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Publication
Sobre a Possibilidade da Resistência à Banalização do Mal
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Advisor(s)
Abstract(s)
Depois de, no julgamento de Eichmann, em 1961, serem relatadas as histórias de algumas pessoas que resistiram ao Mal no III Reich, Arendt procurou explicar como foi possível que esses indivíduos preservassem a capacidade de distinguir o Bem do Mal sem o apoio da normatividade externa e, apesar das enormes pressões, tenham resistido ao Mal. O nosso propósito é, justamente, investigar a possibilidade da resistência à banalização do Mal, para a qual se requer a capacidade de julgar e uma fonte de motivação independentes da normatividade externa, a partir das propostas de Kant, Arendt e Kierkegaard. Neste trabalho, não seguimos a ordem cronológica. Na primeira parte, abordamos as propostas de Kant e de Arendt. Na segunda parte, abordamos a de Kierkegaard. Procuramos mostrar que as propostas de Kant e Arendt são antagónicas, visto que Kant confia especialmente na capacidade legisladora da razão, enquanto Arendt defende que não precisamos de princípios ou regras para distinguir o Bem do Mal. Por sua vez, Kierkegaard foca-se no problema da motivação, sublinhando que nem todos os indivíduos consideram que a diferença entre Bem e Mal é o mais importante. A proposta de Kierkegaard tem elementos que também encontramos nas de Arendt e de Kant, mas fornece-nos uma alternativa a ambas. A visão-de-vida ética, centrada na ideia de Bem, que se concretiza numa forma de amor (compaixão), assegura a motivação para resistir à banalização do Mal, mas aqueles que vivem segundo visões-de-vida estéticas dão mais importância a outras preocupações. O desespero pode motivar o sujeito a transitar de uma visão-de-vida para outra, mas a transição para a visão-de-vida ética depende sempre de uma decisão, e esta não é um mero resultado de razões ou motivações anteriores, pois só se concretiza no esforço contínuo para conferir à interioridade a forma de compaixão.
After the trial of Eichmann in 1961, where the stories of some individuals who resisted Evil in the III Reich were recounted, Arendt sought to explain how those individuals managed to preserve the ability to distinguish Good from Evil without the support of external normativity, and how they resisted Evil despite the immense pressures. Our purpose in this work is to study the possibility of resisting the banalization of Evil, which requires both a capacity to judge and a source of motivation independent of external normativity, basing our study on the proposals of Kant, Arendt and Kierkegaard. We do not follow the chronological order. In the first part of our study, we address the proposals from Kant and Arendt. In the second part, we address Kierkegaard’s. We show that the proposals of Kant and Arendt are antagonistic, since Kant trusts in the legislative capacity of reason, while Arendt argues that we do not need principles or rules to distinguish Good from Evil. As for Kierkegaard, he focuses on the problem of motivation, highlighting that not all individuals take the distinction between Good and Evil as the most important distinction. Kierkegaard’s view has elements that we also find in Arendt and Kant, but it provides an alternative to both. The ethical lifeview, centered in the idea of Good, which is concretized in a form of love (compassion), ensures the motivation to resist the banalization of Evil, but those who live according to aesthetic life-views give more importance to other concerns. Despair can motivate the individual to move from one life-view to another, but the transition to the ethical life-view always depends on a decision. This decision is not merely the result of prior reasons or motivations and only becomes real in the continued striving to give interiority the form of compassion.
After the trial of Eichmann in 1961, where the stories of some individuals who resisted Evil in the III Reich were recounted, Arendt sought to explain how those individuals managed to preserve the ability to distinguish Good from Evil without the support of external normativity, and how they resisted Evil despite the immense pressures. Our purpose in this work is to study the possibility of resisting the banalization of Evil, which requires both a capacity to judge and a source of motivation independent of external normativity, basing our study on the proposals of Kant, Arendt and Kierkegaard. We do not follow the chronological order. In the first part of our study, we address the proposals from Kant and Arendt. In the second part, we address Kierkegaard’s. We show that the proposals of Kant and Arendt are antagonistic, since Kant trusts in the legislative capacity of reason, while Arendt argues that we do not need principles or rules to distinguish Good from Evil. As for Kierkegaard, he focuses on the problem of motivation, highlighting that not all individuals take the distinction between Good and Evil as the most important distinction. Kierkegaard’s view has elements that we also find in Arendt and Kant, but it provides an alternative to both. The ethical lifeview, centered in the idea of Good, which is concretized in a form of love (compassion), ensures the motivation to resist the banalization of Evil, but those who live according to aesthetic life-views give more importance to other concerns. Despair can motivate the individual to move from one life-view to another, but the transition to the ethical life-view always depends on a decision. This decision is not merely the result of prior reasons or motivations and only becomes real in the continued striving to give interiority the form of compassion.
Description
Keywords
Arendt Banalização do Mal Compaixão Decisão Desespero Faculdade De Julgar Kant Kierkegaard Motivação Seriedade Banalization of Evil Compassion Decision