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This study investigates how the use of collateral affects the incentives of borrowers, lenders and the relationship between them in loan pricing. Using the UK Survey of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 2008, the results from a simultaneous equation approach show that high quality borrowers choose a contract with more collateral and lower interest rate, suggesting that collateral acts as an incentive device to adverse selection problem in credit markets. By distinguish business and personal collateral the findings suggest that personal collateral seems to be more effective in acting as a sorting device in line with screening models. Regarding the nature borrower-lender relationship the results also show a substitution effect between relationship length and collateral requirements from the main bank. But the main bank uses explicit loan interest rate as a loss leader to secure long-term rents on relationship business, suggesting that inter-temporal shifting rents is possible.
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Racionamento de crédito PME -- Relacionamento bancário