers a phenomenological interpretation of digital anxiety as a psychophysical experience in the face of existential anguish, examining paradigmatic manifestations – such as avatars, ghosting, doomscrolling, and FOMO – and their ethical-political implications. The thesis demonstrates that digital anxiety is not a clinical symptom but a historical unfolding of bad faith, in which freedom conceals itself beneath the technical mediations of the algorithm. By integrating Sartre’s phenomenological ontology with the structures of cyberculture, the work offers an original interpretation of contemporary subjectivity as an experience of alienated freedom – in which the subject seeks to escape indeterminacy by taking refuge in the guarantees of code. Its main contribution lies in offering the first philosophical systematization of digital anxiety as a historical actualization of the flight from existential anguish through bad faith, repositioning Sartrean ontology at the center of contemporary debates on technology, temporality, and suffering in the digital age.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Jean-Paul Sartre Angústia Ansiedade Digital Liberdade Má-Fé Prático-Inerte Fenomenologia Cibercultura Temporalidade Anguish Digital Anxiety Freedom Bad Faith Practico-Inert Phenomenology Cyberculture Temporality